

Page 1 EXHIBIT 88 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District

# **BIG-TECH BRIBES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS VIA SEX-TRAFFICKING**

WE HAVE MILLIONS OF PAGES OF EVIDENCE

Revision 1.10



Protected by crooked politicians, the “Silicon Valley Boys Club”, dirty judges and culpable law enforcement that caters to the elites

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# The Typical Oligarch's Sick Sex Scheme

- George Soros Had Top Tech Investors Who Raped and Beat Women in Typical Weinsteinian Hell
- Models Lured Women to Wall Street Sex Dungeon: Lawsuit
- Three women have accused Wall Street bigwig Howard Rubin of raping and beating them in his private dungeon—after luring them via models who vouched for him as a ‘good guy.’

By Brandy Zadrozny

The man best known for losing more money on Wall Street than anyone else before the 1987 stock market crash stands to lose \$27 million more and what's left of his reputation, if a federal court believes the allegations in an explosive new lawsuit filed against him and a gaggle of so-called conspirators in Brooklyn federal court.

In the complaint, three Florida women, filing under pseudonyms, have accused 62-year-old Howard Rubin of leading an organized human-trafficking ring in which he allegedly employed women to lure models to his \$8 million Manhattan Penthouse under the guise of a photoshoot or companionship. Once there, the women claim, he led them into a sex-dungeon where he subjected them to sexual assault, rape, false imprisonment, and beatings so severe they would lose consciousness and one had to undergo reconstructive surgery to repair her breasts.

The women—who also say Rubin and his co-conspirators threatened them to keep quiet following the alleged assaults—filed their suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, a law originally created for prosecution of members of the mob.

According to the lawsuit, Rubin's scheme went like this: Stephanie Shon, a 29-year-old former model and current account manager for a legal support services company, would reach out to bikini models and exotic dancers on Instagram and say something to the effect of, “My boss wants to meet you.” Shon then allegedly offered the the women \$2,000—no strings attached—to fly to New York and meet with Rubin in his Manhattan apartment. If Rubin “liked her,” they might take some naughty photos, but nothing too extreme, and he would pay her an additional \$3,000. Rubin just liked hanging out with Playboy models, Shon said.

If Shon, a leggy, honey blonde in her photos on social media (she deleted her accounts this morning) couldn't seal the deal, then Jennifer Powers, a former Hawaiian Tropic model who had once dated Rubin and was now in his employ, would follow up with messages assuring them that he was “a great guy,” and that the trip “would not be about sex,” according to the complaint.

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The plaintiffs in this case say that they agreed to meet Rubin at his 57th Street high-rise, in an apartment decorated with photos of Rubin and Playboy Playmates. Before they could meet the retired fund manager, they were told they'd have to sign non-disclosure agreements. And so they did.

When they returned to the apartment after a pleasant if uneventful dinner, a door that had been locked previously was now ajar. The room, later referred to in the complaint as “the dungeon,” had white carpet and red walls. The room was filled with ropes and chains, face masks with zippers, metal hooks and various sex toys, and a large x-shaped machine.

According to the women's complaint, what happened in that room over the next hour was non-consensual. They say they were restrained against their will, beaten—with Rubin's fist and various objects—and raped. Rubin then allegedly left, walking to the apartment he shares with his wife, with whom he has three children.

The complaint goes on to tell the story of several more terrifying encounters in Rubin's apartment—some involving the same women from the first incident (it is unclear why they continued to visit Rubin). Allegations against Rubin include that he gagged, punched, and in one instance used a cattle prod to rape the women he hired. During another session, he is accused of beating a woman's breast so badly that her implant “flipped,” exposing the closure and requiring reconstructive surgery—which Rubin later allegedly paid, through Powers.

Rubin, Powers, and Shon did not return requests for comment. Reached by email, Rubin's lawyer Yifat Schnur (who is also named as a defendant for allegedly crafting the NDAs and trying to silence the women after the fact) replied with a statement that read in part, “Mr. Rubin denies all of the fabricated allegations made by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' complaint is part of an elaborate attempt to extort my client. We have contacted all appropriate law enforcement agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.” Schnur further alleged that another individual had been “arrested and charged” in the so-called extortion scheme, but would not elaborate.

The women's lawyer John G. Balestriere, also responded in an email saying his team welcomed the involvement of law enforcement, as his clients “not only have significant civil claims but are victims of crimes.”

Further, he wrote, “Schnur's statement that this is extortionist is nonsensical: all defendants' names are now public since we have filed. How can we possibly extort anyone?”

Rubin, a Las Vegas card-counter and Harvard graduate who was featured in Michael Lewis' bestsellers *Liar's Poker* and *The Big Short*, was fired as the head mortgage trader at Merrill Lynch in 1987 after his unauthorized trades were blamed at least in part, for the loss of \$377 million of the firm's money.

According to the lawsuit, this most recent scheme has “caused many millions of dollars in damages to dozens of women over the years.”

This is typical of the tech oligarchs.

# NETFLIX Is A Haven For Rapists And Financial Criminals

By Sara Nathan

A Netflix bigwig has a warrant out for his arrest in the US after being accused of raping his wife multiple times, The Post has learned.

Diego Bunuel, 46, who was head of documentaries for the global streamer and now helms programming at French state broadcaster France Télévisions, allegedly assaulted his wife, writer and socialite Maggie Kim, in the US in 2017, according to court documents.

Bunuel, the French-born grandson of famed filmmaker Luis Bunuel, has been charged with felony rape of Kim, 48, in Massachusetts. The Post has confirmed the warrant for his arrest is still active.

Bunuel's attorneys did not respond to numerous requests for comment on Monday.

Kim, who lives between Los Angeles and France, claims she was left "in actual fear of her life" and struggling to escape as Bunuel allegedly told her he wanted to hurt her, according to court documents.

While Bunuel, who has both US and French citizenship, can now not come back into the US without being arrested, he currently has custody of the couple's two children and is living in France.

Kim claims he will not let her bring the children — who also have dual US and French citizenship — back to the US, according to court papers.

He has yet to return to the United States to face the criminal charges. He has, through his counsel, filed a successful motion to dismiss a pending civil case based on the same alleged conduct. His motion to dismiss states: "Nothing contained in this motion constitutes ... an admission of any liability or wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Bunuel."

There were three alleged rapes by Bunuel, including one on Martha's Vineyard in Massachusetts, according to court documents that are publicly available.

Court papers seen by The Post were filed at Dukes County Superior Court in Massachusetts in the related civil lawsuit last year. They allege: "As a result of the willful and/or malicious conduct of the Defendant, the plaintiff sustained abrasions and contusions to her neck and body.

Diego Bunuel and Maggie Kim were married from 2007 to 2017. Diego Bunuel and Maggie Kim were married from 2007 to 2017. FilmMagic

“In addition, the plaintiff suffered mental and emotional anguish, nervousness, increased heart rhythm, shortness of breath and increased blood pressure, some or all of which are likely to be permanent in nature.”

“As a further result of the willful and/or malicious conduct of the Defendant, the Plaintiff has been and will be unable to engage in personal and family, leisure and social activities as she did prior to the incidents, all of which has and will cause her loss,” Kim claimed in her complaint.

Bunuel and Kim were married from 2007 until 2017, tying the knot in Costa Rica. They are still not legally divorced.

Bunuel was given custody of the children through the French family court.

In April, a Massachusetts judge dismissed Kim’s civil suit and ruled that a French court could oversee the rape case that allegedly happened in Martha’s Vineyard.

Kim’s attorney, Ryan McGuigan, this week is attempting to overturn this decision in court and told The Post how Kim has given a sworn affidavit to police on Martha’s Vineyard, alleging sexual assault by her estranged husband. The Post has not seen her affidavit.

McGuigan told The Post Monday: “It seems that Bunuel is using his arrest warrant as an excuse to prevent Miss Kim from taking her children back to the US, when they are US citizens.

“Even more shocking is that a judge in Massachusetts has dismissed Miss Kim’s civil claims of sexual battery that occurred on Martha’s Vineyard as the judge ruled he thought that she could bring this claim in France. The court decided that it was more convenient for the case to be brought in a foreign country, where the rape did not actually occur. We disagree.”

In July 2017, the court papers filed by Kim allege that Bunuel raped her in the US 10 days after filing for divorce.

McGuigan claimed: “It appears Bunuel committed the sexual assault on Martha’s Vineyard after he had surreptitiously filed divorce papers in France.”

Kim, who previously shared homes with Bunuel in the French countryside, Paris and also the US, has been splitting her time between LA and France, where she mostly stays so she can see her children.

***“Martha’s Vineyard has long been a vacation destination of billionaire playboys, impaired senators and ex-presidents,” McGuigan said. “The Public could interpret it to mean that the powerful and the privileged on Martha’s Vineyard continue to receive preferential treatment when they abuse the under-privileged. What the Public could interpret from this case is that it is acceptable for someone to come to Martha’s Vineyard [to] commit a crime and get away with it.”***

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Additionally, Three former Netflix software engineers and two associates were charged with insider trading in a multi-million-dollar scheme that used inside information on the streaming giant's subscriber growth, the SEC announced.

According to the complaint, which named Sung Mo "Jay" Jun at the center of the scheme, the alleged perpetrators made over \$3 million in profits by sharing confidential information through encrypted messaging applications between 2016 and 2019. The group allegedly traded ahead of 13 earnings announcements.

Between July 2016 and April 2017, Sung Mo Jun allegedly tipped the information to his brother, Joon Mo Jun, and his close friend, Junwoo Chon. They made trades prior to Netflix earnings announcements and Chon allegedly paid Sung Mo Jun \$60,000 from the profits.

After leaving the company in 2017, Song Mo Jun continued to obtain information from insider Ayden Lee. Another Netflix engineer, Jae Hyeon Bae, allegedly tipped Joon Jun off ahead of Netflix's July 2019 earnings announcement.

A lawyer for a former Netflix executive indicted in federal court in San Jose on charges of taking an alleged \$690,000 in kickbacks said today his client "vigorously disputes the allegations of the indictment."

Michael Kail "looks forward to vindication at trial where these allegations will be proven untrue," said defense attorney Joseph Ainley.

Kail, 49, of Los Gatos, was vice president in charge of internet technology at the Los Gatos-based video streaming company from 2011 to 2014. His position gave him the authority to enter into contracts with outside technology companies providing services to Netflix.

He was indicted by a federal grand jury in San Jose on April 26 on 29 counts of fraud and money laundering in connection with his alleged receipt of kickbacks in cash and stock options from nine technology companies that had contracts with Netflix.

The indictment was issued under seal and was unsealed after Kail was arraigned before a federal magistrate in San Jose Tuesday and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

U.S. Magistrate Nathanael Cousins allowed Kail to remain free on a \$200,000 property bond while awaiting trial.

Kail's next court appearance is a status conference on July 10 before U.S. District Judge Beth Labson Freeman, the trial judge assigned to the case.

The indictment alleges Kail's total gain from the kickbacks was \$690,000.

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The charges include 19 counts of wire fraud for documents sent electronically to and from the outside companies in 2013 and 2014, three counts of mail fraud for documents sent by postal mail and Federal Express, and seven counts of money laundering of alleged profits.

The fraud counts each carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and the money laundering counts 10 years, if Kail is convicted.

He could also be fined twice the amount of his gross gain from fraud.

The indictment additionally seeks forfeiture of any property Kail bought with the alleged proceeds, including his Los Gatos house.

The Los Gatos house served as the address of a one-person consulting company Kail set up called Unix Mercenary LLC. The indictment alleges Kail created the company for the purpose of having the kickbacks sent to its bank account. He allegedly then transferred the payments to his personal accounts.

Ainley said in his statement, "As a known technology leader in Silicon Valley, Mr. Kail frequently advises cutting edge startups on next generation technology.

"This indictment is unfounded and takes direct aim at the spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship that makes the valley such a vital part of the economy," Ainley said.

After leaving Netflix in August 2014, Kail went to work for Sunnyvale-based Yahoo as chief information officer. He left that job the following May in the wake of a civil lawsuit filed against him by Netflix in Santa Clara County Superior Court in November 2014.

Netflix's lawsuit included claims of fraud, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment and breach of fiduciary duty. It alleged that Kail fraudulently took so-called "commissions" of 12 to 15 percent on the contracts he approved. The lawsuit was settled on a confidential basis in 2015.

Netflix supports sex perverts and screwed up Frat Boy debauchery in a huge way.



## Hundreds Of Disney Staff Arrested For Underage Sex Schemes

- Disney And Silicon Valley Big Tech media companies work hand-in-hand
- Disney employees charged with trying to lure children for sex

[Courtesy: Seminole County Sheriff's Office](#)

According to the [U.S. Attorney's Office](#), 40-year-old Frederick M. Pohl, Jr. was charged with transferring obscene materials to a minor and attempting to entice a minor.

Investigators say Pohl engaged in a series of online chat communications to arrange a sexual encounter with an 8-year-old girl.

Officials said Pohl believed he was chatting with a child and her father, but he was actually speaking to an undercover federal agent.

Detectives said Pohl sent explicit photos of himself and arranged to meet with the “child” at an Orlando hotel.

When Pohl arrived at the hotel, he was arrested.

Investigators said Pohl was in possession of condoms and a child-sized pink dress at the time of his arrest.

According to [WESH](#), a public information officer for the Middle District of Florida confirmed that Pohl was employed at Disney’s Magic Kingdom.

Pohl faces life in prison if convicted.

[Disney World Employee Arrested Sexual Abuse 8-Year-Old](#)

<https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2019/05/233696/disney-world-employee-arrested-8-year-old-girl-sexual-abuse>

A Walt **Disney** World employee named Frederick Pohl, Jr. was arrested for attempting to sexually abuse an 8-year-old girl in Orlando, FL.

**Disney Channel Actor Arrested for Allegedly Having Sex With ...**

☐ <https://thehollywoodunlocked.com/disney-channel-actor-arrested-for-allegedly-having-sex-with-13-year-old/>

**Disney** Channel Actor Arrested for Allegedly Having **Sex** With 13-Year-Old RELATED: **Disney** Releases The First Trailer For Their Live Action Kim Possible Film An actor who plays the part of a grandfather on a **Disney** Channel show has been arrested for trying to allegedly have **sex** with a young girl.

**Disney World worker, 40, 'tried to lure girl, 8, to hotel for ...**

☐ <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9143166/disney-world-worker-arrest-orlando-sex-girl/>

A **DISNEY** World worker has been arrested after trying to lure an eight-year-old girl to a hotel for **sex**, prosecutors say. Frederick M. Pohl Jr., 40, was caught by cops after turning up to the hotel ...

**35 Disney Employees Arrested On Child Sex Charges In Less ...**

☐ [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/disney-employees-child-sex-charges\\_n\\_5587395](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/disney-employees-child-sex-charges_n_5587395)

At least 35 **Disney** employees in and around Florida have been arrested and accused of **sex** crimes involving children since 2006, CNN reports as part of a six-month investigation. So far, 32 of those cases have resulted in convictions. "Wherever you find children, you'll find sexual predators that want ...

**Disney employee arrested after allegedly trying to lure 8 ...**

☐ <https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ny-disney-employee-arrested-allegedly-lured-girl-for-sex-20190523-xsgzg2hajbhh5lgs7j37lcvmy-m-story.html>

A Walt **Disney** World employee was arrested after he tried to lure an 8-year-old girl to a hotel in Orlando for **sex**, officials said Thursday. Frederick M. Pohl Jr., 40, was charged with transferring ...

**Disney Resort Staff Among Florida Alleged Child Sex Predators ...**

☐ <https://www.newsweek.com/disney-workers-child-sex-police-florida-1161533>

A cook at a hotel on the Walt **Disney** World Resort and a food runner at one of the restaurants on site are among 13 people arrested by undercover police in Florida in a child **sex** predator sting.

**Disney employee accused of trying to arrange sex with 8-year ...**

☐ <https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/crime/florida-theme-park-employee-accused-of-trying-to-arrange-sex-with-8-year-old/67-9184c2ad-dc94-418d-8034-7a5159299ed9>

**Disney** World employee accused of trying to arrange **sex** with 8-year-old ... — The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida announced the **arrest** of a 40-year-old Clermont man ...

**Disney Sex Arrests: 35 Florida Employees Snared in ... - Newsmax**

☐ <https://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/disney-sex-arrests-employees/2014/07/16/id/582961/>

**Disney** issued a statement on the **sex** sting **arrests** to CNN this week. "Providing a safe environment for children and families is a responsibility we take very seriously. We have extensive measures in place, including pre-employment and ongoing criminal background checks and computer monitoring and firewalls," a spokeswoman said.

**Theme park workers arrested in Florida sex sting - CNN**

☐ <https://www.cnn.com/2016/04/05/us/florida-sex-sting/index.html>

Apr 05, 2016 · Two theme park employees were among 18 men charged in a **sex** sting dubbed "Operation April's Fools," Polk County, Florida, Sheriff Grady Judd said Tuesday.

**Another Veteran Disney Executive Arrested On Child Sex Abuse Charges**

In the latest case of Hollywood's spiralling sexual abuse scandal, Variety reports that a veteran 58-year-old Disney executive has been charged with three felony counts of child sexual abuse. Jon Heely, the longtime director of music publishing at Disney, was arrested nearly a month ago and charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child. One of the reported victims was 15. The other was abused for four years starting at the age of 11, according to the charges.

His attorney Robert Helfend said Heely "vehemently denies these allegations."

Heely, who oversees the licensing of music from Disney films, pleaded not guilty on Thursday. If convicted, he faces up to nine years and three months in prison according to The Daily News.

Oddly, the House of Mouse waited until yesterday to suspend the alleged pedophile. A spokesperson claimed the company had only just learned of Heely's arrest:

"Immediately upon learning of this situation tonight, he has been suspended without pay until the matter is resolved by the courts."

Heely's attorney, Robert Helfend, denied the charges: "He vehemently denies these allegations and we will be fighting until the end to clear his name," Helfend said. "It's a shame, that's all I've got to say."

Heely has been with Disney since 1981. He oversees licensing of the company's massive catalogue of film music. He also produced a series of Disney concerts around the world, including "Fantasia Live in Concert," that feature orchestral performances and film clips.

The punchline: Heely's Twitter bio reads, "Disney Concerts and living to glorify God in all things."

## Elon Musk Gives Sex A Bad Name

Elon Musk is a Silicon Valley icon and his most famous girlfriend actively promotes free anal sex. Musk is notoriously involved in sex parties, endless marital issues and other perversions. Musk's father got his sister pregnant and seems to revel in sex misadventures. Many have seen this article:

<http://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-claflin-goddard-singer-20180511-story.html>

That is only the tip of the iceberg. This group of elites have a far dirtier reality than any might suspect. Elon Musk is a glorified member of this group that exemplifies a sick perverted lifestyle.

Musk's love for the Hollywood lifestyle might be a negative, per this video:

<https://vimeo.com/142444429>

Musk's mother promotes herself simply based on her appearance. First, let's look at the message Musk girl Paltrow wants to push:

Gwyneth **Paltrow** publishes a VERY intimate guide to **anal sex**

'If **anal** turns you on, you are not alone': Gwyneth **Paltrow** publishes a VERY intimate guide to the **sex** act on Goop, insisting it is 'practically standard in the modern bedroom repertoire'

[dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-4343520/Gwyneth-Paltrow-s-...](http://dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-4343520/Gwyneth-Paltrow-s-...)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** publishes guide to **anal sex** on Goop website

Gwyneth **Paltrow** publishes guide to **anal sex** on Goop website: 'If **anal** turns you on, you are not alone'

[nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/gwyneth-paltrow-publ...](http://nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/gwyneth-paltrow-publ...)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Publishes Guide to **Anal Sex** on ... - PEOPLE.com

Gwyneth **Paltrow** shares her expertise on all things lifestyle, health and beauty on her goop site — and now that apparently includes **anal sex**. On Thursday, goop released its second annual **SexIssue** featuring content on a number of **sex**-related topics — including a very explicit Q&A about **anal** ...

[people.com/bodies/gwyneth-paltrow-anal-sex-guide/](http://people.com/bodies/gwyneth-paltrow-anal-sex-guide/)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** offers advice on **ANAL sex** in her lifestyle ...

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Gwyneth **Paltrow** offers advice on **ANAL sex** in her lifestyle blog Goop's **sex** issue. Actress advises readers on how to have "good casual **sex**"

<https://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/gwyneth-paltrow-offers...>

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Just Gave 3 Incredibly Great Tips For **Anal** ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow** published Goop's annual **Sex** Issue yesterday, and it features an in-depth Q&A about all things **anal sex**. Here's what we learned.

<https://www.menshealth.com/sex-women/gwyneth-paltrow-anal-sex-tips>

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Wants You To Do **ANAL!!!** | PerezHilton.com

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Wants You To Do **ANAL!!!** ... its most eyebrow-raising article is about the dos and don'ts of **anal sex**! Related: Gwyneth **Paltrow** Will NEVER ...

[perezhilton.com/2017-03-23-gwyneth-paltrow-goop-anal-sex](http://perezhilton.com/2017-03-23-gwyneth-paltrow-goop-anal-sex)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Goop **Anal Sex** Guide - Cosmopolitan.com

This new trend is all the rage. Gwyneth **Paltrow** Has Apparently Just Discovered **Anal Sex**, Guys. This new trend is all the rage.

[cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/a9178378/gwyneth-paltrow-goop-an...](http://cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/a9178378/gwyneth-paltrow-goop-an...)

Gwyneth answers all your burning questions about **anal sex** ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow** is a backdoor connoisseur.. In honor of her website Goop's second annual **Sex**Issue, the actress, 44, posted a Q&A about **anal sex** with research psychoanalyst and author Paul Joannides, Psy.D., to answer all of her readers' most pressing questions.

<https://pagesix.com/2017/03/24/gwyneth-answers-all-your-burni...>

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Is Here To Teach You About **Anal Sex**

Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s lifestyle brand ... Savend this month that choice is **anal sex**. Yes, Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s website is ready to teach you the ins and outs of ...

<https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/gwyneth-paltrow-teach-anal-sex-...>

Gwyneth **Paltrow** encourages **anal sex** in X-RATED blog post ...

GWYNETH **PALTROW** has published a frank Q&A with psychoanalyst and author Paul Joannides on how to have great **anal sex**.

<https://www.express.co.uk/celebrity-news/783308/Gwyneth-Paltrow-ana...>

PEOPLE Readers React to Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s **Anal Sex** Guide ...

On Thursday, PEOPLE published a piece covering Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s site goop's explicit Q&A about **anal sex** with psychoanalyst and author Paul Joannides. While the piece aimed to squash the stigma around the sexual act, some PEOPLE readers weren't quite ready to be enlightened. Many took to the ...

[people.com/celebrity/people-readers-react-to-gwyneth...](#)

[Here Are 5 Things We Learned From Gwyneth \*\*Paltrow\*\*'s Guide to ...](#)

Here Are 5 Things We Learned From Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s Guide to **Anal Sex**. ... The interview also addresses health issues surrounding **anal sex** in some detail and ...

<https://www.maxim.com/women/gwyneth-paltrow-guide-to-anal-2017-3>

[Gwyneth \*\*Paltrow\*\*'s website Goop publishes advice on \*\*anal sex\*\*](#)

Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s website Goop publishes advice on **anal sex** "If **anal** turns you on, you are definitely not alone."

[digitalspy.com/showbiz/news/a824383/gwyneth-paltrow-goop...](#)

[Gwyneth \*\*Paltrow\*\* tackles \*\*anal sex\*\* in website guide | Toronto Sun](#)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** has tested fans with a new study on **anal sex** in her latest Goop website post. The actress and contributors to her online lifestyle hub have often been criticised for testing the bounds of decency and offering up bizarre beauty and wellbeing techniques, and now **Paltrow** has raised eyebr...

[torontosun.com/2017/03/24/gwyneth-paltrow-tackles-anal-s...](#)

[Gwyneth \*\*Paltrow\*\* Wants to Improve Your \*\*Sex\*\* Life With 9 Goop ...](#)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Wants to Improve Your **Sex** Life With 9 Goop-Approved Tips About Orgasms, **Anal** and More

[eonline.com/news/838301/gwyneth-paltrow-wants-to-impr...](#)

[Actriz habla del sexo \*\*anal\*\* | People en Español](#)

La actriz Gwyneth **Paltrow** escribió sobre el sexo **anal** en su blog

[peopleenespanol.com/celebridades/gwyneth-paltrow-habla-del-se...](#)

[Gwyneth: 'Men's Insecurity Depends On How Many Blowjobs You ...](#)

"Haha! And then I said, 'Well, you're going to be insecure for a while because that's not where that thing goes!' He had **sex** with mostly groupies after that. It

[thesuperficial.com/gwyneth-paltrow-brad-pitt-jay-z-beyonce-b...](#)

[Gwyneth \*\*Paltrow\*\* Talks Oral \*\*Sex\*\*, Brad Pitt & Ben Affleck—Read ...](#)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** says the darndest things.. The Mortdecai actress stopped by Howard Stern's SiriusXM radio show this morning and let loose about a variety of topics like Brad Pitt, Ben Affleck, strippers and, um, oral **sex**.

[eonline.com/news/614697/gwyneth-paltrow-talks-oral-se...](http://online.com/news/614697/gwyneth-paltrow-talks-oral-se...)

### Gwyneth **Paltrow** Wants To Be Your **Anal Sex** Guide

Gwyneth **Paltrow** wants you to know how to do **anal sex**.

[idly.craveonline.com/2017/03/gwyneth-paltrow-wants-anal-sex-gu...](http://idly.craveonline.com/2017/03/gwyneth-paltrow-wants-anal-sex-gu...)

### Gwyneth **Paltrow** offers advice on **ANAL sex** in her lifestyle ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow** offers advice on **ANAL sex** in her lifestyle blog Goop's **sex** issue. Actress advises readers on how to have "good casual **sex**"

<https://www.irishmirror.ie/showbiz/celebrity-news/gwyneth-paltrow-of...>

### Gwyneth **Paltrow** Goop **Anal Sex** Guide - cosmopolitan.com

This new trend is all the rage. Gwyneth **Paltrow** Has Apparently Just Discovered **Anal Sex**, Guys. This new trend is all the rage.

<https://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/a9178378/gwyneth-paltrow-goop-an...>

### Gwyneth **Paltrow** imparts **anal sex** tips - Harper's BAZAAR

Gwyneth **Paltrow** has imparted her unsolicited advice on many things - vagina steaming to ex-purging bra burning - and now she's decided to tell us what she's learned about **anal sex**.

<https://www.harpersbazaar.com/uk/beauty/fitness-wellbeing/news/a40605/g...>

### Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s website has published a guide to **anal sex** ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow** has published a guide to **anal sex**.

<https://metro.co.uk/2017/03/24/gwyneth-paltrow-has-published-...>

### Gwyneth **Paltrow** Won't Stop Gooping About Weird, \*Unusual\* **Sex** ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow**'s latest dive into absurdity is a new story on Goop titled, "Reality Check: **AnalSex**." Oh boy. Thank you , Gwyneth. In between vaginal steams, cupping, and sucking down gallons of goat's milk, the actress posts an interview with psychoanalyst Paul Joannides, PsyD, on everything, yes everything, (straight) couples need to ...

[bravotv.com/blogs/gwyneth-paltrow-on-gross-unusual-sex](http://bravotv.com/blogs/gwyneth-paltrow-on-gross-unusual-sex)

Gwyneth **Paltrow** wants to give you a 'reality check' about ...

It's been at least a week since Gwyneth **Paltrow** said something sensational, so you could say this was in the pipeline, so to speak.. The Oscar winner has taken to her lifestyle website Goop to announce that we all need a 'reality check' when it comes to **anal sex**.

<https://www.her.ie/health/gwyneth-paltrow-wants-give-reality...>

Gwyneth **Paltrow's** Goop proves there's no such thing as ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow's** website Goop really is the gift that keeps on giving.  
Gwyneth **Paltrow's** ... **Analsex** was the Cote de Boeuf of the sexual menu.

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/sex/gwyneth-paltrows-goop-proves-no...>

Gwyneth **Paltrow** Publishes A Guide To **Anal Sex** On Goop Website ...

Gwyneth **Paltrow** published a guide to **anal sex** on the Goop Website. PEOPLE's Facebook page is exploding with comments about it! Subscribe to People <http://...>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-DAlvHjmj68>

Gwyneth **Paltrow** publishes **anal sex** guide - Yahoo News

American beauty Gwyneth **Paltrow** has raised eyebrows by publishing a Q&A guide on how to enjoy safe **anal sex** on her lifestyle website Goop. The site released its second annual **Sex Issue** on Thursday and it includes an in-depth (there it is) interview with psychoanalyst Paul Joannides on the subject of

<https://uk.news.yahoo.com/gwyneth-paltrow-publishes-anal-sex-guide-...>

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## Sex Cult Exposed

- 'sexual servitude' at San Francisco-based 'orgasmic meditation' company
- NXIUM, One Taste, Emo, The Woodside Club: why do the leftists get into such kink?
- Undercover camera's in San Rafael, California at 4th street "dance/yoga" building and Mill Valley city building catch sex-for-sale escorts and kink
- They use "meet-up" (the DNC's networking site) to hunt for victims to seduce
- One Taste's "hot little red head" turns out to be the top escort in Marin county

By Michelle Robertson,

Former employees of OneTaste say the San Francisco-based wellness company encouraged them to spend thousands of dollars on orgasmic meditation classes and, in some cases, engage in sexual servitude, according to a report.

Bloomberg Businessweek interviewed 16 former OneTaste employees, some of whom compared it to "a kind of prostitution ring" that sometimes used its teachings to justify sexual exploitation and abuse. Some said they were coerced into sexual acts they did not want to perform. The report says OneTaste settled out of court with a former employee who filed a lawsuit over alleged sexual assault and harassment in 2015.

READ ALSO: A night out at OneTaste's Museum of Awkward

Michal, another former employee, said she and her husband left the organization with \$20,000 in debt, having spent \$150,000 combined on OneTaste's costly classes and retreats, which range in price from a \$199 introduction course to \$16,000 "intensives." Multiple interviewees said staffers encouraged them to open additional credit cards to cover the cost, and they acquired serious debt in the process.

Dr. Danielle Roberts is based out of New York where the alleged cult operated, but she holds a Wisconsin medical license and traveled to the Badger State to treat patients. According to a federal indictment, the accused ringleader of the group, Keith Ranier, founded a company -- NXIVM -- in which women were recruited, branded with his initials and used for sex.

Media: WISN

On its website, OneTaste touts itself as a lifestyle brand intended to increase "health, happiness and connection through proven methods combining meditation and conscious sexuality."

Those methods include "orgasmic meditation," or OM (pronounced ohm) for short. OM is a trademarked practice that typically involves a clothed and gloved man stroking the genitalia of a

woman, who is naked from the waist down, for 15 minutes. There is no goal "other than to feel the sensation," the OneTaste website says. A container on the site describes the organization as a "consciousness-based clit stroking community."

OneTaste denied allegations of sexual coercion and abuse in an email to SFGATE on Monday. The company said the Bloomberg story paints the company in a "false light, hand-picking the sensational allegations of a few while ignoring thousands of satisfied and happy customers," a spokesperson said.

"Moreover, all of the allegations are more than two years old from before OneTaste transformed, under new ownership and leadership, into a traditional company with strong corporate governance, clear-cut sales policies and practices, and strict HR policies."

Bloomberg Businessweek said some of the employees interviewed were involved with OneTaste "as recently as last year."

FROM THE ARCHIVE: Nicole Daedone's mission of orgasmic meditation

The OneTaste spokesperson said it is against sales policy to "pressure" potential customers to take out multiple credit cards, and those who ask for a refund typically receive one.

Since its founding by Robert Kandell and Nicole Daedone in the early-2000s, OneTaste and its clitoris-centric wellness practices have appeared in the pages of The San Francisco Chronicle and the New York Times.

In its 2009 profile, the Times cited former members saying Daedone, the former CEO of OneTaste, possessed "cultlike powers over her followers" and "sometimes strongly suggested who should pair off with whom romantically." Daedone, who previously ran San Francisco's 111 Minna art gallery, stepped down as CEO in 2017, a departure that coincided with the purchase of the company by new owners, the OneTaste spokesperson said. Daedone taught four courses in 2018, but is not scheduled to teach additional classes at this time.

Over the past decades, the company expanded from its mid-Market San Francisco headquarters — next door to Uber HQ — to Los Angeles, New York and London. It plans to open in four additional cities over the next two years.

OneTaste is pushing its sexuality wellness education toward the mainstream. Some former members say it pushed them into sexual servitude and five-figure debts.

When Michal got married in August 2015, her family and longtime friends didn't attend. The woman who walked her down the aisle, the dozens of beaming onlookers, her soon-to-be husband—all were people she'd met in the preceding 10 months. Wearing a loose, casual dress borrowed from one of her new friends, Michal spent the ceremony in a daze.

She knew she didn't want to get married like this, in the living room of a rented San Francisco house without her family's support, yet she felt compelled to do it. That uneasy feeling could apply to most of her experiences in OneTaste.

OneTaste is a sexuality-focused wellness education company based in the Bay Area. It's best known for classes on "orgasmic meditation," a trademarked procedure that typically involves a man using a gloved, lubricated fingertip to stroke a woman's clitoris for 15 minutes. For Michal, like those at her wedding, OneTaste was much more than a series of workshops. It was a company that had, in less than a year, gained sway over every aspect of her life.

Since taking her first class, Michal had started working on OneTaste's sales staff and living in a communal house in Brooklyn with her co-workers. Seven days a week, they gathered for multiple rounds of orgasmic meditation, or OM. (They pronounce it "ohm.") They spent hours calling and texting people who'd come to a OneTaste event, trying to sell seats for the next, more expensive classes. The company-hosted evening OM circles in Manhattan sometimes held 30 or more pairs of strokers and strokees in one room, the fully clothed men concentrating on their moving fingertips while the women, naked from the waist down, moaned, wailed, and sighed. Afterward, Michal and her co-workers would run that night's OneTaste event, where they set up chairs, jogged the microphone over to attendees, and chatted up more sales leads. It was exhausting.

Michal had been drawn to OneTaste because she felt unfulfilled sexually and in other parts of her personal life. The group seemed full of glowing, attractive people confident they could feel profound sexual pleasure whenever they wanted. She believed her new life would bring her closer to the center of OneTaste, where those who were experts in OM—especially the company's co-founder, Nicole Daedone—seemed to hold the key to sexual and spiritual enlightenment.

In OneTaste, Michal was constantly surrounded by people who were her colleagues, roommates, sexual partners, and, suddenly, closest friends. She was also \$20,000 in debt from buying its classes. She was married during a two-week, \$36,000-a-person retreat called the Nicole Daedone Intensive. By the time she and her husband left OneTaste a few months later, they'd spent more than \$150,000. "The deeper I went, the more courses I did, the more I worked for them, the closer I got to Nicole—I knew I was doing something that later would be very difficult to unravel," she says. "I knew I was losing control. In OneTaste, I'd done that again and again and again."

Michal's story is far from unique among those who venture deeper into the organization, though it's almost unknown to the outside world. OneTaste pitches itself to the public as a fast-growing company teaching connection and wellness to an increasingly mainstream audience. But many who've become involved in the upper echelons describe an organization that they found ran on predatory sales and pushed members to ignore their financial, emotional, and physical boundaries in ways that left them feeling traumatized. Even given the recent flurry of stories about groups known for fringe sexual activity—Nxivm, whose founder, Keith Raniere, is awaiting trial in New York along with his alleged

deputy, actress Allison Mack; Rajneeshpuram, the community featured in Netflix’s Wild Wild Country—OneTaste stands out for its conventional appeal to wellness.

Bloomberg Businessweek interviewed 16 former OneTaste staffers and community members, some involved as recently as last year. Most spoke anonymously because they signed nondisclosure agreements or fear retribution. Some, including Michal, asked to withhold their last names because they don’t want to be publicly associated with the company.

Many of the former staffers and community members say OneTaste resembled a kind of prostitution ring—one that exploited trauma victims and others searching for healing. In some members’ experiences, the company used flirtation and sex to lure emotionally vulnerable targets. It taught employees to work for free or cheap to show devotion. And managers frequently ordered staffers to have sex or OM with each other or with customers.

OneTaste calls this characterization “outrageous” and says its goal has always been to help victims. It says it never directed employees to engage in sexual acts with anyone, nor did it have the ability to do so, though it paid a six-figure out-of-court settlement in 2015 to a former employee who said she suffered sexual assault and harassment, as well as other labor violations, while on the job. That settlement hasn’t been reported until now because it was confidential.

OneTaste says that until 2016 it was more of an edgy lifestyle community that’s since become a legitimate business. The company no longer organizes group OMs among students or leases communal homes in its own name. It has added teaching centers in London, New York, and Los Angeles alongside the one that sits across from Uber’s headquarters in San Francisco. It says it made \$12 million in revenue in 2017 and will expand to Atlanta, Chicago, Minneapolis, and Washington over the next two years.

The company has hired executives and advisers who worked at CrossFit and the juice maker Odwalla, and OM has won endorsements from Khloé Kardashian and Tim Ferriss (*The 4-Hour Body*). OneTaste’s nonprofit arm has commissioned a study on the health benefits of OM and expects to publish findings later this year. “OneTaste is the Whole Foods of sexuality—the organic, good-for-you version,” says Chief Executive Officer Joanna Van Vleck, the former head of Trunk Club LLC. “The overarching thing is, orgasm is part of wellness.” OneTaste didn’t make Daedone available for interviews, nor did she respond to requests for comment.

OneTaste has also begun targeting businesses as customers—not teaching their employees how to stroke one another, but how to apply OM principles such as “feel over formula” and “stay connected no matter what” to running a company. “We’re having conversations with companies about #MeToo and how to teach connection as preventive health for companies rather than treating the disease of sexual harassment,” says Van Vleck. She says the National Hockey League is among the businesses that have expressed interest, though the NHL says it can’t confirm any record of a conversation.

A decade's worth of periodic OneTaste press coverage hasn't really gotten past the titillating veneer of OM. Reporters have occasionally used the word "cult" jokingly because of the practice's inherent kookiness and fierce devotees, but Michal and others say OneTaste deserves the term's full weight. "I lost my understanding of money," Michal says. "There was a lot of psychological manipulation. This is an organization that really preys on people's weaknesses."

relates to The Dark Side of the Orgasmic Meditation Company

Daedone has said she developed OM based on a monk's technique. Her 2011 TEDxSF talk has been watched on YouTube almost 1.5 million times.

According to the story she repeats onstage and in YouTube videos, Daedone founded OneTaste in 2004 after she met a monk at a party who showed her a version of the technique she developed into OM. For years her company remained a far-fringe oddity, teaching small classes in San Francisco and running a residential warehouse where dozens of members and residents experimented sexually.

In 2009, though, the New York Times put OneTaste on the front page of its style section, and the brand took off. Daedone, who'd previously run an art gallery, published a book called *Slow Sex* in 2011, and in 2013 gave a speech at South by Southwest called "Female Orgasm: The Regenerative Human Technology." In a 2011 TEDxSF talk that's been watched almost 1.5 million times on YouTube, she describes an essential hunger for connection that especially plagues Western women, who eat too much, work too much, shop too much, and still feel empty. The fix, Daedone says in the video, is OM. The practice helps men and women "lose that sense of hopelessness that you will ever be reached deep inside."

OM has strict rules, and it's supposed to be separate from sex, meaning it's not foreplay. The pitch to women is 15 minutes of meditative focus only on their pleasure and sensation, with no obligation to reciprocate. Men are told it will help them learn to be more sensitive to women's needs, though former members say it's often strongly implied that fellow OneTaste students will be open to sexual experimentation beyond OM.

Many students' first encounters are casual: They spot a free or almost-free event with a title such as "Tired of Swiping Left? Let's Talk Real Intimacy!" or "You Do Yoga. You Meditate. Now try #OrgasmicMeditation." At that event, OneTaste staffers tell them about the \$199 Introduction to OM class. While attendees are no longer invited to try OMing during the intro class, it still features a live OM demonstration between staffers, right before lunch. The way to learn more, the intro students hear, is to take more classes.

Currently, students pay \$499 for a weekend course, \$4,000 for a retreat, \$12,000 for the coaching program, and \$16,000 for an "intensive." In 2014, OneTaste started selling a yearlong \$60,000 membership, which lets buyers take all the courses they want and sit in the front row. Staff also encourage students to repeat courses, telling them the experience changes as they progress. OneTaste

says about 1,400 people have taken its coaching program, 6,500 have come to an intro class, and more than 14,000 have signed up for online courses and its app.

Some students take a course or two and drop off. But often, those with a core yearning—to overcome anxiety or resolve a sexual trauma, for example—are drawn in deeper. Volunteering at events can lead them to work for the company full time, usually in sales. Former staffers say they were trained to target young, beautiful women and awkward, wealthy tech guys. They set up booths at life hacking conferences and early-morning dance parties, serving coffee in shirts with slogans like “The Pussy Knows” and asking passersby, “How’s your orgasm?”

At OneTaste events, attendees often played communication games prompting them to share vulnerable stories. Former staffers say they took notes that might help them sell later—maybe a student was recently divorced and lonely—and senior staff assigned subordinates to home in on wealthy students who seemed attracted to them or had experiences in common. They also say female employees were told to wear lipstick, heels, and short black skirts.

OneTaste denies that its policies targeted specific groups and says it only ever required workers to dress “professionally.” That said, last month, around the time Bloomberg Businessweek started asking OneTaste about its sales practices, onetime sales chief Rachel Cherwitz resigned. “I’ve realized not everyone makes decisions as fast as I do. I’ve realized sometimes I’ve given my opinion when I should not have,” Cherwitz said in a statement forwarded by the company. “For now, I am focused on taking some time to reflect.”

Cherwitz was Daedone’s top lieutenant for most of the 11 years she spent with the company, according to several former employees. She’s in many of OneTaste’s public videos, calmly explaining how people who OM daily, like her, can gain confidence, feel energized, and have better sex. Former staff say they were drawn to Cherwitz’s intense charisma and terrified of getting on her bad side, especially by not hitting sales goals. Before events, sales staff often watched one of her favorite YouTube videos, a clip of lions hunting in a pack. Some former staffers say they called customers “marks” and referred to themselves as “lions,” “tigers,” and sometimes “fluffers,” a term borrowed from porn sets. “You fluff someone to get them energetically and emotionally hard,” one former salesperson says. “You were the dangled bait, like ‘You can have more of this if you buy this \$10,000 course.’ ”

Former staffers and members say to make parting with thousands of dollars easier, OneTaste taught members that money is just an emotional obstacle. It encouraged students to take out multiple credit cards to pay for courses, and some turned to such sites as GoFundMe and Prosper Funding for help. “We took money from people that we shouldn’t have,” acknowledges Van Vleck, the CEO, adding that OneTaste has revised its policies to make sure customers don’t feel pressure to take on debt along with their courses. The company denies manipulating students to buy courses.

“The first time I didn’t cover my credit card bill, it broke something in my mind,” says Ruwan Meepagala, who went to his first OneTaste event in 2012 at age 24, worked for the company for about

two years, and left owing \$30,000 on his credit cards. “I was no longer afraid of debt,” he says. “Once you break that barrier, \$3,000 is the same as \$30,000.” At one point, Meepagala complained that he and his co-workers hadn’t been paid in two months; he says he was publicly shamed for having a “scarcity mindset.”

Even though OneTaste’s management pushed employees to stop caring about their own money, they used the workers to bring in more of others’ cash. And despite the strict rules the company claimed to have separating OM from sex, initiates soon realized the divisions could be porous when money was on the line. Meepagala says managers told him to OM or have sex with older, wealthy women right before Cherwitz or another staffer called to sell them another course. Some members asked others to pay for their courses, often suggesting they’d offer sex or attention in exchange. They even called it hooking, former staff say. “A lot of women would be like, ‘I’m going to hook this guy for money,’” Meepagala says. “They would brag about it.” The company denies using staff for bait and sex for sales, and says Meepagala now teaches pickup-artistry-esque techniques and isn’t a moral authority.

When Laurie, a 53-year-old private nurse in Los Angeles, started taking classes and joining daily OM circles in 2014, she was overwhelmed by the community’s affection. Young women treated her like a confidante, and men half her age paid attention to her. She moved into an OM house in Santa Monica and signed up for the coaching program. Her new life felt good for a while, but staffers sometimes turned cold, especially when students hesitated to buy more classes. When frozen out, she grew desperate to regain their affection.

Laurie and other former students say they were taught that once they started down the OneTaste spiritual path, they would feel tortured and lost if they left. She says that kind of peer pressure helped keep her in the coaching program starting in early 2015, even after traumas related to her childhood sexual abuse resurfaced. “I was afraid of losing my soul if I left,” she says. “This sounds so dramatic, but in my vulnerable state I believed it. I thought I would be f---ed spiritually.” OneTaste denies that it taught anyone they’d suffer if they stopped taking courses and says it hired a trauma adviser in late 2016.

“We took money from people that we shouldn’t have”

For some committed OMers, the experience became even more complicated and bizarre. Hamza Tayeb, 33, was part of OneTaste for about a decade. He started working for it to leave behind an uninspiring Bay Area software job, he says. He also felt tied down by his young son, born while he was still in college. Daedone heard Tayeb’s story and said the mother’s choice to have the child shouldn’t dictate his choices. She absolved him of responsibility toward his son, he says: “I thought, I’m not going to hear that from anywhere else.” He started teaching courses and eventually married Cherwitz. OneTaste says Daedone never told members to separate from their families.

In 2015, Tayeb took part in a five-day, \$6,500-a-head OneTaste event called Magic School, held near Northern California’s Mount Shasta. The year before, the final evening featured temporary ceremonial



piercings and performers who danced with snakes draped over their shoulders. This time, Daedone named a handful of men and women, including Tayeb, “priests and priestesses of orgasm.” The new clergy, dressed in white, conducted a group OM overseen by Daedone in front of the hundred or so attendees. “It was a religion,” a former employee says. “Orgasm was God, and Nicole was like Jesus or Muhammad.” OneTaste says the ceremonies were “play” and compared Magic School to Burning Man. relates to The Dark Side of the Orgasmic Meditation Company

Tayeb, a former OneTaste “priest of orgasm,” married the company’s onetime head of sales after giving up responsibility for his son.

OneTaste teachings were often used to justify sexual manipulation and abuse, several former members say. “Aversion practice” is the company’s teaching that you gain power and expand your orgasm—within the group, a broad term for sexual energy—by performing sexual acts you don’t want to do, or doing them with people you find disgusting. Meepagala says Cherwitz once saw him bickering with a co-worker and told them they had to leave work and couldn’t come back until they’d slept together. “Sometimes they’d assign someone to be your sex manager for the week,” another former employee says. “That person would go on Tinder or ask the community and line up a person for you to sleep with each day, do all the texting, and tell you who to meet when. ... The authority figure would say, ‘You’re f---ed up,’ and sex was always the solution.”

Although few members say they were forced to do something they explicitly refused, consent in this setting was a gray area. “You’re pushed to do it, and cornered,” says a former employee. In 2015 the company paid \$325,000 to settle a labor dispute with former sales rep Ayries Blanck, according to a person familiar with the matter. Blanck had said Cherwitz and others ordered her to sleep with customers and managers, and two people familiar with the matter say she considered the experience sexual assault. Blanck declined to comment for this story.

OneTaste says the settlement was confidential but that it has never required any employee to engage in a sexual act. Van Vleck says supervisors may have suggested such things to employees in the context of their friendships, but that the company wasn’t involved. It referred Bloomberg Businessweek to nine former staff and customers who say the company’s courses brought them close relationships and new comfort with their sexuality. “People find OneTaste because they’re deeply searching for something,” says former membership coordinator Elyna Anderson, “and we often pass over a fair amount of our own judgment and responsibility into the hands of people we hope are going to turn our lives around.”

Former staffers say there were multiple cases of domestic violence between employees in relationships, which were sometimes characterized as one partner letting out his or her aggressive desire, or “beast.” In one case, an executive repeatedly slapped his girlfriend during a 2014 fight in the company’s Market Street headquarters in front of employees, according to one eyewitness. The executive was fired but has since been rehired. OneTaste says the incident was unacceptable, but that it rehired the executive



because of a belief in rehabilitation. It says it's unaware of other cases and has never promoted or tolerated violence.

Policy changes since 2016—no more hosting group OM circles, no more student OMing in classes or staff OMing in the office—have lessened OneTaste's liability. While OneTaste says these changes were meant to position it for a more mainstream audience, several former staffers say management was also worried about legal consequences. No leases are officially connected to the company, but staff still live and OM together in private, says Tayeb. All of this is in keeping, he says, with how the changes were framed. "Often it was, 'We all know that this stuff is actually good, but the world isn't going to see it that way,' " he says. " 'So we're going to adapt and comply, but all the while keep the core of what we really want to do sacred and hidden.' "

relates to The Dark Side of the Orgasmic Meditation Company

For years, OneTaste organized group OMs, often in communal houses, but says it no longer does.

At age 28, Michal had been in a few long-term relationships, but she always felt self-conscious about her body and about asking for what she wanted during sex. She'd also never had an orgasm. So even though she thought OM sounded weird, she went to a free OneTaste event one evening in late 2014 to see if it could help. She chatted with staffers who seemed open, ate the right food, and did yoga every day. Unhappy in her job as a teacher's assistant in a Jewish school, she started attending regular OM gatherings in New York and responded to the open flirting from the men she met there. "This thing seemed to offer friends, potential mates," she says. "Also, I was on this whole high where there were so many men interested in me. It was weird to feel that power."

OneTaste quickly swallowed Michal's life. She quit her teaching job, gave her dog to her parents, and moved into a crowded OM house in Brooklyn to sell OneTaste classes. OMing did allow her to reach orgasm, but only rarely. Instead, the draw gradually became more about community and purpose. A few months in, she wanted to sign up for the coaching program but didn't have enough money. When she went to talk to Cherwitz about it, Cherwitz took out her laptop and helped her apply for a new credit card. Michal had never been in debt before. Her parents were worried, but "I was so swept in by that point," she says. "I wouldn't listen to anything that said, 'Wait, take a moment.' "

Life at the OM house was relentlessly scheduled. Every morning at around 7 a.m., staff convened for two rounds of OM, switching partners midway. Then came an AA-inspired "fear inventory," writing out and sharing their worries with a partner. Former staffers say they were encouraged to report to management if they heard others express doubts about OneTaste. They all went to Bikram yoga, cooked, cleaned, then spent several hours making sales calls around a table, tracking their progress with Salesforce.com. After an afternoon round of OM, they left to run the evening's public session.

"I felt so much more confused about sex and the boundaries of my body"

Michal, like many of her co-workers, was classified as an independent contractor, earning commissions on the courses she sold. She says she was lucky to make \$200 or \$300 a month, which supplemented the \$900 monthly stipend she received from a manager's personal account. She says she spent more than 80 hours most weeks working on the group's formal and informal activities. Meepagala says he worked around 100 hours per week, on a schedule similar to Michal's, but was told to log 30, and that his salary as a "part-time" worker was about \$15,000 a year. Blanck, in her settled labor dispute, said she was misclassified as an independent contractor because OneTaste dictated what she was doing most hours of the day. She'd also said she was paid less than minimum wage and was owed overtime.

Workers exhausted by the long hours were told they should OM more, that orgasm is an endless energy resource. Some former staffers say frequent OM sessions left them in a constant state of emotional and physical rawness that, combined with a lack of sleep, blurred their ability to think.

During morning check-ins, Michal and her co-workers chirped about feeling "turned on." If they didn't, Cherwitz or someone else would drill down on why they weren't feeling excited to sell. Someone who wasn't hitting sales goals chanced being deemed "tumesced" or "off the rails"—in need of OM or sex. Staffers were rarely alone even at night, because they typically slept two to a bed. Their phones would buzz with 100 texts an hour from OneTaste group chats.

"Like many startups, employees worked long and varied hours at times," OneTaste said in a statement. The company says workers' lifestyle choices were optional, that fear inventory was confidential and wasn't used to harm people, and that in 2016 it started using time sheet service TSheets to track and pay work hours, including overtime. It says it pays workers properly.

As Michal picked up more internal jargon, it began to make sense why OneTaste called outsiders "asleep," "Muggles," or "in the Matrix." The stranger the experience became, the more thrilling it felt, like she was gaining access to something the rest of the world couldn't see.

At the end of a whirlwind week of ritual at the Magic School where Tayeb was initiated, Michal says, a OneTaste executive took her by the hand and led her to a sales table to talk about putting down a \$12,000 deposit for the upcoming Nicole Daedone Intensive. She didn't have the money, so a senior staffer suggested she ask another OneTaste member, a man who worked in tech and had paid part of her Magic School tuition. "I remember in those moments, you have this exhilarating feeling," she says. "You want to do [the intensive], because the people who do it are much better off than those who don't. You also know Rachel would love you more and think better of you."

Michal and her parents began to argue more about OneTaste, especially when she told them she'd be marrying a fellow member—the one who'd been helping pay for her classes. Around the same time, Michal's OneTaste life started to break down. Her closest co-worker left the company, and Michal began to think of leaving as the right, albeit terrifying, move. She regularly woke up screaming from nightmares.

Eventually, Michal persuaded her husband to leave OneTaste with her in September 2015, shortly after their wedding. Under the stress of adjusting to life outside, they divorced soon after. She moved in with her parents in New York, depressed and occasionally suicidal. “I thought, Why do I want to kill myself? I can’t control my emotions,” she says. “I thought I was cursed.”

his image can only be used with attached article for period of 90 days from publication

Laurie says she risked feeling “f---ed spiritually” to leave OneTaste and spent months on disability afterward.

On top of everything else, fleeing OneTaste can be brutally lonely. Laurie, the nurse, spent months on disability after leaving and moved to Boulder, Colo. She’s in the process of divorcing a man she met and married in OneTaste. Tayeb divorced Cherwitz after he left and is trying to rebuild his relationship with his son, who’s now 13. “There’s just a lot of confusion and pain and anger,” he says. “I leveraged myself financially, emotionally. I was married. I was all into this thing. When it doesn’t work out, it’s devastating.”

Like other apostates, Tayeb is conflicted about his years in OneTaste, which he says taught him practical leadership skills and exposed him to useful spiritual teachings. Even OneTaste’s harshest critics often say OM can help people. But Tayeb also says the company exercises “undue influence” over those inside, and he regrets that he saw it happen for years and never said anything. The threat of spiritual ruin is too powerful and is wielded without a moral compass, he says.

OneTaste says the company has changed, especially since Daedone stepped down as CEO last year to work on her next book and teach the occasional class. (She also sold her stake in the company to a trio of OneTaste members.) Van Vleck says OneTaste isn’t a cult, but that it’s common for people to use the term when something “changes their internal perspective.”

The newish CEO is betting that the study OneTaste has funded on the health benefits of OM, which has taken brain-activity readings from 130 pairs of strokers and strokees, will draw fresh crowds. Led by researchers from the University of Pittsburgh, the study is expected to yield the first of multiple papers later this year. “The science that’s coming out to back what this is and what the benefits are is going to be huge in terms of scaling,” Van Vleck says.

For more than two years after leaving OneTaste, Michal continued to struggle with her relationship to sex. Daedone and her disciples had prescribed sex with as many people as possible as a way to achieve enlightenment, according to several former staffers. “You don’t realize until after what a damaging idea that is. I feel really disgusted that I put myself through that,” Michal says. By the end, “I felt so much more confused about sex and the boundaries of my body, even though that’s what they say it helps you cultivate.” She hasn’t OMed since leaving OneTaste, and she says she never will.

## A Multimillion-Dollar Startup

...hid A Sexual Harassment Incident By Its CEO — Then A Community of Outsiders Dragged It Into the Light

In October 2017, the employees of DataCamp, an online data science learning platform, flew to Ponta Delgada, Portugal, for a weeklong company offsite. The charming European city in the Azores Islands was an ideal location for the DataCamp staff to strategize by day and drink, dance, and unwind at night.

You may not have heard of it, but DataCamp is not just another anonymous tech startup. It's a kind of paid, specialized Coursera for data scientists with 3.9 million users in over 190 countries, and a flashy roster of business customers that includes the likes of Uber, Whole Foods, eBay, and Harvard University.

One evening that week at an after-hours bar with a live band playing, DataCamp CEO Jonathan Cornelissen groped 27-year-old Kara Woo, a DataCamp curriculum lead. According to Woo, as other DataCamp employees milled about, a drunken Cornelissen pressed his crotch into Woo's behind, fondling her hips and thighs. Woo says she extracted herself quickly and danced off in another direction. But Cornelissen followed her — and he kept putting his hands on her body.

"I felt humiliated in the moment — or moments, since it happened multiple times that night," Woo told BuzzFeed News. "And the feeling of humiliation really lingered. I kept thinking about whether I should quit."

Three months later she did, reporting the Ponta Delgada incident to DataCamp as part of her departure. And then: nothing. The company did not make a statement, issue an apology, or say there would be consequences for Cornelissen. Woo's story simply disappeared — for a time.

"The feeling of humiliation really lingered. I kept thinking about whether I should quit."

In early April 2019, it resurfaced with an updated narrative — one that included details of DataCamp's efforts to minimize and cover up Cornelissen's behavior, and a data science community appalled by them. Only then, more than a year later, were there consequences — but they still left many frustrated and unsatisfied.

Woo's story and its overlong path to a resolution is, in many ways, a telling example of the entrenched problems of the tech industry when it comes to mishandling sexual misconduct. It is further evidence that for many companies, the perception of accountability is more important than accountability itself, and it suggests that perhaps Silicon Valley's #MeToo moment wasn't one of momentous cultural change, but of the crisis PR infrastructure on which it's built working as it always has. As BuzzFeed

News recently reported, there have been few consequences for the Silicon Valley men who were accused of or admitted to sexual misconduct.

So after #MeToo, what now? And then, what next? The data science community may have an answer.

After the Ponta Delgada offsite, Woo returned to Seattle where she worked remotely for DataCamp. She told her partner what Cornelissen had done to her. (In an interview, her partner confirmed that Woo told him about the incident.) Then Woo did her best to put it behind her. “My plan was to try to just do my work,” Woo said. “But I kept asking myself: ‘Why am I dealing with this job to make money for a CEO who treated me this way?’ I hoped that I could put it behind me... but that turned out to be impossible.”

In January 2018, Woo decided to resign her position and report Cornelissen’s misconduct, but she fretted about how best to do it. Though DataCamp was 5 years old, it had no HR department.

“I was worried it would not be taken seriously, because of the usual victim-blaming stuff,” she said. “We were drinking, we were dancing — he put his hands on me, but it wasn’t anything incredibly violent.”

Woo called her boss to resign, and as she explained her reasons for doing so she described her experience with Cornelissen.

“I was worried it would not be taken seriously, because of the usual victim-blaming stuff.”

Her boss, Woo told BuzzFeed News, said he was sad to hear about the harassment. “His response was that he was very sorry to hear it, and he also said something like, ‘I can’t speak for Jonathan, but I’ve known him for a long time. I know him to be an ethical person,’” she said. According to Woo, her boss explained that he really didn’t “think [Jonathan] meant anything by it,” and “maybe there are some cultural differences at play here” (Cornelissen is Belgian).

Kara’s former boss did not respond to multiple requests for comment. A DataCamp spokesperson said the company does not accept cultural differences as an excuse for inappropriate behavior, and that when Woo’s manager was notified, he immediately reported it.

Jonathan Cornelissen

DataCamp / Facebook / Via Facebook: 726282547396228

Later that day, Cornelissen, who’d not had a meaningful conversation with Woo after the Ponta Delgada incident, sent her a Slack message saying he wanted to apologize. Contemporaneous notes that she took at the time, read by Woo over the phone, back this up. “He said he didn’t remember that evening; if he did, he would have wanted to apologize sooner,” Woo explained. “And he asked if I wanted to have a call to discuss it.”

Woo demurred, but a few days later, she agreed to have a conversation with Cornelissen over a video call. “He apologized again for what happened. He asked me about my experience and what I

remembered,” Woo said. Then he asked her what she thought the company should do in response, and whether she thought he should resign.

“I said it wasn’t necessarily called for at the time,” Woo said. But she was discomfited by the question.

The conversation ended without any specific resolution. Cornelissen told Woo that he wanted to make a formal statement to the whole company. She told him she thought it was a good move. But Cornelissen did not follow through at the time. He declined to speak to BuzzFeed News’ questions, referring us to DataCamp. The company said, through a spokesperson it decided against making an internal announcement because of privacy concerns.

“We are taking significant and appropriate actions to make things right, and we will continue to work to demonstrate our commitment to rebuilding trust and to treating all members of our community with dignity and respect,” a company spokesperson said in a statement responding to a detailed list of questions from BuzzFeed News. “As a company, we are committed to the process we outlined in our prior statement. The way the incident is described today presents new information to us and contains differences relative to the findings of the original 2018 investigation.”

“We take these differences very seriously and expect Anurima Bhargava [the company’s third-party reviewer] to take this new information into consideration as part of her investigation.”

Shortly before Woo’s last day at DataCamp in February 2018, Cornelissen told her the company intended to hire an investigator to look into what had happened during the company off-site the previous fall. That person turned out to be Jeff Fagnan, founder of the early-stage venture firm Accomplice. In a company blog post that appeared suddenly in April 2019, in which DataCamp gave the first public acknowledgment of harassment at the company, Fagnan was described as a “third party not involved in DataCamp’s day-to-day business.” He was unnamed in the post.

But Fagnan wasn’t a neutral third party. He was an early investor in DataCamp’s business. In July 2015, his VC firm Accomplice invested \$1 million in the company; it added another million-dollar investment in February 2016. As recently as December 2018, Accomplice joined yet another round of investment led by another equity firm, totaling \$25 million. Though the financial terms of the deal were not disclosed, this latest round brought the company’s valuation to \$184 million. In total, throughout its history, DataCamp has raised over \$30 million.

Fagnan disagreed that he was not neutral, arguing that investors aren’t involved in the everyday business of a company. “We invest and provide high-level guidance; they [the DataCamp executive team] run the company,” Fagnan said in an emailed response.

Asked what qualifications he had to investigate a sexual harassment incident at the company, Fagnan responded, “I am not an expert, but I do have experience with lots of early-stage companies with a variety of people issues, including sexual harassment. It wasn’t clear that the company was going to do

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a third-party investigation, so I volunteered.” (A company spokesperson pointed to its April statement that said an additional independent third party review would be conducted.)

“It wasn’t clear that the company was going to do a third-party investigation, so I volunteered.”

At the investigation’s conclusion, DataCamp’s April post said the company “immediately took a number of corrective actions,” including, for the executive, “extensive sensitivity training, personal coaching, and a strong warning that the company will not tolerate any such behavior in the future.” It noted, too, that DataCamp had hired a chief people officer, updated its anti-harassment policy and that, after the incident, all employees of DataCamp would be required to have sexual harassment training.

Some of this was in line with what Fagnan had described to Woo in a March 2018 email, sent a month after she’d left DataCamp. But while the blog post mentioned the career coach, sensitivity training, and a new human resources head, it left out a number of other recommendations. Some of the bullet points in the email, which was reviewed by BuzzFeed News, included: “Jonathan to limit himself to two drinks at all company functions that involve alcohol”; “At the next company retreat, use a professional moderator to discuss (1) cultural differences between Europe and US around gender in the workplace; (2) goals and plans for further gender diversification at the company”; “Make a company donation or sponsor an event for Girls Who Code.”

The final recommendation read: “Do not make a formal larger company announcement on the situation or the incident.”

“I asked Fagnan about the last recommendation, and he said it was originally the opposite,” Woo said. “But he had shown the recommendation to the company lawyers, who said DataCamp should do the opposite.”

“Do not make a formal larger company announcement on the situation or the incident.”

Fagnan said in an email that he carried out the investigation after input from DataCamp’s outside counsel and its HR partners, who helped advise him on the scope of the investigation, and how to best communicate with the people he interviewed. He added that he discussed the recommendations internally at Accomplice, before he shared the recommendations with Woo and DataCamp’s executive team.

“Part of the reason for no public or internal message was to protect Kara herself,” Fagnan said. “Kara never pushed back on any of the recommendations or suggested more work was needed; she at the time, said she hoped the company adopted any recommendations and that Jonathan would change his behavior. She said she thought he was apologetic, contrite, and wanted to do better.”

Woo told BuzzFeed News that Fagnan had already made the recommendations to the company when they spoke. “I wanted to move on, so I left it there,” she said. “I did hope the company would take some of these steps and make positive changes. At the same time, in my view there was a gap in terms of accountability.”



It's unclear to what extent DataCamp did end up implementing its diversity initiatives, but in February 2019, DataCamp published several pieces discussing women in data science and people of color and underrepresented groups in data science.

To Woo, the company's actions were "window dressing." "I didn't think these were all that compelling," she said. "But since I'd already left the company, I hoped I could just put it behind me."

But she couldn't. Over the next year, Woo was filled with anxiety at the prospect of running into Cornelissen and turned down professional opportunities if it meant she could avoid seeing him. What's more, when she saw her former DataCamp colleagues at conferences, it was uncomfortable. "Lots of DataCamp instructors are my friends," Woo said. Many of them didn't know what had happened to her, and Woo agonized over whether to tell them or not.

"Do I tell them what happened ... [and] put them in the awkward position of deciding what to do next, plus risk the possibility that DataCamp would retaliate if it thought I was interfering with its business?" she asked. "Or do I keep quiet and watch my friends invest their time and expertise in the company, which is painful for me and also puts them in an awkward position if they heard the story later on, through the rumor mill?"

"This has caused a lot of privately sad moments," Woo said.

Julia Silge, a data scientist with a published course on DataCamp, said she first heard about the harassment Woo had experienced through a mutual friend. "Kara did not talk to people about it for a while," Silge said in an interview. "Then she started talking about it more." Woo would tell people she trusted about the incident, Silge said, if they asked her about it.

When Silge and Woo started organizing a data science conference last year, she got firsthand confirmation of Woo's experience. "My heart just sank," Silge said. "The company needed to know that what it had done so far was not good enough."

"The company needed to know that what it had done so far was not good enough."

She wasn't the only DataCamp instructor who felt the company's public accounting for the incident was nonexistent. As she quickly discovered, other instructors and employees had raised concerns about the incident with the company too, and they were all getting unsatisfactory responses. Many felt they were being stonewalled.

So Silge began organizing them. "We started pulling people in," she said. There were several instructors who had heard just some parts of the story, and they began to talk to each other in emails and eventually, a small, private Slack group. They collectively pieced together Woo's story which had largely been a mystery.

After about six months, Silge said the instructors decided to approach DataCamp as a group. "We said, 'Okay, let's try to engage in this conversation, and ask why the company's answers had been so unsatisfactory,'" she said.



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In October 2018, one year after Woo's encounter with Cornelissen, ecologist Noam Ross published a new data science course on DataCamp. He quickly heard from other data scientists that there was an allegation of sexual misconduct at the company — but he wasn't sure what to do with the information. Then in early 2019, Heather Turner, a freelance statistical consultant and member of R-Ladies, a global group that promotes gender diversity in the data science community, reached out to him. She told him about a group of data scientists thinking of collectively confronting DataCamp over the allegations; she invited him to join.

Turner told BuzzFeed News that in September, DataCamp wanted to partner with R-Ladies to promote three-month scholarships for women and gender minorities. As part of its due diligence, the R-Ladies Global team discovered DataCamp's sexual misconduct incident. R-Ladies then told DataCamp it would suspend all partnerships and promotion of DataCamp activities as an organization; individual members were free to make their own decisions about their relationship with DataCamp.

After Turner's note to Ross, he joined the private Slack group with a couple dozen or so members, including Julia Silge. Most had their names listed on DataCamp's website as course instructors; others had DataCamp courses in development. They brainstormed strategies for applying more pressure on the company.

By the end of the month, there was one concrete development. On the private Slack group, Silge sent around a link to a Google form to sign up for a February 27 conference call that DataCamp told her it would be holding. The goal, ostensibly, was to let instructors ask the company questions about the sexual misconduct issue, and clear the air.

"The primary objective of the call is to address the concerns of our instructors and to communicate the actions DataCamp has taken to correct the issue," the conference invitation email, which was viewed by BuzzFeed News, said. "Please ... submit specific questions or concerns and we will do our best to address them during the call."

The call turned out to be a one-way webinar. Silge, Ross, and the other participants couldn't speak on the line; they couldn't even see who else had dialed in. The DataCamp representatives included Martijn Theuwissen, the company's cofounder; Julianne Horton, its chief people officer; Jelle Carcan, VP of finance and operations; Brooks Crichlow, VP of marketing; and Mari Nazary, head of curriculum. Silge said that she remembered only Theuwissen and Nazary speaking.

Ross, for one, had submitted a question ahead of the call about what the company could say to reassure instructors that DataCamp could be trusted with handling sexual misconduct issues. The company sent him its corporate anti-harassment policy in an emailed response.

Silge was sent the same document after the call, and was similarly frustrated. She demanded that DataCamp remove her name and photo from its online ads and other marketing materials. The company eventually agreed, according to a March 2019 email exchange between Silge and Nazary.

“I want you to know that people in the data science community literally do ask me about what happened at DataCamp, because they have heard rumors or half the story. I am in an untenable situation,” Silge wrote to DataCamp in the email, viewed by BuzzFeed News. “Telling me to send these people who I have relationships with, share trust with, know, etc, to an EEO policy or a blog post focusing on diversity is, frankly, insulting.”

A DataCamp spokesperson told BuzzFeed News the company now feels it was a mistake not to have a more open dialogue during this call with instructors.

For Ross, the company’s actions were yet another disappointment. “We were frustrated that DataCamp was continuing to try to minimize the situation and avoid really engaging with us,” Ross said. “It felt like continued gaslighting on their part, which had been many instructors’ experience until then.”

Silge, along with two other instructors, penned a letter to the company’s leadership detailing their concerns. “As current and prospective instructors and contributors to DataCamp who have spent extensive time and energy in creating content for the DataCamp platform and promoting the DataCamp brand, we are writing to express our disappointment at DataCamp’s mishandling of sexual misconduct,” the letter explained.

“Because we care deeply about fairness and safety, the data science community, and DataCamp itself, we are unable to cooperate with continued silence and lack of transparency on this issue.”

On April 3, Silge and her fellow organizers sent the letter — which now boasted 107 signatories — “to the email addresses of everyone we knew at DataCamp.”

The next day, without warning, and without reaching out to Woo first, DataCamp published a “note to our community.”

The note, with its intended-to-mitigate-liability tone, was not well received by the community that had been looking for answers for so long. As one instructor wrote, “This was a chance to do so much better. I’m disappointed in DataCamp. They have let me down. I really wanted them to do the right thing. Instead, they are doing the ‘legal’ thing.”

The DataCamp post reads, in part: “At an informal employee gathering at a bar after a week-long company offsite, one of DataCamp’s executives danced inappropriately and made uninvited physical contact with another employee while on the dance floor. The employee raised a concern with a manager a few months later ... at which time the executive apologized to the employee.”

A flurry of blog posts and reactions from the data science community voiced other pointed criticism: Ross noticed that DataCamp’s post had a “noindex” tag to prevent search engines from showing it in their results. (The tag was later removed; a DataCamp spokesperson said it had been a mistake to include it.) Mara Averick, a developer advocate for RStudio, pointed out, “All the extra detail is on the behalf of the perpetrator. I don’t care if it was at a Bull Fight in Cuba at 4pm, or at 8am in the copy room.”

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If you think @DataCamp deserves credit for a public post that they did not discipline an executive for sexual misconduct, consider that they put this code in the HTML, so no search engines would index it. I don't see it anywhere else on their blog. #rstats #python #datasci #metoo

Noam Ross @ NYR Conference @noamross

If you think @DataCamp deserves credit for a public post that they did not discipline an executive for sexual misconduct, consider that they put this code in the HTML, so no search engines would index it. I don't see it anywhere else on their blog. #rstats #python #datasci #metoo

02:29 PM - 12 Apr 2019

Reply Retweet Favorite

Noam Ross / Via Twitter: @noamross

Another Twitter user said, “Look at the inclusion of detail about timing. Why was this included? The only reason to include this detail in a post is to downplay the severity of the event.” Around this time, Woo stepped forward and outed herself, and also tweeted: “I’m sure I don’t need to explain the reasons people don’t report things like this immediately.”

“The letter was a big breaking point for a lot of people,” Averick told BuzzFeed News.

I’ve supported D.C. publicly, been on their podcast & pay for their service. I’m VERY displeased with how this was handled. This blog post is bullshit. The post spins a bunch of detail that casts shade / doubt on the victim. This is wrong. Do better, y’all. <https://t.co/NpR9G6aKQG>

JD Long @CMastication

I’ve supported D.C. publicly, been on their podcast & pay for their service. I’m VERY displeased with how this was handled. This blog post is bullshit. The post spins a bunch of detail that casts shade / doubt on the victim. This is wrong. Do better, y’all. <https://t.co/NpR9G6aKQG>

11:42 AM - 05 Apr 2019

Reply Retweet Favorite

CMastication / Via Twitter: @CMastication

After the “noindex” tag was discovered on DataCamp’s blog post, Turner said, “It was clear the main objective of the post was to appease the instructors, rather than demonstrate transparency and accountability.”

The backlash was swift. Instructors could not demand that the company take their courses down because the company shares intellectual property rights with them, but they started to urge the public not to take their DataCamp courses. That included several graduate students for whom a DataCamp

course could provide a nontrivial, added source of income. Data science organizations, including R-Ladies, RStudio, and satRdays, among others, cut ties with the company.

“Sexual misconduct happens everywhere,” Ross said. “But DataCamp was dealing with a community with abnormally high standards and support for each other.”

“The letter was a big breaking point for a lot of people.”

Soon word got out that two former DataCamp employees who knew about Woo’s harassment — Dhavide Aruliah and Greg Wilson — had been fired in June 2018. Each said, in respective blog posts, that they had voiced concerns about DataCamp’s handling of sexual misconduct allegations. Each said that DataCamp offered them an extra month of pay as part of a separation agreement that included a non-disparagement clause.

In its April blog post, DataCamp took issue with the assertion: “As standard practice, DataCamp offered these departing individuals separation packages that contained non-disparagement provisions which specifically and expressly would have permitted them to raise concerns about the company.”

Wilson said in a post that when he pressed the company about whether such a clause would prevent him from speaking about harassment at DataCamp, the company replied, “Nothing limits non-disparagement and it would be at your own peril.” At a later point, the company told him, “The non-disparagement provision would prohibit such public statements ... That said, the Company takes all concerns about potential sexual harassment and/or sexual assault seriously.”

In a post Wilson had written earlier that month, he clarified, “Full disclosure: DataCamp fired me in June 2018 for poor performance.” He also said: “People say that the culture of an organization is defined by the worst behavior its leaders are willing to tolerate. I think it’s also defined by the worst behavior by the leaders that the rank and file are willing to tolerate. DataCamp’s statement only appeared after considerable pressure from the community, and its half-heartedness and deflection just make me sad.”

Aruliah said in his blog post that DataCamp told him he was being fired “for performance”; he added in an interview that the company told him it “categorically refuted” that he had been dismissed because he’d raised concerns about DataCamp mishandling the sexual misconduct incident. But, he said, the company spent eight months trying to recruit him, and that his courses were not only still up on DataCamp — they were extremely successful, with a quarter of a million people having completed them. Aruliah said the business decision “didn’t make sense.”

Wilson, meanwhile, told BuzzFeed News, “I got a glowing review from my boss in February. Four months later I was canned, without notice and without an offer of any sort of improvement plan.”

“But I’m not the story here,” Wilson said in the interview. “Kara’s experience and the company’s repeated attempts to smother it is the story.”

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A DataCamp spokesperson told BuzzFeed News the company does not tolerate retaliation against any employees.

For Woo, who was still trying to move on with her life, watching all of this unfold inspired mixed feelings. “At times, I felt like I kept getting dragged back into it,” she said. “But I was glad people were taking it seriously.”

A DataCamp employee, who did not want to be named, said that before the company’s April 2019 blog post, “there was no written communication, and no formal letter that I can recall” that was sent out to the company addressing the incident.

“I can’t speak for everyone, but many of us are just devastated, frustrated, and hurt,” the employee said. “So much of this wouldn’t have needed to happen if [DataCamp leadership] took the right steps back in 2018. We are where we are now, and it’s difficult to see whether leadership will lead us out of this and make it better.”

On April 24, after much public pressure, Cornelissen posted a personal apology to DataCamp’s website titled “I am deeply sorry.” DataCamp also issued a statement, this time from the company board. It said Cornelissen would step down as CEO for an “indefinite” leave of absence without pay beginning in May. A new investigation would be conducted by outside counsel, and an instructor review board would be created.

“Our public response and this first official statement from the Board regarding this incident is long overdue. We are sorry for this delay,” DataCamp’s statement reads. “... We have learned a lot from the community over the last several weeks and recognize that the company hasn’t listened nearly enough to you over the last 18 months.”

“We have learned a lot from the community over the last several weeks and recognize that the company hasn’t listened nearly enough to you over the last 18 months.”

For Woo, the company’s response was too little, too late. “This has been a big ordeal for me in the last year and a half,” she said. “I watched DataCamp leadership repeatedly fail to address the issue, or take it seriously. I’ve watched former colleagues of mine — friends in the community, who are employees of DataCamp — be complicit in keeping this under wraps. I’ve watched the company roll out diversity initiatives that I thought were disingenuous. ... I never wanted this to happen to me.”

Meanwhile, DataCamp’s community of instructors remain wary of the company’s “indefinite” removal of Cornelissen as CEO. Two told BuzzFeed News they feel the careful wording of the company’s latest announcement seemingly allows for Cornelissen to return to DataCamp in the future.

A company spokesperson said Cornelissen’s future at the company will be determined by the findings of its independent third-party review and its soon-to-be-formed Instructor Advisory Board. According to tech startup database Pitchbook, the board is made up of Cornelissen’s cofounders and a recent investor.

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“The company turned in the right direction, but I still want to see if they move that way,” Ross said. “We [the instructors] don’t think that the core issues that the company as a whole — and not just one individual — were dealt with.”

“I’m keeping an open mind, depending on what comes out of this investigation, and potential changes in leadership,” Ross continued. “It can still go either way. In the meantime, I’m not ready to rush back.”

In his last blog post on the subject, Ross stated, “An investigation into the management missteps that have led to this point is necessary.” He raised several more questions for the company to consider. Ross said DataCamp had reached out one more time after it posted Cornelissen’s apology and the announcement of his resignation, asking for feedback on its actions. Ross sent the ideas in an email back, and copied Cornelissen.

“I haven’t heard back from DataCamp since,” Ross said. ●

## Google's Dr. Strangelove

- Amid World's Largest Corporate Sex Scandals Google CEO Eric Schmidt will leave Alphabet's board
- Google's venture capitalist's and staff hold the world record for sex scandals and hookers
- Departure follows backlash over reports of sexual misconduct cover-ups
- Eric Schmidt's "Sex Penthouse" is world famous on the internet

By [Jacob Kastrenakes@jake\\_kShare](mailto:Jacob.Kastrenakes@jake_kShare)

Eric Schmidt will depart Alphabet's board, after holding a seat for 18 years. His departure comes just over a year after [Schmidt stepped down](#) from his role as Alphabet's executive chairman — it also comes as Google struggles with internal turmoil over its involvement with [US military contracts](#), [potential business in China](#), and [reported cover-ups of sexual misconduct](#).

Schmidt has been a key presence at Google during his time with the company. He initially took a board seat in 2001, when he was made CEO of Google — a role he was given essentially [to lend business expertise](#) to what company founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin had been building. In 2011, he [left the CEO position](#) and became Google's executive chairman. At the beginning of 2018, he stepped down from that role and became a regular board member.

...DIB, NSCAI, [@SchmidtFutures](#), teaching & more, to help coach and develop extraordinarily talented leaders, and to build more free, prosperous societies<https://t.co/QNBracpVnj>

— Eric Schmidt (@ericsschmidt) [April 30, 2019](#)

In a [press release](#) today, Alphabet announced that Schmidt would not seek reelection to the board when his term is up, on June 19th. Alphabet says he'll remain a "technical advisor" to the company, a role he's had since last year.

Schmidt said that he would be stepping down in order to help "the next generation of talent to serve." He said he would be teaching more, working at his philanthropic organization, Schmidt Futures, and using his role as technical advisor to "coach Alphabet and Google businesses/tech."

While Schmidt undoubtedly played a key role in Google becoming the behemoth it is today, his presence may have been a less appreciated one more recently. Just six months ago, Google came under scrutiny when *The New York Times* [reported on sexual misconduct within the company](#). The report included details of a \$150 million payout to Android creator Andy Rubin amid a sexual misconduct inquiry. Schmidt was [later named in a lawsuit](#) accusing the company of covering up harassment by multiple executives.



1. [Inside Google Chairman Eric Schmidt's Lavish Sex ... - NYMag](#)

[nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/07/eric-schmidt-penthouse-new-york-photos-apartment...](http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/07/eric-schmidt-penthouse-new-york-photos-apartment...)

Jul 25, 2013 · Inside Google Chairman **Eric Schmidt's** Lavish **Sex** Palace. By Dan Amira. To be fair, nobody knows for sure exactly what goes on in **Eric Schmidt's** \$15 million **penthouse** ...

2. [Eric Schmidt Spent \\$15 Million On A New York Penthouse ...](#)

<https://www.businessinsider.com/eric-schmidt-spent-15-million-on-a-new-york-penthouse...>

Jul 25, 2013 · REUTERS/Rick Wilking Former Google CEO, and current chairman, **Eric Schmidt** spent \$15 million to buy a **penthouse** apartment in Manhattan's Flatiron ...

- **Author:** Jay Yarow

3. [The Many Women of Eric Schmidt's Instagram](#)

[valleywag.gawker.com/the-many-women-of-eric-schmidts-instagram-913796517](http://valleywag.gawker.com/the-many-women-of-eric-schmidts-instagram-913796517)

If there's one thing you should know about Google's Director of Open Marriage Engineering, **Eric Schmidt**, it's that he loves to fuck. He's also following a select, interesting assortment of people on Instagram, and by interesting I mean a lot of models and women in swimwear..  
**Google Boss Enjoys \$15 Mil Manhattan Sex Penthouse**

4. [Google CEO and serial womanizer Eric Schmidt spends 15 ...](#)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric...>

Jul 25, 2013 · Google boss **Eric Schmidt** has splashed out \$15 million on a sprawling Manhattan **penthouse** in the trendy Flatiron District to be close to at least two of his female friends in the city.

5. [Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt Buys Sex Penthouse](#)

<https://www.eteknix.com/google-executive-chairman-eric-schmidt-buys-sex-penthouse>

Jul 26, 2013 · Google Executive Chairman **Eric Schmidt** Buys **Sex Penthouse**. ... News outlets have dubbed it the '**Sex Penthouse**'. **Schmidt** had a net worth ...

6. [Eric Schmidt, Google CEO, owns \\$15m sex penthouse](#)

<https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2q7406>





1:14

May 14, 2015 · Google CEO **Eric Schmidt**, the guy you entrust your online privacy to, is clearly a man of passion. Among his interests, the 58-year-old's apparently particularly fond of banging. In addition to the roster of attractive ...

- **Author:** TomoNews US
- **Views:** 85

7. [Eric Schmidt is a playboy - Big League Politics](#)

[\*https://bigleaguepolitics.com/schmidt-is-a-playboy\*](https://bigleaguepolitics.com/schmidt-is-a-playboy)

In 2013, Gawker reported on **Schmidt's** \$15 million New York City duplex, described as a “**sex penthouse**,” which is outfitted with a wet bar, soundproofed walls, and a 3,300 square foot terrace. The duplex does not have a doorman, a curious feature for the W. 21st St. abode located in the ritziest enclave of Manhattan.

- **Author:** Peter D'abrosca

8. [Google chairman Eric Schmidt: Instagram girls, yachts and ...](#)

[\*https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/eric-schmidt-google-scandal\*](https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/eric-schmidt-google-scandal)

Jan 06, 2014 · How Google's executive chairman is gaining a reputation as a playboy, thanks to a deleted Instagram account, a £9.4 million Manhattan **penthouse** and his very own superyacht. As in: **Eric Schmidt ...**

9. [Google Boss Enjoys \\$15 Mil Manhattan Sex Penthouse](#)

[\*valleywag.gawker.com/google-boss-enjoys-15-mil-manhattan-sex-penthouse-909299764\*](http://valleywag.gawker.com/google-boss-enjoys-15-mil-manhattan-sex-penthouse-909299764)

If you're a "normal married dude," who also happens to have a ton of **sex** on the side, you probably go to a motel or the back of a Jeep, I don't know. But if you're Google's executive chairman, knee deep in it with billions to spend, you have this soundproofed third base Xanadu.

Eric Schmidt is backed by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), a white boys club that helps rich oligarchs cover up each other's crimes. The FBI, The SEC, The FTC, the U.S. Attorney General and the Civil Court system have been asked to investigate and prosecute a “Cartel organization” known as the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), per documents filed.

This organization, created by CIA liaisons from a shady rogue group known as In-Q-Tel (funders of Google) James Breyer, Gilman Louie, as well as John Doerr, Eric Schmidt, Steve Jurvetson and other notorious Silicon Valley names, has been discovered to be operating a covert “boys club” which

arranges collusion, price fixing, market rigging, political bribes, monopolies, black-lists, valuation rigging, stock pumps, and Flash Boy stock manipulations.

These billionaires use back-room meetings, secret databases, intelligence systems, coded Tweets, and private Google docs and DropBox boxes to rig the tech industry so that only their private club gets to decide which American tech companies get to live or die. Unless you were in their “elite family fraternity houses, you are simply grist for their mercenary mill...” say the charges.

This monopoly club began to get exposed in the notorious “AngelGate Scandal”. The spotlight focused even more tightly on them in the other twisted tech scandal known as “The Silicon Valley No-Poaching Conspiracy”, in which a lawsuit revealed how far their collusion could go.

Because these men fund political campaigns that go all the way up to The White House, law enforcement has been slow to the gate. In every enforcement agency, though, there are a mix of Democrat and Republican employees. You only need a couple good cops to keep a case going. In federal agencies with thousands of investigators, there will always be a handful of “Elliot Ness”-motivated good guy cops from each political party. At least one of those will eventually get their man, or men, in this case.

The NVCA cartel rigged trillions of dollars of taxpayer money for themselves in the Department of Energy Cleantech Crash, The TARPP funding and NASA contracts. Now the chickens have come home to roost.

The related Angelgate scandal began in September 2010 after [Michael Arrington](#), editor of the [TechCrunch](#) publication, wrote in his [blog](#) that he had been turned away from a secret meeting among so-called “[super angels](#)” he knew,<sup>[3]</sup> held at Bin38, a [wine bar](#) in San Francisco's [Marina District](#).<sup>[4]</sup> The participants at the meeting, among other things, discussed how they could compete with other angels, venture capitalists, and the [Y Combinator](#) business incubator for the limited pool of worthy investment opportunities.<sup>[5]</sup> Arrington said that after the meeting, he had been informed by two of the attendees that the investors had discussed how to fix low valuations for new [start-up](#) companies, and how to keep better-funded venture capitalists from investing.<sup>[6]</sup>

The blog became the subject of discussion among the [Silicon Valley](#) start-up community over the next several days.<sup>[7][8]</sup> Investor [Ron Conway](#), whose business partner attended the meeting, wrote an email highly critical of the angels involved and called the event “despicable and embarrassing”.<sup>[9]</sup> [Dave McClure](#), a well-known angel present at the event,<sup>[7]</sup> wrote in a blog that Arrington's account was inaccurate, and a tweet (later deleted) complaining about Conway.<sup>[10]</sup> [Chris Sacca](#) wrote a lengthy email that defended the participants and was critical of Conway, which was also leaked to TechCrunch.<sup>[11]</sup>

Reports arose that the United States [Federal Bureau of Investigation](#) began reviewing the incident.<sup>[12]</sup>

There was skepticism that there was actually any collusion or that price fixing could succeed if it was attempted.<sup>[1][13][14]</sup> The event also gave rise to various online cultural phenomena. Among other things there was a [flash mob](#) at the wine bar, a [Hitler Downfall parody](#), a spike in the establishment's Google rank, a number of Twitter jokes,<sup>[4]</sup> and so-called "fakeplans" for super-angel meetups on the site [plancast.com](#).<sup>[7]</sup> On Monday, September 27, 2010, Ron Conway, Dave McClure, Chris Sacca, and others appeared at a panel discussion hosted by Arrington at his "TechCrunch Disrupt" conference in San Francisco<sup>[15][16]</sup> where, despite Arrington's prodding, they avoided a "[Jerry Springer](#) moment".<sup>[17]</sup>

- Alexei Oreskovic (September 22, 2010). ["Investor conspiracy theory grips Silicon Valley"](#). Reuters.
- Mangalindan, JP (September 29, 2010). ["Angel collusion: It's not necessarily a bad thing"](#). Fortune Magazine.
- Russell Garland (September 24, 2010). ["The Daily Start-Up: 'AngelGate' Escalates"](#). Wall Street Journal.
- Paolo Lucchesi (September 24, 2010). ["AngelGate meeting scandal gives Bin 38 lots of free publicity, punchlines, and a Hitler parody"](#). San Francisco Chronicle.
- Neyfakh, Leon (September 28, 2010). ["Paul Graham of Y Combinator Pulls Back the Curtain on What Goes On At His Start-Up Factory"](#). New York Observer. Archived from [the original](#) on October 3, 2010.
- Jameson Berkow (September 23, 2010). ["The secret rulers of Silicon Valley"](#). National Post.
- Maggie Shiels (September 23, 2010). ["Angelgate': A tech conspiracy?"](#). BBC.
- ["After Quiet Dinner, Angels Get Indigestion"](#). New York Times. September 22, 2010.
- Patrick Hoge (September 23, 2010). ["Ron Conway slams 'super angels' hard"](#). San Francisco Business Times.
- Ryan Singel (September 24, 2010). ["Showdown! Angels, Arrington to Go Mano a Mano"](#). Wired Magazine. Archived from [the original](#) on September 28, 2010.
- Michael Arrington (September 26, 2010). ["AngelGate: Chris Sacca Responds To Ron Conway"](#). TechCrunch. Retrieved 5 June 2013.
- Patrick Hoge (September 23, 2010). ["FBI reportedly looking into Angelgate"](#). San Francisco Business Times.
- Dan Primack (September 22, 2010). ["Super-angels have dinner, all hell breaks loose"](#). Fortune Magazine.
- Alex Salkever (September 24, 2010). ["AngelGate or Not, Controlling the Market in Hot Startups Is Impossible"](#). Daily Finance.
- Nitasha Tiku (September 27, 2010). ["How Michael Arrington's School of Friendship Journalism Led to 'AngelGate'"](#). New York Magazine.
- Tomio Geron (September 27, 2010). ["'AngelGate' Players Come Face To Face, But Fireworks Are Few"](#). Wall Street Journal.

- Jessica Guynn (September 27, 2010). ["'AngelGate' disrupts TechCrunch conference but no 'Jerry Springer' moment"](#). *Los Angeles Times*.

HSBC “Swiss Leaks”, hacked documents, ex-employee testimony, surveillance records and the combined dockets of multiple past cases now reveal the true intentions, strategies, covert manipulations and illegal anti-trust actions of this Silicon Valley “Crime Club”.

Using database code signals on sites such as [www.gust.com](http://www.gust.com), a public venture funding blog, as well as secret DropBox accounts, this insiders club of “Venture Capitalists”, as they called themselves, were able to black-list, and run defamation “hit-jobs” on inventors, and entrepreneurs, who were too good at inventing technologies that put their existing holdings out of business. Criminal charges have been demanded from the FBI, FTC, SEC and Attorney General. Civil anti-trust lawsuits are underway.

Hopefully these actions will correct the sad state of affairs that Silicon Valley has fallen into at the hands of this mercenary, misogynistic old white frat house “boys club”.

## Media Silence

- Allison Mack's Arrest Exposes Child Trafficking For Billionaire-Backed Sex Slave Ring
- The Rothschild-linked Bronfman sisters donated millions to the cult whose leaders, Allison Mack and Keith Raniere, have been charged with child sex trafficking.

John Vibes, Per: [https://www.scribd.com/document/377378941/Allison-Mack-Case-File#from\\_embed](https://www.scribd.com/document/377378941/Allison-Mack-Case-File#from_embed) , reveals more details that emerge in the case of the elite Hollywood sex cult NXIVM, it seems that the story goes even deeper than was first reported. There is growing evidence that this alleged self-help group was just a front for a human trafficking ring. It has also been revealed that this group has close ties with high-power ruling class families, including the Rothschilds, Clintons, and Bronfmans.

According to the charges, Smallville actress Allison Mack was a member of the cult and worked in a management position. As second-in-command, it was her job to lure women into the programs under the pretense of female empowerment and self-help workshops, to then convince them to sign up for a more "advanced program" called Dominus Obsequious Sororium, which required these women to basically turn the lives over to cult leader Keith Raniere. Dominus Obsequious Sororium is a quasi-Latin phrase that roughly translates to "Master Over the Slave Women."

When women joined Raniere's inner circle, they were forced to sign over their finances to him, starve themselves to maintain a certain weight, and he even had them surgically branded with his initials. Raniere would use blackmail to keep the women from speaking out, by collecting nude photos and damaging evidence on family members.

"As alleged in the indictment, Allison Mack recruited women to join what was purported to be a female mentorship group that was, in fact, created and led by Keith Raniere. The victims were then exploited, both sexually and for their labor, to the defendants' benefit," U.S. Attorney Richard P. Donoghue said in a statement.

The cult was finally exposed when the daughter of former Dynasty actress Catherine Oxenberg became a member. Oxenberg told the New York Times that she became concerned after she saw that her 26-year-old daughter India was extremely emaciated from dieting, and was suffering from serious health problems.

"Some people have said this is a voluntary sorority. The women I have spoken to tell a far different story," Oxenberg said. "Coercion is not voluntary. Extortion is not voluntary. Blackmail is not voluntary."

When these accusations hit the news, other women, including actress Sarah Edmondson, came forward to all to tell the same story, of the blackmail, the branding, as well as the forced labor and forced sexual activity.

Raniere is also accused of having a history of pedophilia, with accusations that stretch back over 20 years, involving girls as young as 12.

In 2012, several women were interviewed by the Albany Times Union about the coercive sexual experiences that they had with Raniere when they were young girls. One of the women in the case was found dead of a gunshot wound before she was able to give the interview. Her death was ruled a suicide.

The U.S. attorney's office requested to have Raniere held without bail in a letter to the court stating that he was a known child predator.

Although this extremely important detail is being left out of most mainstream reports, one of the main charges in the criminal indictment against Raniere and Mack is sex trafficking of children.

A quick search for Allison Mack's arrest report or charges—as reported by the mainstream media—will not yield any mention of children. Most mainstream reports only mention sex trafficking and ominously omit that the charges were for sex trafficking of children. Exactly why the media is refusing to report this remains a mystery.

Another important aspect of this case that has been largely overlooked, is the connections that this organization has to high-level figures in politics and finance. The organization worked much like a pyramid scheme, collecting regular fees from its members. But the majority of the funding, over \$150 million, came from the trust funds of Seagram heiresses, Sara and Clare Bronfman.

Their involvement with Raniere began in 2002 and has been very public and controversial, with other members of the Bronfman family distancing themselves from the sisters in the press. The Bronfman family has very close ties to the Rothschild banking dynasty, with members of both families belonging to many of the same companies, including their joint financial firm, Bronfman & Rothschild.

Additionally, at least three high-ranking members of the organization, including Nancy Salzman and the Bronfman sisters, are members of Bill Clinton's foundation, the Clinton Global Initiative, which requires an annual \$15,000 membership fee.

The question on everyone's mind – are Bill and Hillary Clinton connected to or involved with child sex trafficking or child labor trafficking networks – or, are they advocates for children as they portray themselves to be? Though the focus is on both Bill and Hillary, this report will primarily break down a timeline of Hillary's work as it relates to children, in addition to both of their connections with individuals who have been indicted and/or convicted of crimes against children – because they are stacking up. The information that follows will provide facts, for each person to use their own discernment in determining what they believe to be truth, or until further information is revealed.

Human trafficking is a \$150 billion dollar industry.

Timeline of Hillary's Work Specifically Involving Infants & Children:

1970: Worked at Yale Child Study Center, learning about early childhood brain development, and research assistant on the book Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, and handled cases of child abuse at Yale–New Haven Hospital

1970: Summer – worked on Walter Mondale's Subcommittee on Migratory Labor

1971: Met husband Bill, interned at law firm Treuhaft, Walker and Burnstein where she worked on child custody and other cases

1973: Postgraduate study on children and medicine at Yale Child Study Center, her article "Children Under the Law" was published in the Harvard Educational Review, staff attorney at Marian Wright Edelman's Children's Defense Fund in Cambridge, MA, consultant to Carnegie Council on Children

1977: Co-founded Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families – a state level alliance with Children's Defense Fund, and worked pro bono in child advocacy during her work at Rose Law Firm

1979: Published "Children's Policies: Abandonment and Neglect and "Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective

1985: Introduced Arkansas's Home Instruction Program for Preschool Youth (preparedness & literacy)

1988-92: Children's Defense Fund Chairman of the Board and on the board of the Arkansas Children's Hospital's legal services

1995: Wrote an article on orphaned children that led to the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997

1996: Published book "It Takes A Village: And Other Lessons Children Teach Us"

1997: Supported State Children's Health Insurance Program, and promoted nationwide immunization against childhood diseases; hosted child care conference and early childhood development and learning conferences at White House; initiated and shepherded the Adoption and Safe Families Act which required states to terminate parental rights for children in foster care for 15 out of 22 months and provided funding for efforts in encouraging adoption as well as subsidies for adoptive children up through age 18; By executive memorandum, her husband President Bill Clinton added the "Adoption 2002 Initiative" which aimed to lower barriers to adoption so as to double the rate of adoption by 2002

1999: Instrumental in passing Foster Care Independence Act, doubling federal funding for teenagers opting out of foster care, launched the International Center for Missing and Exploited Children along with Lady Catherine Meyer and Cherie Booth Blair

2000: Hosted children and adolescents conference and conference on teenagers at White House



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2005: Introduced the Family Entertainment Protection Act with other senators to protect children from inappropriate content found in video games

2007: Via Clinton Health Access Initiative, worked in Pakistan to train nurses and midwives to perform both births and abortions

2009: Via Clinton Health Access Initiative, worked in Zambia, Malawi, Haiti, Mexico and Central America to train nurses and midwives to perform both births and abortions. Partnered with the Polaris Project who runs the National Human Trafficking Resource Center and Hotline, and is also a Clinton Global Initiative member, to build an “Anti-trafficking approach replicable worldwide.”

2010: Clinton Health Access received \$25 million from IKEA for CHAI to join the “Every Woman Every Child” initiative so CHAI can partner with governments to educate moms on the right treatment for their child’s diarrhea and encourage manufacturers to develop child-friendly formulations, with a focus in Kenya, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.

2012: Hosted a Clinton Global Initiative Conference focusing on human trafficking, with former president Obama as they keynote speaker.

2013: Through Bill, Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation focused on early childhood development and initiative “Too Small to Fail” led by former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard to encourage girls worldwide to enroll in secondary schools; Lead “No Ceilings: The Full Participation Project,” a partnership with Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to study data on progress of girls and women around the world; Via Clinton Health Access Initiative, launched a 7-year health program in Rwanda with Ivy Leagues from the U.S. and \$150 million from the U.S. Government, to train over 6,000 young women to be nurses and midwives for performing both births and abortions.

2014: Partnered with the Polaris Project, a CGI member, in creating an online “Global Modern Day Slavery” database directory.

2018: Campaigned for women’s right to abortion, and cheered Governor Cuomo’s on, leading up to his announcement of passing New York’s new abortion laws allowing abortions up to full term, which removed legal protections for failed abortions where babies are born alive – meaning, they allow them to die.

Does all of this involvement with children equate to people who are advocating for children, or is it cover for other nefarious actions?

Review all of the information below to draw conclusions.

Last year, the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), another entity that was never filed properly and is operating illegally, received over US\$1.1 million for an award from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation – a huge contributor to the Clintons, and NORAD – who also helped fund their Ten Island Challenge program. The award was allegedly for saving the lives of mothers and newborns.

### Hillary's Involvement with The International Center for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC)

Back in the mid 1990s, Belgium reached out to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in request for assistance with their missing children issues. The NCMEC's Board of Directors authorized the creation of a new organization that would devote itself to doing globally what NCMEC was committed to doing in the United States. In 1998, members of the Board of the newly created International Center for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC) held their first meeting, and in April 1999 it was launched by then First Lady Hillary Clinton, Lady Catherine Meyer, and Cherie Booth Blair, wife of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The full archived press release can be viewed [here](#).

Richard Branson's mother, Eve Branson, was a founding board member of ICMEC in 1999 and served on the Board of Directors until 2005. Richard Branson was ICMEC's founding sponsor. ICMEC is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charity supported entirely by private funds and resources, and is headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia near the CIA. It is a non- government agency. It also has an Asia-Pacific office and Latin America & The Caribbean office.

Since their inception, they have helped to create four national or regional missing and exploited children's centers around the world. One of those is the Global Missing Children's Network (GMCN), which happened to launch in 1998, the same year ICMEC launched. There are 29 member countries on 5 continents allegedly working to help recover missing and abducted children.

In a photo of the Board of Directors provided on Wikipedia, Eve Branson along with her son Richard Branson, and a lot of other familiar faces are pictured.

Bill and Hillary Clinton's ties with Richard Branson go way back, as well as forward. They are all currently working together on The Ten Island Challenge pilot program, which launched in 2012 and began with ten islands, and quickly evolved to over twenty islands, all throughout the drug and child trafficking transits in the Caribbean. Since their inception, they have now branched out to form alarming new partnerships and focus on the tourism and hotel industry. This Ten Island Challenge program, funded by GEF, an arm of the World Bank, OPIC, the Dutch postal code lottery, and the Norwegian government, has allegedly set out to setup islands with solar farms and renewable energy.

Most of these Caribbean islands have been deemed tier 2 & 3 and are subject to U.S. aid restrictions due to their level of human trafficking and subjecting large populations to modern slavery – as the documentation reveals in this report. Based on Hillary's portrayed background in fighting for children's rights, why then would she wish to focus her energy on setting up a small solar farm to feed a block of homes on each of these islands – all of which include free solar systems to the government buildings – rather than fighting for the suffering children that reside on these islands?

Another important and relevant fact to include, is that Planned Parenthood setup the Caribbean family Planning Affiliation on 10 of those islands as well. The same year Clinton's Ten Island Challenge launched, Planned Parenthood Federation announced their plan to training youth leaders in Latin

America, Africa and the U.S., as well as their desire to combat the vulnerability of youth to unintended pregnancy and unsafe abortion. Why is this relevant? Because the Clintons have been working with Planned Parenthood since 1993 when Bill Clinton removed the “gag order” to secure ongoing funding for clinics performing abortions, and both have been training midwives and nurses to perform abortions in multiple countries, which all began in New York City.

Back to ICMEC: To understand the magnitude of ICMEC’s reach, in a 2014 report for the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pertaining to “International Parental Child Abduction” it states that ICMEC has trained law enforcement in 121 countries. They have reviewed laws in 200 countries and worked with parliaments in 100 countries to enact new law on child pornography. They built a global missing children’s network to include 22 countries, established national centers in multiple countries, and created a regional center in Europe, serving 13 countries in the Balkan region.

In addition, they met with 400 Arab leaders in Cairo to create an agreement on child protection. They also partnered with the Vatican, Mayo Clinic and Il Telefono Azzurro to create ‘The Declaration of Rome’ on children’s rights. And finally, they entered into formal partnerships with Interpol, and launched a Global Health Coalition of pharmaceutical companies and health care institutions to address a public health crisis with child sexual abuse.

In 2005, six years after the launch of ICMEC, it was estimated that 600,000 to 800,000 humans were trafficked across international borders each year, with 50% being minors, according to the U.S. Department of State, and according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), “global profits made from forced laborers exploited by private enterprises or agents reach \$43 billion every year, of which \$31.6 billion was from trafficked victims.” Nine years later, in 2014, the (ILO) reported “forced labor in the private economy generates \$150 billion in illegal profits per year, three times more than previously estimated.”

All of this begs the question, if ICMEC is as all-powerful as they claim, and have taken all of the above steps to help prevent this worldwide epidemic, why then have the numbers of trafficked victims significantly increased since its inception in 1999 rather than decreased? When does “at any moment” go into effect exactly?

### **Follow The Money: Financial Connections to ICMEC**

The board of ICMEC (past and present), nearly all have a work history with big pharma, biotech, and banks. These folks have put together a fantastic itemized list of board members, a timeline with press releases linking to ICMEC, and donations. Full credit goes to them for compiling the financial information extracted below.

Göran Ando, served on the board for ICMEC, and worked for Novo Nordisk, UK Ltd., and Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd.

- Novo Nordisk paid \$1.7 million to Podesta Group between 2004-2012

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- Novo Nordisk donated between \$50-100k to Clinton Foundation
- AstraZeneca PLC donated \$100,000 – \$250,000 to Clinton Foundation
- AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP donated \$50,000 – \$100,000 to Clinton Foundation

Mike DeNoma, is a former director of ICMEC and currently serves on the board of directors for ICMEC. He is also the senior advisor to

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. LP, and has held high-ranking positions at Standard Chartered Plc / International Private Banking Business, and

Citibank NA.

- Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. LP paid over \$1.3 million in lobbying fees to the Podesta Group
- Standard Chartered Bank (more below) donated \$1,000,001 – \$5,000,000 to Clinton Foundation
- James A. Kohlberg donated \$50,001 – \$100,000 to Clinton Foundation

Victor Halberstadt, vice chairman of the board of directors on ICMEC, worked for The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Daimler-Chrysler.

Interestingly, he was also a Trustee for the Population Council, New York.

- Daimler Trucks North America LLC donated \$500,001 – \$1,000,000 to Clinton Foundation
- Goldman Sachs Philanthropy Fund donated \$250,001 – \$500,000 to Clinton Foundation
- The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. donated \$1,000,001 – \$5,000,000 to Clinton Foundation

Dr. Franz B. Humer, chair on the board of directors for ICMEC, with an extensive resume, including Roche Holdings AG, Citigroup, Diageo

PLC, Genentech, Inc., and many more.

- Roche Group paid the Podesta Group over \$1.5 million between 1998 – 2006
- Roche Holdings paid the Podesta Group \$560,000 between 2007 – 2009
- Citigroup Inc. paid the Podesta Group \$100,000 in 2001
- Diageo PLC paid the Podesta Group over \$1.3 million between 2010 – 2016
- Genentech, Inc. donated \$10,001 – \$25,000 to Clinton Foundation
- Citi Foundation donated \$1,000,001 – \$5,000,000 to Clinton Foundation
- Citigroup Inc. donated \$500,001 – \$1,000,000 to Clinton Foundation
- Diageo PLC donated \$50,001 – \$100,000 to Clinton Foundation

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Dr. Raymond F. Schinazi, is a former director of ICMEC and currently serves on the board of directors for ICMEC. He founded several pharmaceutical companies, including Pharmasset, Inc. which he sold to Gilead Sciences for \$11 billion in 2012.

- Gilead Sciences, Inc. donated \$100,001 – \$250,000 to Clinton Foundation

Per-Olof Loof, former director of ICMEC and currently serves on the board of directors for ICMEC.

- Donated \$2,700 to Hillary For America in 2016

Podesta Group lobbying fees can be found here from above financials. Here is an archived version as well.

The Clinton Foundation donors list, with an archived version as well.

On April 9, 2019 Standard Chartered Bank, big donor to Clinton Foundation, admitted to illegally processing transactions in violation of Iranian sanctions and agreed to pay more than \$1 billion. The criminal conspiracy went on from 2007 – 2011, and resulted in SCB process roughly 9,500 financial transactions worth approximately \$240 million through U.S. financial institutions for the benefit of Iranian entities.

Beginning to get the picture of who runs the show, and who collects the dough? This begs the question – is ICMEC about saving children or making money? More importantly, what is being exchanged for all of this money?

#### Global Modern Day Slavery Directory – A Clinton Global Initiative

In addition to all of the above involvement with human trafficking, the Clinton Global Initiative partnered with the Polaris Project in 2009, to build an anti-trafficking approach, replicable worldwide. The Polaris Project operates the National Human Trafficking Resource Center (NHTRC) and runs the National Human Trafficking Hotline. Polaris is based out of D.C. and is funded in part by the Department of Health and Human Services. Together, they created a “Global Modern Day Slavery” database of organizations across the globe to monitor human trafficking, in 2014.

They claim it is the most comprehensive database of modern day slavery organizations ever compiled for the public, and as noted above, there are 199 countries in this database.

They state “By enabling actors in the anti-human trafficking field to better locate, identify, and connect with each other, the tool will help connect victims of human trafficking and at-risk populations to the help they need.”

When they began this project in 2014, they had 200 organizations in the database. There are now 2936 organizations and hotlines working on human trafficking and forced labor. There are 26 in D.C. alone. If one has done any research on human trafficking, there is a lot of telling information to be garnered from this database. It’s definitely one heck of a network.

The Global Modern Day Slavery Directory has also partnered with Liberty Asia's Freedom Collaborative, an online, password-protected platform for anti-trafficking "stakeholders" that offers a newsfeed updated by users, a global community of organizations and research, and programmatic and legal resources. USAID and UNDP are just two of Freedom Collaborative's partners.

Liberty Asia also partnered with La Strada International and the Polaris Project in 2013 to launch an alliance of human trafficking hotlines around the world. Google funded this effort with \$3 million dollars after determining that most illegal groups were involved in human trafficking in some way. Jared Cohen, director of Google Ideas, said that there wasn't great coordination between all of the hotlines.

"If you call one hotline in one company, it generates data locally, but there is no way to correlate data with a hotline in another country," said Cohen. "[So we thought]: can you integrate all these hotlines so it doesn't matter which one you call? You need an integrated ecosystem to make the right response."

#### KEY FACTS

- The Polaris Project is a member of the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI). Members are by invite only and donate a minimum of \$15,000 annually.
- Catherine A. McLean is the Chairperson for the Board of Directors at Polaris. McLean was the senior advisor to the Hillary Clinton for President Campaign in 2008.
- Steve Rosenthal, on the Board of Directors, served as Associate Deputy Secretary of the US Department of Labor during the Clinton administration.
- It's also important to remember that the Clinton Global Initiative was never formally setup correctly and is not a legal entity.

#### **Pedophile Cover-Up of U.S. Ambassador While Hillary Clinton Was Secretary of State**

More questions are raised, when looking back to the State Department cover-up of pedophilia that plagued the MSM when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State. As the New York Post CBS, and NBC news reported in June, 2013, they had obtained documents tied to ongoing investigations involving eight cases of alleged misconduct by state department workers, contractors, and a United States ambassador, all of which occurred during Hillary Clinton's tenure. An internal Inspector General memo from October, 2012 reported the ambassador under investigation "routinely ditched his protective security detail in order to solicit sexual favors from BOTH prostitutes and minor CHILDREN." The report also states that a high-ranking official at the State Department directed investigators to "cease the investigations".

Former New York Congressman Anthony Weiner, husband of Huma Abedin, Hillary Clinton's Deputy Chief of Staff when she was secretary of state, and Vice Chair of Hillary's 2016 Campaign for President, recently completed serving prison time for sexting with a 15-year-old girl. Weiner's laptop contained 340,000 emails, with a significant amount of them being between Hillary and Huma. On

page 294 of the IG report, it states: Initial analysis of laptop – thousands emails, Hillary Clinton & Foundation, crime against children.

The FBI also released a document indicating “Anthony Weiner; Producers of Child Pornography” with a blanked out box below it. Note that “producers” is plural. They also stated that a significant number of the 340,000 emails were between Huma Abedin and Hillary Clinton.

In the June 2018, Office of the Inspector General 568-page report reviewing the various actions by the FBI and DOJ in advance of the 2016 election, they state “In September 2016, the FBI’s New York Field Office (NYO) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) began investigating former Congressman Anthony Weiner for his online relationship with a minor. A federal search warrant was obtained on September 26, 2016, for Weiner’s iPhone, iPad, and laptop computer. The FBI obtained these devices the same day. The search warrant authorized the government to search for evidence relating to the following crimes: transmitting obscene material to a minor, sexual exploitation of children, and activities related to child pornography.

On page 303 of this report, the case agent, being the only one that had the authority to release the laptop, stated his concerns over no one contacting him:

Anthony Weiner was released from prison on February 17, 2019 and sent to a halfway house in Brooklyn, New York. Huma Abedin still works side- by-side with Hillary Clinton on her illegally-run ‘Onward Together’ 501(c)(4) political organization. Til this day, what is on that laptop, remains a mystery.

NXIVM is often referred to as a “sex cult,” and with good reason. It is a dark pyramid scheme that has been around for decades, and includes human trafficking, forced sex and slave labor, wire fraud, money laundering, identity theft, blackmail, visa fraud, child sex trafficking, branding women’s bodies, and racketeering. The leaders are well-connected, backed by millions, and have an army of lawyers. Though, they like to refer to themselves as an executive and group-awareness training organization, spanning 23 states.

The leaders were indicted in 2018, with potential additional indictments still on the table. This case is explosive and expanding, with new evidence and new plea deals emerging.

Clare Bronfman, Seagram’s Heiress – Bankroller

Allison Mack, Smallville Actress – Recruiter

Keith Raniere, Leader and Co-founder

Nancy Salzman, President and Co-founder

Lauren Salzman, High-Ranking Member

Kathy Russell, Accountant



It's leader, Keith Raniere, also operates a secret society called DOS, known as "The Vow." According to a report in Epoch Times, prosecutors said the society was created around 2015, and is purported to be an acronym for the Latin phrase "dominus obsequious sororium," which loosely translates to "master over the slave women."

Court documents reflect that DOS operates as a pyramid, in which Raniere is at the top, as the highest master. All of the participants are women, most of which are recruited from within NXIVM, and there are levels of "slaves" headed by "masters." When recruiting, masters would inform their prospective slave that they would need to provide "collateral," to ensure the slave would keep what she was about to learn a secret. The collateral included sexually explicit photographs, videos stating damning information about themselves or someone close to them, or letters with damning accusations and assigning rights to certain assets. The "slaves" had to provide collateral on an ongoing basis, which was kept in a safe.

A Superseding Incitement Reflects Child Sex Abuse: Raniere, 58, is accused of having a child "engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing one or more visual depictions of such conduct, which visual depictions were produced and transmitted."

His co-defendants "were aware of and facilitated Raniere's sexual relationships with two underage victims: (1) a fifteen-year-old girl who was employed by Nancy Salzman and who – ten years later – became Raniere's first-line 'slave' in DOS."

### **Nancy Salzman Pleaded Guilty to Racketeering**

Former psychiatric nurse Nancy Salzman, co-founder and president of NXIVM, pleaded guilty on March 12, 2019, to one count of racketeering, and admitted to participating in a widespread criminal enterprise. She also confessed to stealing email passwords of NXIVM enemies and altering tapes before turning them over for use in a lawsuit.

### **Lauren Salzman Admitted to Enslaving a Woman for 2 Years**

In the final days of March 2019, Lauren Salzman quietly pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges, and on April 2<sup>nd</sup> admitted in court that she had harbored her own personal slave from March 2010 through April 2012, by keeping her imprisoned in a room and threatening her with deportation back to Mexico. She also admitted to being a member of DOS, Raniere's secret society.

Clare Bronfman Fainted When Finding Out Attorneys Mark Geragos & Michael Avenatti Were Indicted for Extortion of Nike In the midst of this bombshell, on March 27, 2019, Clare Bronfman fainted in the courtroom after being asked if she had secretly retained lawyer Michael Avenatti. In a recent indictment, one of Bronfman's attorneys, Mark Geragos was identified as a co-conspirator with Michael Avenatti to extort \$20 million from Nike. Avenatti was arrested just two days before Bronfman's court appearance. Then, on April 11, 2019, Avenatti was indicted on 36 counts of fraud and embezzlement.

**Allison Mack Pleaded Guilty to Racketeering**

Fast forward to April 8, 2019, and Smallville actress Allison Mack pleaded guilty to racketeering charges for manipulating women into becoming sex slaves for their leader, Keith Raniere. Her original pending counts on court documents indicated sex trafficking of children by force, fraud or coercion. She is now in Prison in Fremont, California where we contacted her.

**How big is NXIVM, and how far is their reach?**

This is a list of their affiliations, documented in court records.

**How Do These Individuals Connect with The Clintons?**

Clare Bronfman, Seagram's Heiress, her sister Sara Bronfman, and NXIVM's Nancy Salzman were all members of the Clinton Global Initiative, which is by "invite only." What does this mean? It means, that they paid the Clintons a minimum of \$15,000 in annual donor fees in order to be involved with their projects and initiatives, to gain contracts and business. Based on evidence thus far, it would be easy to speculate the nefarious pay-to-play operations that took place with NXIVM's group and Clintons working on any projects together. The fact that they all ran in similar circles, including NXIVM hosting seminars and partying on Richard Branson's Necker Island, doesn't bode well either. Whereas Branson maintains he was not aware of these events on his island, there are cozy photos of him and Clare's sister Sara Bronfman, indicating he was close with the family.

The Clintons have been close with the Bronfman family for quite some time, and Hillary Clinton spoke at Clare's father Edgar Bronfman's funeral in 2013. Edgar received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Bill Clinton in 1999. He was also a donor to the Clintons and their foundation.

In addition to Clare and Sara Bronfman being members of Clinton Global Initiative, NXIVM was a big donor to Hillary Rodham Clinton's 2008 presidential run. According to the New York Post, federal records show that executives, top associates, and family members of NXIVM contributed \$29,900 to Hillary's 2008 campaign.

**NXIVM VIP Tables at Clinton Foundation – Joined by Kirsten Gillibrand**

It was recently reported by Fox News, court documents reveal that Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand's father worked for NXIVM. The 2020 Democratic presidential candidate's father, Doug Rutnik, worked as a lobbyist for NXIVM for four months in 2004 at a rate of \$25,000 per month. Her father got her stepmother into being a member of NXIVM. Apparently, Rutnik attempted to distance himself from the group, at which point NXIVM sued him. Later, Clare Bronfman donated money to Kirsten Gillibrand, and she accepted it.

The Frank Report tells a more in-depth story about Gillibrand's stepmother. They allege that Doug Rutnik asked Gwenn Bellcourt, Gillibrand's cousin, who later became her stepmother, to take a 5-day intensive to determine if NXIVM needed a license as an education institution. This all transpired while Rutnik was working for NXIVM. Bellcourt was taken with NXIVM, and immediately targeted by its

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leaders Keith Raniere and Nancy Salzman, for inclusion in the cult. Raniere wanted her to become NXIVM's inside attorney. Raniere decided they no longer needed Rutnik, at which time NXIVM attempted to sue Rutnik to retrieve the \$100,000 they had paid out to him. It was settled out of court and Rutnik paid the \$100,000. He later managed to get Bellcourt out of the cult and married her.

According to a report in Big League Politics, eyewitness John Tighe describes a 2006 Hillary Clinton fundraiser, that entailed Gillibrand sitting at a NXIVM table. He stated, "Gillibrand sat with one of the front tables. Yeah, the three front VIP tables were all bought by NXIVM and she was sitting with Nancy Salzman."

Kirsten Gillibrand made the claim in 2017 that she had never heard of NXIVM until she read about them in the newspaper.

### **The Podesta Brothers**

John Podesta, Former White House Chief of Staff to Bill Clinton, Former Counselor to Barack Obama, and Former Campaign Chairman for Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign Tony Podesta, Bigtime DC Lobbyist and founder of the Podesta Group John and Tony are very close with the Clintons, have worked together for decades, and even grew up in the Chicago area just 14-minutes away from each other – the Podesta's in Jefferson Park, and Hillary Rodham Clinton in Park Ridge, IL.

Though the Podesta brothers have yet to be charged with crimes against children, Tony Podesta was indicted on other charges documented below.

Due to some very disconcerting material evidence, and the fact that they are very close with the Clintons, they are being included in this report.

### **JOHN PODESTA**

In John's office, at then Hillary Clinton's Brooklyn campaign headquarters, he had an oil painting on loan from his brother Tony. It shows two men holding knives and forks, leaning over a dining room table, where a man in a suit lay. When asked about this painting by Time Magazine, John said, "it's better to be the guy with the fork than the guy on the table." This isn't a painting depicting surgery, it is depicting cannibalism.

John has been at the center of Pizzagate ever since Wikileaks released his emails back in 2016. Rolling Stone magazine would have everyone believe that "Russian hackers" stole the emails from John and sent them off to Wikileaks for release. They, like all other mainstream media sources, have claimed that Pizzagate is a deranged conspiracy theory, and made Comet Ping Pong the central point of the pizza-pedophilia theory.

Yet, Pizzagate actually dates back decades prior to the release of those emails, and was only recently labeled as "Pizzagate." Without going in- depth into Pizzagate, as that would be an entirely separate article in itself, let's just limit this to two facts we do know with 100% validation. 1) Whereas John Podesta denies being involved with children in a sexual manner, at no point does he ever address or

explain the suspicious language in his emails. 2) An undercover officer setup a sting on Craigslist because Stephen Salamak, a New Jersey corrections officer had put out a message looking for women and moms “that are into cheese pizza,” – a reference to child pornography. This is all stated in the indictment. The man was indicted, numerous child pornography photos were found on his computer, and on July 27, 2018, he filed a guilty plea with a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years.

The fact is, whether or not it can be proven that John is involved with “Pizzagate,” – pizza, sex, and pedophilia have gone hand-in-hand for many years, it is well-known, and it is well-documented. Heck, Al Vernacchio, a sex education teacher at a Quaker school in Pennsylvania, has been teaching children about pornography and sex, utilizing pizza terms since 1999. In fact, it’s been such a hit, he went on TED to break it all down for everyone in 2012. So for 20 years, pizza/food terms have been used as “sex talk” quite openly, if one does their research. It all makes the “Podesta emails” surrounding food terms and children just a bit more curious.

But hey, if that doesn’t float your boat, you can always stroll on over to the “sexy, Instagram-baiting museum of pizza in NYC” packed with a 29- room funhouse, and promoted with photos of folks strapped up in leather, cuffs, chains, and well – not much else, while tonguing down pizza, or better yet – holding a slice over their genitals. Pizza sex talk indeed. But, nothing to see here. It’s been code for a long time folks. It would take the average person to find sexual connections to pizza throughout Hollywood, used in advertising, promoted through campaigns, and certainly on the dark web – roughly 10 minutes, to draw the conclusion that sex and pizza have been linked together for decades. The only thing that evolved was the label itself – “Pizzagate.”

Therefore, to make the claim that Pizzagate doesn’t exist, with their entire focus being on “Comet Ping Pong,” is illegitimate, ignorant, and irresponsible reporting. They intentionally focus on the label, as opposed to the actual facts that child pedophiles and child sex trafficking has been rampant since the beginning of time, and has gotten progressively worse over the years, especially within the church. Perhaps sticking with the label “Pedogate” makes it harder for them to try to control the narrative. Food for thought.

## **TONY PODESTA**

Tony Podesta, longtime lobbyist in DC, and founder of the Podesta Group, was indicted in 2017 for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Shortly thereafter, the Podesta Group closed up shop. Then, in July 2018, Special Counsel Robert Mueller offered Tony Podesta immunity to testify against Paul Manafort, who had worked with the Podesta Group in a public relations campaign for the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine, founded by three senior members of the pro-Russia Party of Regions – and who had been indicted on bank and tax fraud charges. Paul Manafort was sentenced to 7-1/2 years in prison. Meanwhile, Tony seems to have skated into the wind.

In addition to Tony's own collection of disturbing art surrounding children, his manager, as well as artists they bring into their exhibits, are equally disturbing. One such exhibit included artwork by ArtAngel, founded by Roger Took, a convicted pedophile in the worst degree imaginable.

Some refer to Tony as a "provocative artist," while others find the idea of children being clothless and bound to be incredibly disturbing.

The Podesta brothers are close friends with Marina Abramovic, a Siberian performance artist and film producer who is best known for her provocative, and to some – disturbing, art exhibitions and spirit cooking parties. Abramovic's book "Spirit Cooking with Essential Aphrodisiac Recipes" was released in 1996, utilizing ingredients such as fresh sperm milk, breast milk, and fresh morning urine. The spirit cooking festivities typically include feasting on replicas of full-size bodies with edible ingredients that give the effects of oozing blood and tissue. It seems to be a Hollywood hit.

In one exhibit she was preparing, she painted the words in what appears to be actual blood, onto a wall, stating "With a sharp knife, cut deeply into the middle finger of your left hand. Eat the pain." On another wall, she painted the words, "Fresh morning urine sprinkle over nightmare dreams."

In an email from June 2015, Marina emailed Tony about attending a spirit cooking dinner at her place, and asked if his brother would be joining him, signed "all my love, Marina."

### **The Podesta Group and Amber Ready, Inc.**

In May 2009, Amber Ready, Inc., selected the Podesta Group as their agency of record to be their PR company, covering all media relations, and building a campaign to promote Amber Ready's cell phone technology. The program enables parents to create, store and lock their children's Alert profiles in parent's wireless phones so that if a child goes missing, police can transmit the Alert Profiles in minutes via Amber Alert. Then-Principal of the Podesta Group Ed Rothschild stated: "Working with AMBER Ready to help inspire nationwide support for their innovative child safety solution should prove to be very exciting and gratifying." That is a lot of data on children being stored in accessible cell phones.

### **Laura Silsby**

Probably one of the most well-known names that is talked about, is convicted child trafficker Laura Silsby. Here are the facts:

- On January 29, 2010, Laura Silsby was arrested at the Haitian border for trying to smuggle 33 children out of Haiti, allegedly into an orphanage in the Dominican Republic, without documentation.
- Silsby was with a team of 9 other members, all of which were from America, and 7 of the 10 were from Central Valley Baptist Church in Meridian, Idaho.
- Silsby is the former director of The New Life Children's Refuge, which is documented in a Wikileaks email that indicates a plan to "rescue orphans from Port au Prince, Haiti," in addition to requesting donations.

- Jorge Torres, the lawyer Silsby retained after her arrest, was arrested in connection with an international smuggling ring that trafficked children and women from Central American and Haiti into the United States. He was a fugitive from justice when he was indicted in 2003 on charges of conspiring to smuggle aliens from Central America into the United States through Canada in 2002. He was hiding out in Canada under the name “George Simard” after a 1999 bank fraud conviction. The U.S. government was unable to locate him in 2003, but they tracked him once he showed up in the media, representing the Laura Silsby case, and going under the assumed name “Jorge Torres Puello.” He was extradited, plead guilty, and was sentenced on alien smuggling charges, to serve 3-years and 1-month in prison.

At that time, Jorge Torres was wanted by four countries in connection with charges including sex trafficking of girls and women, and making counterfeit documents and violating parole. He was wanted in El Salvador for bringing women and girls from Central America and the Caribbean into El Salvador and luring them into prostitution. Jorge’s wife was arrested for holding girls captive in a Nicaraguan house, and they had documentation indicating that they may have had protection from government officials.

- All of the Americans were released with exception of the leader Laura Silsby, who they wanted to further question about the children, as well as her connection to Jorge Torres Puello.

- On February 7, 2010, Bill Clinton, then-special envoy for the United Nations, suddenly took up an interest in this case, intervened and struck a

diplomatic deal for the release of the 9 American missionaries that were in a jail on child abduction charges, except Laura Silsby who the judge still had questions for.

- Just two days after Bill’s intervention, Hillary Clinton, Cheryl Mills, and several others were communicating in an email thread about USG’s options regarding the 10 Amcits, only the page containing the “options” is “denied” from being seen. In a cryptic message at the bottom, it states, “Cheryl asked for a memo from L for S BY TOMW AM outlining S’s options re the Amcits. Her questions:”

- Laura Silsby’s charges were miraculously reduced to “arranging irregular travel,” which got her a 6-month prison sentence in Haiti. On May 17, she was found guilty and sentenced to the time served in jail prior to the trial.

- Silsby returned to Idaho where she married in 2015, and took the last name Gayler. She became the Vice President of Marketing for AlertSense who works with the federal government on FEMA’s Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS), including the Amber Alerts when kidnappings occur.

Coincidentally, in May 2009, Amber Ready, Inc., selected the Podesta Group as their agency of record to be their PR company, covering all media relations, and building a campaign to promote Amber

Ready's cell phone technology. The program enables parents to create, store and lock their children's Alert profiles in parent's wireless phones so that if a child goes missing, police can transmit the Alert Profiles in minutes via Amber Alert. Then-Principal of the Podesta Group Ed Rothschild stated: "Working with AMBER Ready to help inspire nationwide support for their innovative child safety solution should prove to be very exciting and gratifying."

### **A Quick Recap to Wrap This 2009 Group Together**

Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) stated that since 2009 they have "placed a particular focus" on combatting human trafficking. The Polaris Project and Free the Slaves are BOTH CGI members. As indicated above under the NXIVM section, members of the Clinton Global Initiative are by invite only, and are required to give minimum donations of \$15,000 annually.

Also in 2009, is when the Podesta Group partnered with Amber Ready, Inc., which ultimately creates a database of information on children across the globe, stored in cell phones, which are highly accessible, especially when technology is designed to be accessed.

Finally, Laura Silsby had been planning her trip to Haiti and working on developing her "orphanage" in 2009, eventually making her way to Haiti in January 2010, when she was arrested for trafficking 33 children, and whose lawyer was extradited on charges of smuggling women and children. Despite all of this, she managed to get a job at a company that works with the Federal Government in direct relation with Amber Alert.

Curious.

### **Bill and Hillary Clinton came to the rescue of Laura Silsby.**

#### **Wealthy Hedge Fund Manager Jeffrey Epstein**

Jeffrey Epstein, served 13 months in prison and home detention after agreeing to an illegally carried out plea deal back in 2008, in which Epstein admitted to soliciting an underage girl for prostitution. This story is about much more than just one underage girl – in fact, there were 30.

Epstein was accused by more than 30 girls, most between the age of 13 and 16, of being lured to his mansion for sex acts. According to the Miami Herald, court and police records show that he then used those same girls to recruit more girls over a period of several years.

This 2008 plea deal gave Epstein and an untold number of others who weren't named, immunity from federal prosecution. This non-prosecution agreement is now a big focus of the Justice Department's investigation.

On February 22, 2019, a federal judge ruled that the deal made back in 2008 was illegal because former Miami U.S. Attorney Alexander Acosta kept it from Epstein's victims, which is in violation of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. They concealed a plea agreement from more than 30 underage victims who had been sexually abused. In a 33-page opinion, Judge Marra said: "prosecutors not only violated the



Crime Victims’ Rights Act by not informing the victims, they also misled the girls into believing that the FBI’s sex trafficking case against Epstein was still ongoing — when in fact, prosecutors had secretly closed it after sealing the plea bargain from the public record. Epstein worked in concert with others to obtain minors not only for his own sexual gratification but also for the sexual gratification of others.”

On March 11, 2019, a federal court of appeals in New York gave multimillionaire Jeffrey Epstein and his former partner Ghislaine Maxwell until March 19<sup>th</sup> to establish good cause as to why the documents from their prior case should remain sealed. If they fail to do so, the summary judgment and supporting documents will be made public. The court also reserved a ruling on additional documents in the civil case, which includes discovery materials.

On March 19, 2019, two anonymous individuals filed complaints objecting to the unsealing of the court documents, over privacy issues and fear of being publicly identified as third parties.

#### Connections to The Clintons:

- Hillary Clinton received a \$50,000 political donation from Epstein in 2006 while he was under indictment for trafficking children for sex.
- Epstein routed \$25,000 from HSBC Swiss accounts directly to the Clinton Foundation in 2006.
- In a 23-page letter, written by Epstein’s lawyers Alan Dershowitz and Gerald Lefcourt in July 2007, to negotiate a plea deal before being tried for sex trafficking underage girls from his Palm Beach, Fla base to his 72-acre island Little St James in the Caribbean, they stated his close friendship with Bill Clinton and claimed that he helped start the Clinton Global Initiative. It stated, “Mr. Epstein was part of the original group that conceived the Clinton Global Initiative, which is described as a project ‘bringing together a community of global leaders to devise and implement innovative solutions to some of the world’s most pressing challenges.’” Thus far, Jeffrey Epstein, Nancy Salzman, and Clare Bronfman have all been convicted, and coincidentally, were all involved with the Clinton Global Initiative, two of whom had islands in the Caribbean. As noted above, the plea deal worked.
- Flights logs show Bill Clinton flew on Epstein’s private plane “Lolita Express” at least 26 times and ditched his Secret Service detail for at least five of the flights.
- Epstein hosted a trip to Africa in 2002, on his private plane, for the Clinton Global Initiative’s anti-AIDS mission. Bill Clinton, actor Kevin Spacey, and other celebrities were all aboard.

#### Actor Kevin Spacey

In December 2018, Kevin Spacey was charged with sexual assault of a teenager at a bar in Nantucket, Massachusetts, that occurred late on July 7 into July 8, 2016. This followed on another allegation by actor Anthony Rapp, who claimed Spacey made sexual advances toward him in 1986 when he was 14-years-old and Spacey was 26. At the same time he offered a public apology to Rapp, he also came out

for the first time, declaring himself a gay man. CNN, of all media outlets, did a little hit piece on Spacey about coming out during an apology.

Another case of sexual battery accusations that took place in 1992, was dropped last September due to California's statute of limitations. However, there are court documents in pacer on another ongoing case that was filed on January 31, 2019, in California, whereby the plaintiff, a massage therapist listed as "John Doe," alleges repeated sexual assault and battery by Spacey while falsely imprisoning plaintiff. UK police are also investigating several allegations from when he served as artistic director at London's Old Vic Theatre.

In December, Spacey took to YouTube and posted a bizarre video, in which he was in his "House of Cards" character, while seemingly, both denying and divulging a mix of information, such as this:

"Of course some believed everything. They're just waiting with bated breath to hear me confess it all. They're going to say I'm being disrespectful, not playing by the rules," he adds. "Like I ever played by anyone's rules before. I never did. And you loved it."

According to the Herald News, the pending case in court regarding the teenager in the bar, in which Spacey was brought up on charges, is the first case that has resulted in criminal charges. It is expected to go to trial in the fall. Police reports indicate that the teen told investigators that Spacey kept bringing the teen drinks, repeatedly invited him back to his home, and unzipped the teen's pants and rubbed his penis over his underwear as they stood in a crowded area of the bar. Spacey has been accused of sexual misconduct by more than a dozen men, in which some of them were teens at the time of the alleged incidents. According to ABC Action News, the criminal complaint indicates that investigators have video of Spacey sexually assaulting the 18-year-old boy.

Spacey apparently owns a \$7 million dollar home in Nantucket, where the island is buzzing with rumors about Spacey and other alleged victims.

### **Connections to The Clintons**

- The New York Times published an article in 2015 about Spacey's "bromance" with Bill Clinton. At the 10th anniversary celebration of the William J. Clinton Presidential Center, Spacey stated, "we, in fact, have spent so much time together that I sometimes I even become him." According to NYT, Spacey first met Bill Clinton in the White House during his first term, kept in touch, grew closer, and continued their talks a couple times a month. There is even a photo of Spacey and Clinton hanging on the wall in "House of Cards," from one of in 2002.
- After Clinton left office, Spacey began working with Bill on some of the Clinton Foundation's initiatives.
- In 2002, Kevin Spacey flew to Africa with Bill Clinton, on Jeffrey Epstein's plane, for a 5-day CGI AIDS mission.
- In 2013 Bill Clinton revealed he was an ardent admirer of "House of Cards".

- Spacey stated to David Letterman that he is pals with Bill Clinton when describing their visit to Starbucks in 2014.

Joel A. Getz, Independent Director of Chain of Private Kindergartens in China. Getz, a former Clinton Foundation official, is an independent director of RYB Education, who operates 80 kindergartens and has an additional 175 franchised locations across 130 cities in China. In November 2017, China launched a nationwide investigation into the chain of schools following claims of abuse at multiple locations. Parents had reported at least 8 toddlers were forced to take white pills and some sort of brown syrup by the teachers, needle marks were found on their bodies, and the children were stripped naked and forced to either stand or locked in dark rooms. Medical examinations confirmed the injuries were from needles, and China's Xinhua news agency reported that children were also sexually molested.

One of the parents came forward and said that her son was made to strip naked after being injected with brown syrup, then examined by a naked male adult, in what was described as sexual intercourse. The mother requested to see closed circuit footage from the school, but they denied her.

Another parent said that the kids were saying the teachers would give them the white pill and tell them it was "a secret" and to call it a jellybean rather than a pill, and it was a reward. One father said that his child had taken two white pills after lunch and then fell asleep.

The kindergarten was located next to a large military base, and speculation began that men from the base may have been sexually abusing the children, since the director's husband was previously an official at the base. They were unable to prove this theory.

Abuse had happened at other kindergartens in this chain as well. Back in October 2016 two teachers from an RYB kindergarten in northeast Jinan province were sentenced to 34 months in prison for jabbing children in their mouths, head, and buttocks with needles.

All of the directors of RYB are Chinese, with the exception of Joel Getz. He is also listed as a member of the Audit Committee and the Compensation Committee. It seems quite odd that an associate dean at Yale would be on the board of directors of a Chinese kindergarten chain.

Prior to this, he served as the director of development for the William J. Clinton Foundation in New York and was President of the Mayor's Fund to Advance New York City. According to his Yale bio, when working for the Clintons, he was "instrumental in creating a formal development operation for the Clinton Foundation, which raised in excess of \$135 million annually."

Interestingly, when Getz was on the board of advisors for the Mayor's Fund, film producer Harvey Weinstein was also on the board. Weinstein is currently facing rape charges in an ongoing court case. Another interesting side note: Daisy Soros, George Soros's sister-in-law was also on the board. The Mayor's Fund is no joke. A lot of big organizations and foundations are donors, including George

Soros. In 2017, they took in over \$21 million in grants and contributions, and in 2016 they cleared over \$24 million.

### **Harold H.L. Moody**

Harold Moody worked for Pulaski County Youth Services in Little Rock, AR, where he was arrested on November 5, 2018 for pornography charges involving live streaming chat rooms where infants were being raped. Clinton Health Matters Initiative and its partners, were working with Pulaski County Youth Services from 2012 – 2017. In addition, he was a communications director for the Democratic Party of Arkansas for a year-and-a-half, and prior to that, he was chairman of the Pulaski Democratic Party for two years. Some of Moody's friends and associates include Chad Griffin who is head of the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), and Jason Wiest co-host of The Big Gay Radio Show and former deputy director of communications at the office of Gov. Mike Beebe, as shown in a video clip Harold Moody posted to his Facebook page, along with hundreds of photos with politicians at political events.

### **George Nader**

George Nader is a Middle East analyst and convicted pedophile who worked for the Clinton administration and received a congressional tribute for his work on his magazine, after an exclusive interview with former President Bill Clinton. Some may be familiar with his name, because he was questioned in the Mueller probe for consulting with the Trump administration.

George Nader was born in Lebanon, and came to the U.S. as a teenager. In 1981, he started a company and magazine by the name of International Insight Inc., and the magazine later became "Middle East Insight." Before long, the magazine featured original interviews with senators John McCain, Dianne Feinstein, Mitch McConnell, then-Senator Joe Biden, as well as George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, as well as Middle Eastern leaders, including Saudi Arabia's Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, Muammar Gaddafi, Yasser Arafat, and others.

During the Clinton Administration (1993–2001), Nader tried to broker an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement, and worked with Estée Lauder heir Ronald Lauder. He served as an informal envoy to Syria for the Clinton administration and worked as a negotiator to help free U.S. hostages in Lebanon.

George Nader had an exclusive interview with former President Bill Clinton, that was published in the November–December 1995 issue, and saved in congressional records.

Just four months later, in April 1996, a tribute was made to Nader and his magazine in a congressional report. The report also makes clear of his access to key political and business leaders throughout the Middle East.

According to court records, Nader was indicted in 1985 for importing child pornography from the Netherlands, containing an eight-mm movie film, four magazines and one advertisement for another film, in addition to a magazine title "Boy No. 53" and "Sweet Little Sixteen, Volume 3, No. 8," along

with two pictures. The material contained nude boys, as well as nude boys engaged in a variety of sexual acts.

A U.S. Customs inspector opened the package because he felt he had reasonable grounds to suspect the enclosed material was being imported into the U.S. contrary to law. The case was later dismissed when more child pornography evidence was seized from Nader's home, was thrown out based on procedural grounds.

In 1991, Nader was caught at Dulles airport in Washington, DC, transporting videos of underage boys in sex acts, dated 1990. He was convicted and sentenced to six months at a halfway house in Maryland, by a federal court in Northern Virginia, on a felony charge for transporting sexually explicit materials in foreign commerce. His case was sealed, and he was not placed on the sex offender's registry because Virginia required two or more convictions.

In the early 2000s, he up and left his Washington apartment and completely vanished. His website went offline and his business was dissolved. At some point in 2003, he resurfaced to take a couple to court who had purchased his apartment through foreclosure, while he was gone.

In May 2003, Nader was sentenced to a one-year prison term for sexually abusing 10 young boys between 1999 and 2002, in Prague. He was convicted of moral corruption of minors, sexual abuse and impairing morals. He often offered money, jewelry, cellphone and such, as accommodations for sexual services. In one of the cases, he had requested oral sex from a 14-year-old boy in a room at the Hilton Hotel in Prague. Nader proceeded to masturbate in front of the boy, after the boy had refused.

He was expelled from the Czech Republic after his release. Being as he returned to Washington in 2003 to reclaim his apartment, it would seem he didn't serve the full-year prison sentence.

### **The Verdict**

On March 13, 2019, The Washington Post published an article in regard to the transcripts released on former FBI lawyer Lisa Page from the probe into how federal law enforcement agencies conducted the Trump and Clinton investigations. Former FBI counterintelligence officer Peter Strzok and Lisa Page were both assigned to these investigations, were having an affair, and had exchanged numerous bias texts against Donald Trump.

Page clarified this by stressing that senior bureau officials were also expressing anti-Clinton animus, and stated "many of us in law enforcement dislike the subject of our investigations. We are not keen on pedophiles and fraudsters and spies and human traffickers.

That is fine. What would be impermissible is to take that harsh language and to act in some way that was illegal or against the rules. And we don't do it."

The question on everyone's mind – are Bill and Hillary Clinton child traffickers?

What would be their motive? Money is certainly a driving motivator for the Clintons, and it's a \$150 billion dollar industry. They most definitely have worldwide connections to pull off operations for child sex trafficking, organ harvesting, or slave labor. Does this alone make them guilty? Are they themselves pedophiles like many of their convicted friends, or are they just okay with that behavior? Why is it that they seem to continually surround themselves with corrupt individuals, some even former lawmakers, as well as other sexual predators, and some under question for murder.

Does anything go with the Clintons? Why are they working with Branson, Gates, Soros, Bezos, numerous organizations and foundations, across 26 islands in the Caribbean to build up "tourism" and focus on sustainable infrastructure, such as hotel resorts. Polaris points out that hotels are a venue for traffickers, with 1,434 cases of human trafficking in hotels having been reported back in 2007. Most of the Caribbean islands are either tier 2 or tier 3 for human trafficking.

### **What It Boils Down To**

**Option A.** They had absolutely no clue that any of these people they spent a great deal amount of time with, both personally and through business, were involved in crimes against children. All of the work they have done for children is about the children, not the money. This is a hard sell given all of the evidence above.

**Option B.** They turned a blind eye, despite being aware. A highly unlikely option. If anything, the Clintons would use this information to extort those people. And in doing so, would indicate their lack of concern for children, making all of their said causes a lie.

**Option C.** They created bills, instilled laws, built relationships, worldwide databases, countless initiatives, partnerships, and global hotlines – all with direct access to, and knowledge of, children and their whereabouts. In both politics and business they are known as the procurement specialists, often using this language in their press releases. They and Jeff Epstein may have been running the sex trade for all of the American billionaires...???

The evidence is piling up against the Clintons. It's becoming more and more difficult to rationalize all of their choices, relationships, and nefarious dealings, away.

There will come a day when the light will brightly shine on all of this, when investigations into the Clintons wrap up, and truth be unveiled. Until then, pray for the children in this world – for this battle we fight day and night – is for them. Now that Raniere is in jail and Mack is on bail and ordered not to have any contact with other cult members, Clare Bronfman has taken on the role of leader within the organization.

In response to the recent controversy surrounding NXIVM, Bronfman made a statement on her website denying the accusations against Raniere. She praised Raniere and the NXIVM programs, insisting that she is doing work that is truly helping people, and that no one has ever been coerced as a part of their workshops.

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Frank Parlato, a former NXIVM publicist-turned-whistleblower told the New York Post that Bronfman is among the harshest leaders in the organization.

“She’s the enforcer—the brutal one. Clare’s running the [operation] now, and she’s the most ruthless of them. I’m issuing an absolute warning now. Clare Bronfman is a true fanatic, and if there’s a Jim Jones situation, everyone will commit suicide but her.” Parlato said.

Of Allison Mack, Parlato said that she was a troubled woman, who was both a victim and an abuser.

“Mack was both a victim and a victimizer. She was both a mastermind and Raniere’s useful idiot. She started as a slave and she became a slave master. Her nickname among defectors is ‘Pimp Mack,’” Parlato said.

It is highly possible that this is a position that Mack was groomed for since she was a child, as many childhood stars turn from victims to predators as a result of what they often experience behind the scenes in the industry. Oddly enough, one of Mack’s very first roles was in a softcore porn movie called “Night Eyes Three.” She was just 11 years old at the time.

A former chairman of the California Democratic Party, who knew of these sex cults, is accused in a lawsuit of forcibly performing oral sex on a male subordinate and threatening him to keep quiet, the *Sacramento Bee* [reports](#).

The lawsuit from William Floyd, a former party employee, is against former chairman Eric Bauman, the California Democratic Party, and the Los Angeles County Democratic Party. The former assistant to Bauman says he was first assaulted after falling asleep in a hotel and waking up to his boss performing oral sex on him, and that there were two more instances where he was forced to submit to Bauman.

The lawsuit also says the party failed to properly respond to Bauman's conduct and tried to make him quit.

Bauman, who resigned due to other sexual assault allegations, denies the allegation from Floyd, according to the report.

Floyd, who is now 28, began working as Bauman’s assistant in 2016, when Bauman was chair of the Los Angeles County Democratic Party. Floyd says Bauman assaulted him at least three times and groped him on numerous occasions. In his lawsuit, Floyd alleges Bauman threatened him, telling him “if you cross me, I will break you.”

Bauman resigned late last year after other allegations of sexual misconduct became public. He denied Floyd’s allegations through his lawyer.

“We have not yet been formally served with this lawsuit and have only learned about the filing of it through media inquiries this evening,” Bauman’s lawyer Neal Zaslavsky said in a statement. “Mr. Bauman denies the allegations in the complaint and looks forward to complete vindication once the facts come out.”



Floyd says he told senior members of the party about incidents with Bauman before he was forced to relocate.

Several Seattle employees of both Google and Amazon were busted after using their corporate accounts to send emails to local brothels and pimps looking to purchase services from sex workers trafficked from Asia, according to emails obtained by Newsweek.

"[E]mails obtained by Newsweek reveal another sordid corner of the tech sector's treatment of women: a horny nest of prostitution "hobbyists" at tech giants Microsoft, Amazon and other firms in Seattle's high tech alley."

Many of the emails were swept up in a 2015 sting operation which targeted online chat rooms and message boards in which customers rate sex workers - resulting in the arrest of 18 of these "prostitution hobbyists," including several high level Amazon and Microsoft directors - two of which are currently scheduled for trial in March.

Seattle brothels had been catering to Microsoft employees through several "backpage.com" ads located nearby the company's Redmond, WA headquarters, in what is becoming a booming business.

A study commissioned by the Department of Justice found that Seattle has the fastest-growing sex industry in the United States, more than doubling in size between 2005 and 2012. That boom correlates neatly with the boom of the tech sector there. It also correlates to the surge in high-paying jobs, since this "hobby" (the word johns use online to describe buying sex) can be expensive: some of these men spent \$30,000 to \$50,000 a year, according to authorities.

The tech sector has not only employed a significant number of men who pay for sex with trafficked women, it has also enabled traffickers to more easily reach customers and to hide their business from cops by taking it off the streets and into computers and ultimately, hotel rooms, motels or apartments. In one 24-hour-period in Seattle, an estimated 6,487 people solicited sex on just one of the more than 100 websites that connect buyers with sellers, according to a 2014 study.

Of note, Backpage.com shut down its adult sections in January, citing government pressure following a 2016 Senate report on commercial sex services fingered the website as a hotbed for criminal activity, and stating that "Backpage officials have publicly acknowledged that criminals use the website for sex trafficking, including trafficking of minors."

In October, 2016, Backpage CEO Carl Ferrer was arrested in Houston and the company's Dallas headquarters searched. NPR reported at the time that Ferrer, 55, was charged with pimping a minor, pimping and conspiracy to commit pimping. Two controlling shareholders of Backpage — Michael Lacey and James Larkin — also are charged with conspiracy to commit pimping."

The prostitutes trafficked from Asia typically don't speak much English, relying on translation apps to offer services such as "girlfriend" experiences and "Nuru" (nude massage). Many of the women are

working their way out of debt bondage, and feared for their lives or those of their families - according to one pimp interviewed during the 2015 sting.

A spokesman for Microsoft said of the emails "Microsoft has a long history of cooperating with law enforcement and other agencies on combating sex trafficking and related topics, and we have employees who volunteer their time and money specifically to combat this issue as well. The personal conduct of a tiny fraction of our 125,000 employees does not in any way represent our culture. No organization is immune to the unfortunate situation when employees act unethically or illegally. When that happens, we look into the conduct and take appropriate action. Microsoft makes it clear to our employees they have a responsibility to act with integrity and conduct themselves in a legal and ethical manner at all times. If they don't, they risk losing their jobs."

Amazon told Newsweek it's investigating the matter, and that "It is against Amazon's policy for any employee or Contingent Worker to engage in any sex buying activities of any kind in Amazon's workplace or in any work-related setting outside of the workplace, such as during business trips, business meetings or business-related social events.' When Amazon suspects that an employee has used company funds or resources to engage in criminal conduct, the company will immediately investigate and take appropriate action up to and including termination. The company may also refer the matter to law enforcement."

In China, Apple's and Amazon's workers must provide sex to factory bosses in order to get favorable treatment in the work farms. Apple and Amazon go to great lengths to cover this up.

The China Labor Watch community group dispatched several investigators into Hengyang Foxconn, a factory that predominantly manufactures products for Amazon. CLW's investigation revealed a number of rights violations at the Hengyang Foxconn factory, which manufactures Amazon's Kindle, Echo Dots and tablets. This is CLW's first investigation into an Amazon supplier factory.

The investigation revealed that dispatch workers made up more than 40% of the workforce, a clear violation of the legally mandated 10%. Furthermore, the working conditions between dispatch workers and regular workers were markedly different despite working the same positions.

Whilst regular workers receive five days of training, dispatch workers only receive eight hours of training, which is well below the legal stipulation of 24 hours of pre-job safety training. Dispatch workers are also required to pay the physical examination fees, whereas some regular workers reported not having to pay any fees for the physical examination.

In addition, sick leave is unpaid for dispatch workers, and they are regularly sent on leave during the factory's off season. During this time, they do not receive any wages. Dispatch workers also do not receive any social insurance, nor are contributions made to their housing provident fund. According to the Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch, dispatch workers are to be registered for social insurance and employers are to make social insurance contributions.

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Regular workers are also paid overtime wages, however, dispatch workers earn 14.5 RMB/hour (\$2.26 USD) and are paid the same rate for normal hours and overtime hours. The hourly rate includes an attendance bonus, and workers who take more than two days off or are late more than twice a month would receive wages calculated by a 13.5 RMB/hour (\$2.11 USD) standard for the month.

While there are clear distinctions in working conditions between regular workers and dispatch workers at the factory, all workers are subject to long hours and low wages. Workers put in over 100 overtime hours during peak season, and there was an instance of workers working consecutively for 14 days. The average monthly wage in Hengyang is 4,647 RMB (\$725.22 USD), however, workers at the factory on average earned wages between 2000 – 3000 RMB (\$312.12 - \$468.19 USD) during off-season. As wages are low, workers must rely on overtime hours to earn enough to maintain a decent standard of living. In spite of that, the factory cuts the overtime hours of workers as a form of punishment for those who take leave or have unexcused absences.

Other major issues at the factory include inadequate fire safety in the dormitory area, lack of sufficient protective equipment, absence of a functioning labor union at the factory, and strict management who subject workers to verbal and sexual abuse.

Some attractive workers are offered “internships in America”. Some of those male workers may get sent to Apple’s Mr. Cook, or his friends, for “special duties”.

The treatment of dispatch workers remains a key issue not only at Foxconn, but also in factories across China. Previously, labor laws in China lacked any mention of dispatch or temporary workers. The “Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch” came into effect in 2014; however, as dispatch labor remains widely used because of its flexibility, factories continue to abdicate their legal responsibilities as a way to cut down on labor costs. With the dispatch company being contractually obligated to the worker, this allows factories to shirk responsibility for labor rights abuses. Amazon has the ability to not only ensure its supplier factories respects the rights of workers but also that there is equal pay for equal work. Amazon’s profits have come at the expense of workers who labor in appalling working conditions and have no choice but to work excessive overtime hours to sustain a livelihood.

#### Summary of Rights Violations at Hengyang Foxconn

The investigation took place during the factory’s off-season and it was discovered around 40% of the total number of workers were dispatch workers. Chinese labor law stipulates that dispatch workers must not exceed 10% of the total workforce.

Before starting work, dispatch workers need to pay 50 RMB (\$7.86 USD) to cover physical examination fees. Some regular workers reported having to pay 60 RMB (\$9.47 USD) for the physical examination, while others did not pay any fees.

Chinese law stipulates pre-job training to be at least 24 hours, however, dispatch workers only receive eight hours of pre-job safety training.

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Many dispatch workers do not receive a copy of their labor contract.

Sick leave is unpaid for dispatch workers. Regular workers have 20% deducted from their day's wages for sick leave.

Dormitories for both regular and dispatch workers do not have emergency exits. The dormitory area for dispatch workers does not have a fire extinguisher and escape routes are not labelled. Fire drills are not performed in the dormitory area.

Workers are required to arrive to their work positions ten minutes before their shift starts and these ten minutes are uncompensated.

During each month of peak production season, workers have to put in over 100 hours of overtime. However, Chinese law stipulates monthly overtime cannot exceed 36 hours. During peak season, there was an instance of workers working 14 days continuously without a day off.

During off-season, the factory schedules dispatch workers to go on leave, resulting in these workers having no wages. Additionally, the factory management will schedule no overtime for regular workers. Due to their low wages, by not allowing workers to work overtime, it forces workers to resign of their own volition. If workers are late, have an unexcused absence, or are on sick leave, the production line leader will also reduce their number of overtime hours. Due to a low base wage, it is a punishment for workers to not be able to work overtime during off-peak season.

Workers earn an hourly wage of 14.5 RMB (\$2.26 USD) regardless of whether they worked normal hours or overtime hours, which includes a 1 RMB (\$0.16 USD) attendance bonus. If the worker takes more than two days off or if they are late more than twice a month, their month's wages would be calculated by a 13.5 RMB/hour (\$2.11 USD) standard.

Many big tech companies have sex trafficking operations inside of them and they operate their crimes with impunity because U.S. Senators own their stock and protect them.



## A Culture of Fear

...at the Firm That Manages Bill Gates's Fortune and The Sex Cult Of The Oligarchs

For 27 years, Bill Gates has entrusted the management of his [enormous wealth](#) and the endowment of his giant foundation to a single man: Michael Larson.

Mr. Larson has invested the Microsoft co-founder's money in farmland, hotels, stocks, bonds, even a bowling alley. Thanks in part to Mr. Larson and the soaring value of Microsoft's shares, Mr. Gates's fortune has gone from less than \$10 billion to about \$130 billion.

But Mr. Larson, 61, also engaged in a pattern of workplace misconduct at Mr. Gates's money-management firm, Cascade Investment, according to 10 former employees as well as others familiar with the firm.

He openly judged female employees on their attractiveness, showed colleagues nude photos of women on the internet and on several occasions made sexually inappropriate comments. He made a racist remark to a Black employee. He bullied others. When an employee said she was leaving Cascade, Mr. Larson retaliated by trying to hurt the stock price of the company she planned to join.

Over the years, at least six people — including four Cascade employees — complained to Mr. Gates about Mr. Larson, according to former employees and others with direct knowledge of the complaints. (Several of them also complained to his wife, Melinda French Gates.) Cascade made payments to at least seven people who witnessed or knew about Mr. Larson's behavior; in exchange, they agreed to never speak about their time at the firm.

Even as Cascade grew to more than 100 employees and to manage more money than most Wall Street hedge funds, the perception that Mr. Larson had Mr. Gates's unflinching support allowed him to maintain a culture of fear inside the company's lakeside offices, the former employees said. Mr. Larson still runs Cascade.

Mr. Gates's reluctance to take decisive action at Cascade adds to an emerging portrait of the billionaire philanthropist that is at odds with his image as a roving global do-gooder and champion of women's empowerment.

As The New York Times has reported, Mr. Gates for years [regularly spent time with Jeffrey Epstein](#), who faced accusations of sex trafficking of girls — a relationship that was among the factors

precipitating Ms. French Gates's recent decision to seek a divorce. And on at least a few occasions, [Mr. Gates pursued women](#) who worked for him at Microsoft and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. In 2019, Microsoft's board investigated one of those cases, in which Mr. Gates acknowledged he had an affair with an employee. Mr. Gates stepped down from the board last year.

Mr. Larson and Chris Giglio, his spokesman, denied some but not all instances of Mr. Larson's misconduct.

"During his tenure, Mr. Larson has managed over 380 people, and there have been fewer than five complaints related to him in total," Mr. Giglio said. He added, "Any complaint was investigated and treated seriously and fully examined, and none merited Mr. Larson's dismissal."

Mr. Giglio and Bridgitt Arnold, a spokeswoman for Mr. Gates, said that Bill and Melinda Gates Investments, whose name is sometimes used interchangeably with Cascade's, has robust policies to deal with employee complaints about wrongdoing. "B.M.G.I. takes all complaints seriously and seeks to address them effectively to guarantee a safe and respectful workplace," Mr. Giglio said.

Ms. Arnold said, "B.M.G.I. does not tolerate inappropriate behavior." She added that "any issue raised over the company's history has been taken seriously and resolved appropriately."

Mr. Larson said, "Calling B.M.G.I. a toxic work environment is unfair to the 160 professionals who make up our team and our culture."

Courtney Wade, a spokeswoman for Ms. French Gates, said, "Melinda unequivocally condemns disrespectful and inappropriate conduct in the workplace. She was unaware of most of these allegations given her lack of ownership of and control over B.M.G.I."

Some former Cascade employees declined to comment because of nondisclosure agreements that prohibit them from discussing their time at the company. Others spoke on the condition of anonymity because they feared retribution.

Years after they left Cascade, a few found talking about Mr. Larson so upsetting that they could hardly speak.

### **A Generic-Sounding Name**

Before Mr. Larson, Mr. Gates's financial consigliere was Andrew L. Evans, a longtime friend who had previously served a six-month prison sentence for bank fraud. (Mr. Gates visited him in jail.) But when Mr. Evans's criminal record was spotlighted in a front-page Wall Street Journal article in 1993, Mr. Gates sought out a new money manager.

The next year, he hired Mr. Larson, who previously was a fund manager at Putnam Investments. In 1995, Cascade was incorporated in Washington State. The generic-sounding name with no reference to Mr. Gates allowed Mr. Larson to run a vast investment operation with a low public profile.



From the start, Cascade, whose sole function was to manage the Gateses' money, was deeply entwined with the wider Gates universe, including Microsoft. The firm is in the same office park in Kirkland, Wash., as Mr. Gates's personal office, Gates Ventures, and across the street from Ms. French Gates's own group, Pivotal Ventures. Over the years, employees have moved among Cascade, the Gates Foundation, Microsoft, the two Gates ventures and K&L Gates, the law firm where Mr. Gates's father had been a named partner. In 2005, when Cascade needed a new human resources executive, the company hired a Microsoft veteran.

Mr. Larson regularly hired people fresh out of college or in the early stages of their careers. Graduates of Claremont McKenna College, his alma mater, were a particular favorite. The college has several scholarships endowed by Mr. Larson.

Some employees saw working at Cascade as a way to make the world a better place. Because Cascade also oversees the Gates Foundation's \$50 billion endowment, helping it do well meant more money for things like fighting malaria and funding education. Others said they were star-struck by the idea of working for Mr. Gates, who founded Microsoft in 1975 with Paul Allen.

Throughout his tenure, Mr. Larson earned steady returns for Mr. Gates. He invested largely in undervalued, old-fashioned stocks, eschewing hot tech companies. When the dot-com bubble burst in the late 1990s, the strategy paid off. Mr. Larson also shielded Mr. Gates's assets from the steepest declines of the recession in 2008 and 2009.

Mr. Larson branched out into real estate and high-end hotels. He bought a 47.5 percent stake in the Four Seasons chain. He acquired vast tracts of land that by some estimates make Mr. Gates the [largest private owner of farmland](#) in the United States. Chasing the highest returns was not the main goal. The mandate, according to one former employee, was: "We don't want Bill's name in the headlines."

### **'You Live in the Ghetto'**

In the spring of 2004, Stacy Ybarra decided to quit her job at Cascade to join the internet company InfoSpace.

Ms. Ybarra, then 30, had joined Cascade three years earlier as an investor relations analyst. After she announced her planned departure, Mr. Larson became so angry that he shorted the stock of InfoSpace, according to three people familiar with the episode. (Short selling involves placing bearish bets on the company's shares, which sometimes causes the stock to fall.) Two of the people said they saw Mr. Larson's trades on their computer terminals.

Mr. Larson told Ms. Ybarra and others that he had shorted InfoSpace's stock out of spite, according to the three people, who heard about his remarks at the time.

Mr. Giglio confirmed that Cascade shorted the stock but denied that Mr. Larson did it to spite Ms. Ybarra.



At the same time, Mr. Larson repeatedly pressured Ms. Ybarra to remain at Cascade. She ultimately agreed to stay.

On Election Day that November, Mr. Larson asked some Cascade employees in the office about the best time to go vote. Ms. Ybarra, who is Black, replied that she had voted that morning without having to wait in line. Mr. Larson responded: “But you live in the ghetto, and everybody knows that Black people don’t vote.” The scene was described by two people who heard the comment and a third who was told about it later.

Mr. Giglio denied that Mr. Larson made the remark.

At least one employee at Cascade complained to human resources about Mr. Larson’s remark. The complaint made its way to Mr. Gates and Ms. French Gates, who later spoke to Ms. Ybarra as part of an internal investigation, according to people familiar with the matter.

In January 2005, she quit Cascade, received a small payout and agreed to not speak about the firm in the future.

“When these allegations were made more than 15 years ago, B.M.G.I. took them very seriously” and hired an independent lawyer to investigate, Mr. Giglio said. He added that it is standard procedure at Cascade to have employees sign confidentiality agreements when they get severance packages.

### **Potential for Embarrassment**

In November 2006, Mr. Gates and Ms. French Gates were sent another complaint about Mr. Larson. This one was from Robert E. Sydow, a California fund manager who had been close friends with Mr. Larson and whose firm, Grandview Capital Management, Mr. Larson had hired to manage a \$1.6 billion slice of the foundation’s endowment.

Doug Rowan had been hired by Bill Gates to create his CORBIS images company, but things went awry and Rowan departed Corbis. Rowan has stories to tell about Gates.

Mr. Sydow wrote a six-page letter to the Gateses accusing Mr. Larson of abruptly severing Cascade’s ties with Grandview after a dispute between him and Mr. Sydow. (The dispute, Mr. Sydow wrote, came after Mr. Sydow warned Mr. Larson that he needed “to stop using his power to hurt others in anger.”)

The letter, reviewed by The Times, said Mr. Larson had harmed Grandview’s reputation in part by spreading “false and defamatory” lies about it in the market.

Mr. Sydow, the godfather to one of Mr. Larson’s children, went on to describe multiple instances of Mr. Larson seeking to punish employees who left Cascade and retaliating against those who cooperated with the investigation into his treatment of Ms. Ybarra, among other things.

Mr. Larson has “the potential to greatly embarrass both you and the foundation,” Mr. Sydow wrote.

“We exit agreements with third-party investment managers for a variety of reasons,” Mr. Larson said in a statement sent by Mr. Giglio.

After Ms. Ybarra’s departure, Cascade hired a new head of human resources, Kathy Berman. She had once worked at Microsoft, most recently as the head of executive recruiting.

Around then, there were also efforts to create physical distance between Mr. Larson and some Cascade employees, including moving a number of people onto a different floor from Mr. Larson’s office, according to three former employees. Mr. Giglio said employee morale was high.

Cascade employees including Mr. Larson were required to undergo sexual harassment and sensitivity training. Mr. Larson didn’t seem to take it seriously, one former employee said. “We don’t need this,” the former employee recalled Mr. Larson saying. Mr. Giglio denied that.

Mr. Larson’s conduct did not improve, former employees said.

In emails, he sometimes castigated colleagues as “stupid” or called their work “garbage,” according to several people who saw the emails. (The missives came to be known as “Larson bombs.”) At meetings, he would sometimes dismiss employees’ presentations with comments like, “That’s the dumbest idea I’ve ever heard.”

“Years ago, earlier in my career, I used harsh language that I would not use today,” Mr. Larson said in the statement. “I regret this greatly but have done a lot of work to change.”

At a work Christmas party in the mid-2000s, Mr. Larson was seated outdoors with a small group of male employees after dinner, according to one of the men. Three female colleagues were standing about 20 feet away. “Which one of them do you wanna” have sex with? Mr. Larson asked the men, using a profane verb.

When a female employee was on a Weight Watchers program, Mr. Larson asked her, “Are you losing weight for me?” according to someone who heard the remark. Another former employee said Mr. Larson would ask male employees whether certain women at Cascade were single.

On at least one occasion in recent years, with employees looking on, Mr. Larson displayed photographs of naked women on his phone and compared them to Ms. Berman, the human resources executive, according to a former employee who witnessed the incident and another person who was told about it. (Ms. Berman left Cascade in 2015.) Another woman who worked at Cascade said Mr. Larson asked her if she would strip for a certain amount of money.

Mr. Larson denied making any of those comments. “This is not true,” he said.

### **A Canceled Contract**

About three years ago, Megan Scott, Mr. Larson’s chief of staff, complained to the Gateses about Mr. Larson, according to three people with knowledge of the matter.

Among her concerns was that Mr. Larson was preparing to sign a five-year contract with a recruiting firm that a Cascade employee, Pamela Harrington, was starting, two of the people said. (The proposed contract would pay Mrs. Harrington's firm an annual retainer that started at less than \$1.5 million and over time decreased to \$400,000, said Mitchell Langberg, a lawyer for Mrs. Harrington.) Ms. Scott and another employee complained to the Gateses about what they saw as the close personal relationship between Mr. Larson and Mrs. Harrington, the people said.

"This allegation unfairly emanates from a former disgruntled employee who has tried hard to undermine the reputation of Mrs. Harrington, a highly accomplished and successful individual in her own right," Mr. Giglio said.

Mr. Gates told Mr. Larson to cancel the proposed contract with Ms. Harrington's firm, the people said.

Mr. Giglio said the decision was part of a broader move "not to outsource many internal functions, including recruiting."

By 2019, that had apparently changed. Mr. Langberg said that B.M.G.I. entered into an executive recruiting contract with Mrs. Harrington's firm that December. "Mrs. Harrington has been providing service under that contract since that time," he said.

Around the time of the complaints involving Ms. Harrington, Mr. Larson was repeatedly propositioning, and being rebuffed by, the manager of a local bicycle store that was mostly owned by a firm, Rally Capital, that Cascade had invested in.

In 2017, the manager hired a lawyer, who sent a letter to Mr. Gates and Ms. French Gates warning them that if Mr. Larson did not stop harassing her, she would sue them. The letter said Mr. Larson had exposed himself to the manager and had told her that he wanted to have sex with her and another woman, according to someone who read the letter.

Mr. Gates agreed to settle the matter by having a payment made to the bike store manager. Ms. French Gates insisted that an outside investigator review the incident and Cascade's culture, people familiar with the matter [previously told The Times](#). In 2018, Mr. Larson went on paid leave while the investigation took place.

At the time, Mr. Gates told a Cascade employee that he doubted that Mr. Larson would ever return, according to a person with knowledge of the conversation.

Jessie L. Harris, a lawyer for a Seattle law firm, Williams Kastner, conducted the investigation. He concluded that the bike shop manager's complaint could not be substantiated.

"You should know that Michael wanted to contest the allegations throughout the investigation," Mr. Giglio said. "But he, obviously, was not the ultimate decision maker."

Mr. Larson returned from leave in 2019. Cascade's chief operating officer had departed during Mr. Larson's absence, and Ms. Scott left shortly after his return. To curb Mr. Larson's influence over

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Cascade, Mr. Gates told him to hire a new chief operating officer, a former Cascade employee said. Mr. Giglio said the process included a committee and an outside search firm.

The pick was Mr. Larson's college and business school classmate.

Threats and intimidation keep the tales of the filthy tech oligarchs in check but crowd-sourced forensics have now opened the floodgates,

The perpetrators operate a **massive and abusive national sex cult**. The perverts in the Sand Hill Road Venture Capital offices, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel.

( <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum> )

Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, LinkedIn, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. The Harvey Weinstein and Ed Buck sex scandals are well known.

( <https://ktla.com/2019/09/17/dem-donor-ed-buck-arrested-after-3rd-mans-overdose-charged-with-operating-west-hollywood-drug-house/> )

These sex cult actions have been widely covered in the news individually, ie:

- The Joe Lonsdale rape case

( <https://europetodaynews.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/joe-lonsdale-rapist-abusive-frat-boy-and-mysoginst-or-gods-gift-to-women/> )

- The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit

( <https://www.eandblaw.com/employment-discrimination-blog/2016/02/19/pao-v-kleiner-perkins/> )

- The Eric Schmidt sex penthouse stories

( <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric-Schmidt-spends-15-million-dollars-private-doorman-Manhattan-penthouse-totally-soundproofed.html> )

- The Jeffrey Epstein case

( <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html> )

- The Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case

( <https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/07/09/google-exec-hayes-killed-by-call-girl/12422797/> )

- **The Google Andy Rubin sex slave case**

( <https://conservativedailypost.com/android-co-founder-accused-of-running-sex-slave-ring/> )

- **The Sergy Brin 3-way sex romp scandal**

( <https://nexter.org/google-sex-scandal-sergey-brin-playboy-book-alleges> )

- **The Steve Bing Case**

( <https://newspunch.com/steve-bing-clinton-friend-associate-epstein-links-dead/> )

- **The Hydrant investigation**

( [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Hydrant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Hydrant) )

- **The Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties scandals**

( <https://pagesix.com/2018/02/12/elon-musk-sported-interesting-getup-at-alleged-sex-party/> )

- **The NXIVM sexual slave cases**

( <https://www.oxygen.com/crime-time/nxivm-sex-slave-details-horrific-allegations-against-keith-raniere> )

- **The Michael Goguen anal sex slave case**

( <https://www.news.com.au/finance/tech-titan-michael-goguen-of-sequioa-capital-kept-amber-baptiste-as-a-sex-slave-for-13-years/news-story/91012180fc3b23d50c1e6be8105c92e7> )

- **The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties**

( <https://fortune.com/2018/01/02/brotopia-book-silicon-valley-sex-party/> )

and thousands of other cases and federal divorce court filings.

( <https://www.pacer.gov/> )

This group of people have proven themselves, over and over, to be sociopath control freaks not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control.

( <https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/09/19/551810814/silicon-valley-s-ellen-pao-tackles-sex-discrimination-workplace-diversity-in-mem> )

( <https://nypost.com/2018/01/03/book-details-tech-bros-drug-fueled-sex-parties-in-silicon-valley/> )

The Four Seasons Hotel and Rosewood Hotels in Silicon Valley are estimated to engage in over \$30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by Eastern Bloc Mafia operators.

( <https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valleys-sex-workers-are-being-priced-out-of-the-city-by-their-own-clients> )

( <https://escortontop.com/hotel-escorts.htm> )

( <https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/05/silicon-valley-cougar-nights-love> )

( <https://www.quora.com/Do-escorts-really-use-the-Rosewood-Hotel-lobby-bar-in-Menlo-Park> )

- **The Elon Musk sex perversions are the tip of the iceberg.**

( <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8426719/Cara-Delevingne-three-way-affair-Amber-Heard-Elon-Musk.html> )

At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO airports every week for these Cartel members. Google boss David Drummond engaged in horrible philandering sexual violations of his wife yet Google covers up every story about it on the web. Google's Eric Schmidt is under massive investigation.

( [http://american-corruption.com/Eric\\_Schmidt\\_Has\\_A\\_Psychotic\\_Need\\_To\\_Control\\_Governments\\_And\\_Society.html](http://american-corruption.com/Eric_Schmidt_Has_A_Psychotic_Need_To_Control_Governments_And_Society.html) )

You hear about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims. One of their vast numbers of prostitutes is quoted as saying that the girls and boys are paid "*not just for sex but for the oligarch's endless need to feel that they can control anyone for any reason...*". Multiple attorney general's controlled by their cartel, ie: [Eric Schneiderman](#) and [Eliot Spitzer](#) , are involved in these sex rings.

( <https://newspunch.com/eric-schneiderman-nxivm-child-sex-slaves-clintons/> )

( [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliot\\_Spitzer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliot_Spitzer) )

*These are the main influencers of a national political party and they are all involved in horrific sex perversions and abuses! The associates political figures financed by this sex Cartel include: Illinois State Representative, **Keith Farnham**, who has resigned and was charged with possession of child pornography and has been accused of bragging at an online site about sexually molesting a 6-year-old girl; Spokesperson for the Arkansas Democratic Party, **Harold Moody, Jr**, who was charged with distribution and possession of child pornography; Radnor Township Board of Commissioners member, **Philip Ahr**, who resigned from his position after being charged with possession of child pornography and abusing children between 2 and 6 years-old; Activist and BLM organizer, **Charles Wade**, who was arrested and charged with human trafficking and underage prostitution; Texas attorney and activist, **Mark Benavides**, who was charged with having sex with a minor, inducing a child under 18 to have sex and compelling prostitution of at least nine legal clients and possession of child pornography, he was found guilty on six counts of sex trafficking; Virginia Delegate, **Joe Morrissey**, who was indicted on charges connected to his relationship with a 17-year-old girl and was charged with supervisory indecent liberties with a minor, electronic solicitation of a minor, possession of child pornography and distribution of child pornography; Massachusetts Congressman, **Gerry Studds**, who was censured by the House of Representatives after he admitted to an inappropriate relationship with a 17-year-old page; Former Mayor of Stillwater, New York, **Rick Nelson** who was plead guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography of children less than 16 years of age; Mayor of Clayton, New York, **Dale Kenyon**, who was indicted for sexual acts against a teenager; Former Mayor of Hubbard, Ohio, **Richard Keenan**, who was given a life sentence in jail for raping a 4-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Winston, Oregon, **Kenneth Barrett**, who was arrested for setting up a meeting to have sex with a 14-year-old girl who turned out to be a police officer; The Mayor of Randolph, Nebraska, **Dwayne L. Schutt**, who was arrested and charged with four counts of felony third-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of intentional child abuse.*

*The associates political figures financed by this sex Cartel also include: The Former Mayor of Dawson, Georgia, **Christopher Wright**, who was indicted on the charges of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, rape, child molestation and statutory rape of an 11-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Stockton, California, **Anthony Silva**, who was charged with providing alcohol to young adults during a game of strip poker that included a 16-year-old boy at a camp for underprivileged children run by the mayor; Former Mayor of Millbrook, New York, **Donald***



**Briggs**, who was arrested and charged with inappropriate sexual contact with a person younger than 17; The party leader for Victoria County, Texas, **Stephen Jabbour**, who plead guilty to possession and receiving over half a million child pornographic images; DNC activist and fundraiser, **Terrence Bean**, who was arrested on charges of sodomy and sex abuse in a case involving a 15-year-old boy; DNC Party Chairman for Davidson County, Tennessee, **Rodney Mullin**, who resigned amid child pornography allegations; DNC activist, **Andrew Douglas Reed**, who pleaded guilty to multiple counts of 2nd-degree sexual exploitation of a minor for producing child pornography; DNC official from Terre Haute, Indiana, **David Roberts** who was sentenced to federal prison for producing and possessing child pornography including placing hidden cameras in the bedrooms and bathrooms at a home he shared with two minor female victims; Democratic California Congressman, **Tony Cárdenas**, who is being sued in LA County for allegedly sexually abused a 16-year-old girl; Democratic aide to Senator **Barbara Boxer**, **Jeff Rosato**, who plead guilty to charges of trading in child pornography; Alaskan State Representative, **Dean Westlake**, who resigned from his seat after the media published a report alleging he fathered a child with a 16-year-old girl when he was 28; New Jersey State Assemblyman, **Neil Cohen**, who was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography; DNC donor and billionaire, **Jeffrey Epstein**, ran an underage child sex brothel for The Commission and was convicted of soliciting underage girls for prostitution; New York Congressman, **Anthony Weiner**, who plead guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor as part of a plea agreement for sexted and sending Twitter DMs to underage girls as young as 15; DNC donor, activist, and Hollywood producer **Harvey Weinstein** is being criminally prosecuted and civilly sued for years of sexual abuse (that was well known “secret” in Hollywood) including underage sexual activities with aspiring female actresses; DNC activist and #metoo proponent, **Asia Argento**, settled a lawsuit for sexual harassment stemming from sexual activities with an underage actor; Mayor of Racine, Wisconsin, **Gary Becker**, who was convicted of attempted child seduction, child pornography, and other child sex crimes; Democratic Seattle Mayor **Ed Murray** resigned after multiple accusations of child sexual abuse were levied against him including by family members; San Francisco Mayoral candidate **John Molinari** had his daughter removed from his home by San Francisco Police for his abuse of her according to SFPD reports; San Francisco Mayoral candidate **Roger Boas** was arrested for running an underage sex brothel which catered to San Francisco political elite; DNC activist and aid to NYC Mayor De Blasio, **Jacob Schwartz** was arrested on possession of 3,000+ child pornographic images; Democratic activist and actor, **Russell Simmons**, was sued based on an allegation of sexual assault where he coerced an underage model for sex; DNC Governor of Oregon, **Neil Goldschmidt**, after being caught by a newspaper, publicly admitted to having a past sexual relationship with a 13-year-old girl after the statute of limitations on the rape charges had expired; Democratic Illinois Congressman, **Mel Reynolds** resigned from Congress after he was convicted of statutory rape of a 16-year-old campaign volunteer; Democratic New York Congressman, **Fred Richmond**, was arrested in Washington D.C. for soliciting sex from a 16-year-old boy; Democratic activist, donor, and director, **Roman Polanski**, fled the country after pleading guilty to statutory rape of a 13-year-old girl - Democrats and Hollywood actors still defend him to this day, including, **Whoopi Goldberg**, **Martin Scorsese**, **Woody Allen**, **David**

**Lynch, Wim Wenders, Pedro Almodovar, Tilda Swinton and Monica Bellucci;** Democratic State Senator from Alaska, **George Jacko**, was found guilty of sexual harassment of an underage legislative page; Democratic State Representative candidate for Colorado, **Andrew Myers**, was convicted for possession of child pornography and enticing children; Illinois Congressman, **Gus Savage** was investigated by the Democrat-controlled House Committee on Ethics for attempting to rape an underage female Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire; Activist, donor, and spokesperson for Subway, **Jared Fogle**, was convicted of distribution and receipt of child pornography and traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor; State Department official, **Carl Carey**, under **Hillary Clinton's** state department, was arrested on ten counts of child porn possession; Maine Assistant Attorney General, **James Cameron**, was sentenced to just over 15 years in federal prison for seven counts of child porn possession, receipt and transmission; Leading DNC boss and financier **Ed Buck** was arrested for killing gay prostitutes and running a sex and drug ring. Wealthy businessman Ed Buck hobnobbed and financed elite Democrats such as Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Gavin Newsom. Away from the glamour of the dinner parties and fundraisers, Buck had a dangerous dark side. It included preying on masked gay black men in sexual games and injecting them with fatal levels of GHB and methamphetamine. ; State Department official, **Daniel Rosen**, under **Hillary Clinton's** state department, was arrested and charged with allegedly soliciting sex from a minor over the internet; State Department official, **James Cafferty**, pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography; Democratic radio host, **Bernie Ward**, plead guilty to one count of sending child pornography over the Internet; Democratic deputy attorney general from California, **Raymond Liddy**, was arrested for possession of child pornography. There are **THOUSANDS** of other sex crime cases involving associates of the tech Cartel. All of these perpetrators had financing from and social and political direction from the Silicon Valley controlling perpetrators.

An inordinate number of the members are closeted homosexuals who seek to use their media monopolies and massive lobbyist ownership's to promote child sex and child sex change consideration.

( <https://nationalnewsnetwork.net/video/the-silicon-valley-mafia-cartel> )

( [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal\\_Mafia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal_Mafia) )

( <https://nypost.com/2016/10/09/the-sex-slave-scandal-that-exposed-pedophile-billionaire-jeffrey-epstein/> )

Hence the massive, sudden, promotion of those issues in all of their media since they took power in 2008 and pretty much ran the Obama White House.

( <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/fashion/silicon-valley-embrace-gay-and-lesbian-community.html> )

( <https://www.wired.com/2007/11/how-paypal-gave/> )

( <https://topica.asia/news/biggest-secret-of-silicon-valley-mafia-network/> )

The press has widely reported on underage boy sex clubs and the payment to parents for the blood of young boys by these oligarchs. A large number of tech VC's and senior executives are covert gay activists who hire women to act as their "beards".

( <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottallison/2012/08/25/gay-in-silicon-valley-a-founders-perspective/> )

( <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/31/blood-transfusions-from-teenagers-start-up-charging-8000-a-piece.html> )

( <http://www.abeldanger.org/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/The-Silicon-Valley-Mafia-Update-4.2-1.pdf> )

Their elitist Yale and Stanford fraternity house upbringings promoted "bromances", "rape culture" and a don't-worry-daddy-will-fix-it mentality. Highly gay law firms, (like Covington, Perkins and Sonsini), actively lobby to place gay politicians in office from their Bay Area offices.

( <http://politicalhat.com/2018/08/13/tech-overlords-of-silicon-valley-gay-frogs-and-the-silencing-of-dissent/> )

( [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-has-being-openly-gay\\_b\\_14367576](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-has-being-openly-gay_b_14367576) )

( [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brock-turner-dad-letter-is-rape-culture-in-a-nutshell\\_n\\_57555bace4b0ed593f14cb30](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brock-turner-dad-letter-is-rape-culture-in-a-nutshell_n_57555bace4b0ed593f14cb30) )

**What some of the fundraisers for the political candidates tell these oligarchs to get their cash:**

*"...We need to control the government or you won't have enough money to buy private islands, ranches and penthouses and have young boys and girls flown in to have sex with. If we don't control the government, no more sex parties for you..."*

The AngelGate Conspiracy ( <https://venturecapitalcorruption.weebly.com/the-angelgate-conspiracy.html> ); The Job Collusion Case ( [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech\\_Employee\\_Antitrust\\_Litigation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation) ) and hundreds of other cases, prove that the perpetrators regularly meet, conspire, collude and racketeer, in full view of law enforcement, without ever getting arrested by the FBI because they bribe public officials in order to avoid prosecution.

( <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5229757/amp/Inside-Silicon-Valleys-sex-drug-parties.html> )

Public officials and Silicon Valley oligarchs exchanged felony bribes and manipulated government actions in order to benefit themselves and harm us. these are the facts including the lists of bribes, attacks and covert financing routes!

Famous members of congress lie, cheat, steal and manipulate public records in order to protect their

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trillions of dollars of Google, Facebook, Netflix, Tesla and Amazon insider stock market payola.

Now the public is working together, around the globe, to end this corruption forever by exposing every single one of the corrupt and all of their dirty secrets!

Department of Energy staff (ie: Chu), White House staff (ie: Emanuel), CIA staff (ie: Woolsey) owned the rare earth (ie: lithium, indium) mining scam stock (ie: Goldman Sachs transfers) market securities from foreign countries (ie: Afghanistan, Congo) which only benefited themselves, Elon Musk and his Silicon Valley cartel.

( [http://american-corruption.com/department\\_of\\_energy\\_financing.html](http://american-corruption.com/department_of_energy_financing.html) )

Demand the immediate divestiture of all stock market holdings of all politicians and their family members because that is how most bribes are now paid!

## Silicon Valley Is Their “Hunting Grounds”

Executives and “venture capitalists” From Google, Facebook, Netflix, Tesla and the Sand Hill road VC offices use Silicon Valley as their personal hunting grounds for sex abuse, sex trafficking, sex cults and date rape!

The public is now joining together to expose them and seek their arrest!

The following is now documented, as fact, in investigations of the Silicon Valley and Hollywood oligarch sex perversions:

- These twisted deeds indicate the mind-set, moral depravity and disturbed culture of the, so-called, "oligarchs" who control modern media.
- Silicon Valley Venture Capitalists rape and sex-extort interns.
- Silicon Valley's Greylock Partners, Kleiner Perkins, and most other VC's are rapists, sexual predators and political bribery enthusiasts and nobody ever arrests them for it because they control judges and politicians.
- They hire hookers and ‘Rent-Boys’, not just for the sex, but to be able to "control another human" because they are almost all Sociopath personality types.
- They hire "sex club" operators to secure underage children for them because they want to have total manipulation over a helpless person because it makes these men feel more powerful.
- The Rosewood Hotel and the Four Seasons hotels in Palo Alto are riddled with \$6000.00 per night hookers, rent boys, Stanford Co-Ed "sugar babies" and Russian Mafia managed Ukrainian prostitutes. You just have to know the "code words" and hand signals to play "the game".
- Google executives killed by their hookers, black-mailed by their hookers, exposed in sex slave rings and worse.
- Huge number of Google, Netflix and Facebook senior executives are homosexual and pressure staff for sex.

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- San Jose and San Francisco International Airports have a non-stop flow of European Hookers flown in by tech CEOs who got them off of "seeking arrangements.com" and "match.com" using the "code words".
  - Almost every tech executive and Sand Hill Road VC has been charged with spousal abuse, sex trafficking, intern sex extortion, bribing Stanford to cover up sex exploitation and worse.
  - Stanford University bosses cover-up, and support, frat house sex crimes in order to keep rich daddies donating to Alumni funds.
  - Basements and secret rooms in some of their Woodside and Atherton, California mansions house BDSM chambers and sex abuse lock-rooms
- See This shocking video: <https://www.invidio.us/watch?v=O13G5A5w5P0>

By KATIE BENNER

Rachel Renock, the chief executive of Wethos, center, with her business partners, Claire Humphreys, left, and Kristen Ablamsky. Ms. Renock said they received sexist comments while seeking financing. Credit Sasha Maslov for The New York Times

Their stories came out slowly, even hesitantly, at first. Then in a rush.

One female entrepreneur recounted how she had been propositioned by a Silicon Valley venture capitalist while seeking a job with him, which she did not land after rebuffing him. Another showed the increasingly suggestive messages she had received from a start-up investor. And one chief executive described how she had faced numerous sexist comments from an investor while raising money for her online community website.

What happened afterward was often just as disturbing, the women told The New York Times. Many times, the investors' firms and colleagues ignored or played down what had happened when the situations were brought to their attention. Saying anything, the women were warned, might lead to ostracism.

Now some of these female entrepreneurs have decided to take that risk. More than two dozen women in the technology start-up industry spoke to The Times in recent days about being sexually harassed. Ten of them named the investors involved, often providing corroborating messages and emails, and pointed to high-profile venture capitalists such as Chris Sacca of Lowercase Capital and Dave McClure of 500 Startups.

The disclosures came after the tech news site The Information reported that female entrepreneurs had

been preyed upon by a venture capitalist, Justin Caldbeck of Binary Capital. The new accounts underscore how sexual harassment in the tech start-up ecosystem goes beyond one firm and is pervasive and ingrained. Now their speaking out suggests a cultural shift in Silicon Valley, where such predatory behavior had often been murmured about but rarely exposed.

The tech industry has long suffered a gender imbalance, with companies such as Google and Facebook acknowledging how few women were in their ranks. Some female engineers have started to speak out on the issue, including a former Uber engineer who detailed a pattern of sexual harassment at the company, setting off internal investigations that spurred the resignation in June of Uber's chief executive, Travis Kalanick.

Most recently, the revelations about Mr. Caldbeck of Binary Capital have triggered an outcry. The investor has been accused of sexually harassing entrepreneurs while he worked at three different venture firms in the past seven years, often in meetings in which the women were presenting their companies to him.

Several of Silicon Valley's top venture capitalists and technologists, including Reid Hoffman, a founder of LinkedIn, condemned Mr. Caldbeck's behavior last week and called for investors to sign a "decency pledge." Binary has since collapsed, with Mr. Caldbeck leaving the firm and investors pulling money out of its funds.

The chain of events has emboldened more women to talk publicly about the treatment they said they had endured from tech investors.

"Female entrepreneurs are a critical part of the fabric of Silicon Valley," said Katrina Lake, founder and chief executive of the online clothing start-up Stitch Fix, who was one of the women targeted by Mr. Caldbeck. "It's important to expose the type of behavior that's been reported in the last few weeks, so the community can recognize and address these problems."

The women's experiences help explain why the venture capital and start-up ecosystem — which underpins the tech industry and has spawned companies such as Google, Facebook and Amazon — has been so lopsided in terms of gender.

Most venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are men, with female entrepreneurs receiving \$1.5 billion in funding last year versus \$58.2 billion for men, according to the data firm PitchBook. Many of the investors hold outsize power, since entrepreneurs need their money to turn ideas and innovations into a business. And because the venture industry operates with few disclosure requirements, people have kept silent about investors who cross the lines with entrepreneurs.



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Some venture capitalists' abuse of power has come to light in recent years. In 2015, Ellen Pao took her former employer, the prestigious venture firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, to trial for allegations of gender discrimination, leveling accusations of professional retaliation after spurned sexual advances. Ms. Pao lost the case, but it sparked a debate about whether women in tech should publicly call out unequal treatment.

"Having had several women come out earlier, including Ellen Pao and me, most likely paved the way and primed the industry that these things indeed happen," said Gesche Haas, an entrepreneur who said she was propositioned for sex by an investor, Pavel Curda, in 2014. Mr. Curda has since apologized.

Some of the entrepreneurs who spoke with The Times said they were often touched without permission by investors or advisers.

At a mostly male tech gathering in Las Vegas in 2009, Susan Wu, an entrepreneur and investor, said that Mr. Sacca, an investor and former Google executive, touched her face without her consent in a way that made her uncomfortable. Ms. Wu said she was also propositioned by Mr. Caldbeck while fundraising in 2010 and worked hard to avoid him later when they crossed paths.

"There is such a massive imbalance of power that women in the industry often end up in distressing situations," Ms. Wu said.

After being contacted by The Times, Mr. Sacca wrote in a blog post on Thursday: "I now understand I personally contributed to the problem. I am sorry." In a statement to The Times, he added that he was "grateful to Susan and the other brave women sharing their stories. I'm confident the result of their courage will be long-overdue, lasting change."

After the publication of this article, Mr. Sacca contacted The Times again to amend his original statement, adding: "I dispute Susan's account from 2009."

Many of the women also said they believed they had limited ability to push back against inappropriate behavior, often because they needed funding, a job or other help.

In 2014, Sarah Kunst, 31, an entrepreneur, said she discussed a potential job at 500 Startups, a start-up incubator in San Francisco. During the recruiting process, Mr. McClure, a founder of 500 Startups and an investor, sent her a Facebook message that read in part, "I was getting confused figuring out whether to hire you or hit on you."

Ms. Kunst, who now runs a fitness start-up, said she declined Mr. McClure's advance. When she later discussed the message with one of Mr. McClure's colleagues, she said 500 Startups ended its

conversations with her.

500 Startups said Mr. McClure, who did not respond to a request for comment, was no longer in charge of day-to-day operations after an internal investigation.

“After being made aware of instances of Dave having inappropriate behavior with women in the tech community, we have been making changes internally,” 500 Startups said. “He recognizes he has made mistakes and has been going through counseling to work on addressing changes in his previous unacceptable behavior.”

Rachel Renock, the chief executive of Wethos, described a similar situation in which she faced sexist comments while seeking financing for her online community site. While she and her female partners were fund-raising in March, one investor told them that they should marry for money, that he liked it when women fought back because he would always win, and that they needed more attractive photos of themselves in their presentation.

They put up with the comments, Ms. Renock said, because they “couldn’t imagine a world in which that \$500,000 wasn’t on the table anymore.” Ms. Renock declined to name the investor. Wethos raised the \$500,000 from someone else and is still fund-raising.

Wendy Dent, 43, whose company Cinemmerse makes an app for smart watches, said she was sent increasingly flirtatious messages by a start-up adviser, Marc Canter, as she was trying to start her company in 2014. Mr. Canter, who had founded a software company in the 1980s that became known as Macromedia, initially agreed to help her find a co-founder. But over time, his messages became sexual in nature.

In one message, reviewed by The Times, he wrote that she was a “sorceress casting a spell.” In another, he commented on how she looked in a blue dress and added, “Know what I’m thinking? Why am I sending you this — in private?”

Mr. Canter, in an interview, said that Ms. Dent “came on strong to me, asking for help” and that she had used her sexuality publicly. He said he disliked her ideas so he behaved the way he did to make her go away.

Some entrepreneurs were asked to not speak about the behavior they experienced.

At a start-up competition in 2014 in San Francisco, Lisa Curtis, an entrepreneur, pitched her food start-up, Kuli Kuli, and was told her idea had won the most plaudits from the audience, opening the door to possible investment. As she stepped off the stage, an investor named Jose De Dios, said, “Of course

you won. You're a total babe."

Ms. Curtis later posted on Facebook about the exchange and got a call from a different investor. He said "that if I didn't take down the post, no one in Silicon Valley would give me money again," she said. Ms. Curtis deleted the post.

In a statement, Mr. De Dios said he "unequivocally did not make a defamatory remark."

Often, change happens only when there is a public revelation, some of the women said. In the case of Mr. Caldbeck and Binary, the investor and the firm have apologized, as has Mr. Caldbeck's previous employer, the venture capital firm Lightspeed Venture Partners, which had received complaints about him.

"We regret we did not take stronger action," Lightspeed said on Twitter on Tuesday. "It is clear now that we should have done more."

Lindsay Meyer, an entrepreneur in San Francisco, said Mr. Caldbeck put \$25,000 of his own money into her fitness start-up in 2015. That gave Mr. Caldbeck reason to constantly text her; in those messages, reviewed by The Times, he asked if she was attracted to him and why she would rather be with her boyfriend than him. At times, he groped and kissed her, she said.

"I felt like I had to tolerate it because this is the cost of being a nonwhite female founder," said Ms. Meyer, who is Asian-American.

But even after she reached out to a mentor, who alerted one of Binary's investors, Legacy Venture, to Mr. Caldbeck's actions, little changed. Legacy went on to invest in Binary's new fund. Binary and Mr. Caldbeck declined to comment.

"We failed to follow up on information about Mr. Caldbeck's personal behavior," Legacy said in a statement. "We regret this oversight and are determined to do better."

A Silicon Valley venture capitalist has been sued for \$40 million by a woman who claims he used her as a virtual sex slave for 13 years.

Michael Goguen, who had worked for a firm that funded Google and Paypal, "sexually and physically" abused Amber Laurel Baptiste over more than 13 years after picking her up at a Texas strip club, her lawsuit alleges.

Baptiste, who claims she was brought to the United States from Canada by human traffickers at 15,

said she endured “countless hours of forced sodomy” from the tech titan. The former stripper said Goguen made her endure demeaning sexual acts, sodomized her for “six hours at a time,” and forced her to call him “king” and “emperor.”

Filed in San Mateo County, Calif., on March 8, her suit details a life of torture and servitude as she was jetting around the globe to serve as the millionaire’s plaything. She claims Goguen had promised to save her from human trafficking but instead became an even worse predator himself.

Goguen, who was forced to step down from his position at Sequoia Capital, did not deny that the two had a sexual relationship but insisted the sex was consensual. He filed a countersuit against Baptiste claiming she is an “exotic dancer . . . looking for a payday.”

The venture capitalist said Baptiste was obsessed with him and sought to extort him because she was jealous of his wife. In his countersuit, Goguen provides pages of texts and emails in which she apparently refers to him as “Prince Charming,” “My Beautiful Love” and “the sweetest man in the world.”

The suit includes Baptiste’s descriptions of the “amazing sex” the two had together and photos that she allegedly sent him in which she is seen playfully posing in her underwear.

Baptiste is demanding \$40 million, saying the two agreed on the amount to compensate her for the horrors she had suffered. Goguen, who has already paid her \$10 million, said she is “a woman scorned” and a victim “of her own delusions.”

He claims that when he tried to end their relationship, Baptiste became bent on vengeance, threatening to ruin his life and reputation. He said that he had no choice but to pay her the \$10 million, but that she refused to relent and demanded more money.

Sequoia Capital released a statement that called Goguen’s departure from the firm the “appropriate course of action.” A philanthropist, Goguen was lauded for donating \$2 million to fight online child pornography and sex trafficking where he lives in Montana.

Goguen is not the only business leader who’s faced backlash over sexually inappropriate behavior.

#### **FACEBOOK BOSS IN UNDER-AGE SEX SCANDAL -**

Dov Katz, head of the computer vision and machine learning group at Facebook-owned Oculus, has been charged in King County for attempted commercial sexual abuse of a minor. The 38-year-old tech exec allegedly attempted to contact what he believed to be was a 15-year-old girl for sex. The fictitious

15-year-old was actually an undercover police officer with the Tukwila Police Department, a city just south of Seattle.

The news was first reported by KING 5, which said that Katz was arrested by Tukwila Police on Wednesday. Katz is to be arraigned on January 5th, and bail was set at \$125,000. An Israeli citizen who resides in California, Katz is forbidden to have contact with any minors, except in the presence of a responsible adult, according to charging documents. Katz allegedly **responded to an online advertisement that offered sex in exchange for money, an ad which was posted by undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.**

### **Horrific Google Anal Sex Slave Case Uncovers Twisted Perversions Of Google Executives**

By Samantha Conners - APT

Michael Goguen, Google's married senior investor, “sexually and physically” abused Amber Laurel Baptiste with constant anal sex over more than 13 years after picking her up at a Texas strip club. His company: Sequoia Capital, has had other run-ins with cheating married executives, escorts and tax evasion schemes, per legal filings.

Eric Schmidt, the head of Google, proclaimed that he would have a “open marriage” where he could have sex any time, with anybody, and is documented in a ream of news articles and video regarding his fifteen million dollar “sex penthouse” in New York.

Sergey Brin, another head of Google, is featured in numerous news articles for his “three way sex romp” with multiple Google employees forcing one employee to move to China to escape him. A married Google senior executive named Hayes, who helped rig Google's searches for political clients, was murdered on his “sex yacht” by his prostitute, which other Google executives had used.

Ravi Kumar, another VC associated with Google Executives, was also murdered by a pack of hookers and pimps that frequented his Silicon Valley home.

Valley Girls was a private escort service that used Stanford Co-eds to service the sexual kinks of Google executives.

Ellen Pao famously sued Google founding investor John Doerr, and his company Kleiner Perkins, for sexual abuse.

Google employee divorce filings hold the Silicon Valley record for use of the word “abuse” as one of the reasons given in the legal papers filed to initiate the divorce.

The list of kinky, twisted, bizarre sexual antics of Google executives, and their investors, goes on for pages and pages.

Google seems to attract the most twisted, perverted, morally decrepit men in the world. One has to wonder why, of all the large companies on Earth, only Google got to place the majority of its people in the White House? That's right, Nike doesn't have its people in the White House. Macy's doesn't either. Neither does Chevron, or John Deere tractor or any other company on Earth.

Only Google, exclusively and uniquely, had all of their people placed in the White House and top federal agency lead positions. What's up with that? Were they selected because of their technical skills or their ability to make people bend over?

An addiction to dirty sexual perversions are not the only illicit trends that Google folks display. The Google investors are members of a financing cartel called the National Venture Capital Association

(NVCA). This group of frat boy elitists got busted for running the “Angelgate” scandal in which they were documented rigging, colluding, black-listing and contriving the whole Silicon Valley start-up industry.

Then they were caught again when Eric Schmidt, Mr. “Sex Penthouse” and the head of Google, wrote emails ordering a conspiracy against Silicon Valley engineers. This “No Poaching” conspiracy got the Silicon Valley VC's sued in a class-action lawsuit, which the VC's lost. The Google founder's best friend: Jacques Littlefield, kept the world's largest private fully functional military tank squadron, in fully operational status, hidden in vast warehouses in his Silicon Valley estate in Woodside, California.

He said he had this arsenal: “just in case”. Does Google make white frat house men insane or does it draw the crazy ones to it?

The FBI is finally crunching down on these people. After so many years of the White House ordering the FBI to leave the Google VC's and Silicon Valley perverts alone, it was just getting plain embarrassing for the FBI. The audacious impunity with which Google, and its friends, engaged in tax evasion, importing hookers, bribery, stock market rigging, anti-trust schemes and other crimes has become so overt, in the media, that it was created a spotlight on federal law enforcements avoidance of prosecution of the shenanigans of the Google crowd.

#### **MORE HARD EVIDENCE:**

<https://voat.co/v/news/3031859>

<https://www.bitchute.com/video/BHKtRhglgVMw/>

<https://voat.co/v/news/3051589>

<https://geopolitics.co/2019/02/22/pierre-omidyars-funding-of-pro-regime-change-networks-with-cia-cutouts/>

<https://www.foxnews.com/us/la-news-anchor-died-from-meth-overdose-during-sexual-encounter-at-hotel-autopsy-reveals>

<https://voat.co/v/news/3053343>

<https://cssrc.us/content/california-democrats-protect-offenders-who-lure-minors>

<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/anthony-weiner-released-from-prison-as-part-of-federal-re-entry-program>

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqV9ysq\\_n44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqV9ysq_n44)

[JaysAnalysis.com Sex Cults, Silicon Valley, CIA Hollywood ...](#)

☐ <https://jaysanalysis.com/2018/08/09/sex-cults-silicon-valley-cia-hollywood-technocracy-cfr-jay-dyer/>

In this new episode I cover the history of **Silicon Valley** as a public-private partnership from the beginning, the CFR on China in 2025, the real power of foundations and charities, and the connection of all these together into Hollywood, the CIA and the Pentagon

[The \*\*Silicon Valley\*\* Sexual Predator Cult - Eagle Rising](#)

☐ <https://eaglerising.com/49928/the-silicon-valley-sexual-predator-cult/>

There is a **Silicon Valley** sexual predator subculture that hides itself under the guise of "setting a new paradigm of behavior." There is a **Silicon Valley** sexual predator culture that helps explain a lot of sexual harassment and worse allegations. This was exposed recently by Emily Chang in Vanity Fair. These parties claim to be about being ...

[Sex Cults, Silicon Valley, CIA Hollywood, Technocracy & CFR ...](#)

☐ [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pBMID4CR8\\_4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pBMID4CR8_4)



**Sex Cults, Silicon Valley**, CIA Hollywood, Technocracy & CFR - Jay Dyer Jay Dyer. ... **Vegan Cults** Vs Paleo - Funny Weirdos & Socially Engineering Food - Jay Dyer on Primal Edge - Duration: ...

**Sex Cults, Silicon Valley**, CIA Hollywood, Technocracy & CFR ...

☐ <https://www.spreaker.com/user/acrnetwork/sex-cults-silicon-valley-cia-hollywood-t>

In this new episode I cover the history of **Silicon Valley** as a public-private partnership from the beginning, the CFR on China in 2025, the real power of foundations and charities, and the connection of all these together into Hollywood, the CIA and the Pentagon.

'Cult of founders' is a real problem in **Silicon Valley**: Roger ...

☐ <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/cult-of-founders-is-a-real-problem-in-silicon-valley-roger-mcnamee.html>

Oct 05, 2018 · Roger McNamee, co-founder of tech-focused private equity firm Elevation Partners, told CNBC's "Squawk Alley" that the "**cult** of founders" has become a problem in **Silicon Valley**.

Beware: **Silicon Valley**'s cultists want to turn you into a ...

☐ <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/03/hi-tech-silicon-valley-cult-populism>

Jan 03, 2016 · Love & **sex** Home & garden Health & fitness Family Travel ... **Silicon Valley**'s cultists want to turn you into a disruptive deviant ... Like all good **cults**, such firms tap into our inner quest for ...

How Propaganda Spreads Angry White Manfluencer **Silicon Valley** ...

☐ <https://artificialisintelligentiaedictum.home.blog/2019/05/10/how-propaganda-spreads-angry-white-manfluencer-silicon-valley-cargo-cults-and-spas/>

While criticism just really is based on information from **Silicon Valley** power players who fast days at a "cargo **cult**" -type meditation retreat, there are staggering pods of consumer trends that shape the 11-point Lifestyle Plan of Spirit Baths.

Bad **Sex** in **Silicon Valley** - The Cut

☐ <https://www.thecut.com/2017/06/bad-sex-in-silicon-valley.html>

But people do in fact get laid in **Silicon Valley**, as the show **Silicon Valley** recently dramatized. After more than three seasons of existing in a sexless, screen-filled hell, bumbling programmer Richard Hendricks finally had **sex**: an illicit tryst with his main client's fiancée, in an office conference room, late at night.

Let's Take the **Cult** out of **Silicon Valley** Culture ...

☐ <https://www.enterpriseirregulars.com/134781/lets-take-the-cult-out-of-silicon-valley-culture/>

But sometimes **Silicon Valley cults** are not benevolent - Theranos being the best recent example. Continuing to work in such environments, prioritizing the needs of the **cult** over common sense and business ethics can do lasting damage to your personal relationships, to your health, and to your career.

## Who is the Silicon Valley mafia?

By Terry Reed and Mark Lawson

They are sex abusers like John Doerr and his entire Kleiner Perkins frat boy staff who were sued by Ellen Pao for the misogyny culture of sexual deviancy and abuse that they promote as their corporate culture. They are tax evaders like Ray Lane. They are hooker-hiring sex traffickers like Google's Forrest Hayes who died from an excess of drugs and sex. They are cheaters like Google's David Drummond who destroyed his family by his addiction to infidelity. They are sex addicts who own sex penthouses and cavort with the notorious Wendy Deng like Eric Schmidt. Amid the World's Largest Corporate Sex Scandals Google CEO Eric Schmidt will now leave Alphabet's board. Schmidt is a known womanizer despite being married for 37 years to Wendy Schmidt, who said in 2012 they started living separate lives because she felt like "a piece of luggage" following him around the world. News outlets have been sniffing around Schmidt's former flames looking for a Harvey Weinstein-like bombshell, a source close to Schmidt told The Post. They are mobster-class justice evasion lawyers like Wilson Sonsini and political bribe conduit lawyers like Perkins Coie. They are charged rapists and psychological sex manipulators like Joe Lonsdale.

When Kleiner Perkins offices were broken into by covert law enforcement operatives much was revealed. This was followed by the hack of all of John Doerr's emails' and the email of his top staff. This was followed by the revelation that Doerr bribes Stanford University for special favors for his kids and for certain 'relationships'. Now Doerr must walk on pins and needles because he has been put on notice that even the slightest bribe, political manipulation or mobster-like tech black-listing will not go unnoticed.

A female employee called Tesla's factory a 'predator zone' at a meeting where workers described the constant sexual harassment at Tesla.

DNC chairman Eric Bauman, the head of the California Democratic Party, and the Los Angeles County Democratic Party., has is former assistant say he was first assaulted after falling asleep in a hotel and waking up to his boss performing oral sex on him, and that there were two more instances where he was forced to submit to Bauman.

Bay area party guests and Rothschild-linked Bronfman sisters donated millions to the sex cult whose leaders, Allison Mack and Keith Raniere, have been charged with child sex trafficking.

Goddard, a director, producer and theme park designer, has faced many sex abuse allegations. Eight former members of a Santa Barbara youth theater group in the 1970s alleged that Goddard molested or attempted to molest them. A ninth was said to have told others before he died that Goddard sexually assaulted him as a child. Goddard denied their allegations.

The Silicon Valley Mafia is The Sandhill Road Venture Capital frat boy company bosses in Palo Alto, their National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) partners and the tech companies (Google, Tesla, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) they control. They are sometimes referred to as "The Deep State". They have purchased California, New York and Washington, DC politicians (mostly Senators) who they also control.

They hire rogue ex-intelligence agents to operate Fusion GPS, Gawker/Gizmodo, Black Cube, ShareBlue, New America, In-Q-Tel, Podesta Group, Media Matters, etc. massive media attack programs against competitors, reporters and outsiders. They collude on black-lists, valuation controls, election manipulation, search engine rigging, domestic spying for political manipulation, stock rigging, insider trading, executive prostitute clubs, trophy wife assignments, the bribery of politicians and worse. They are felons who pay politicians to halt investigations and interdiction efforts.

They are widely covered in news media articles as: 'sex abusers, cult enthusiasts, elitists, rapists, woman beaters, probiosis abusers, sexual work extortion operators, extremists, arrogant clones of each other, tone deaf, echo-chamber reinforcing, misogynist, racist, manipulative, insecure, covertly gay, corrupt, thieves' and other anti-social revelations. They are not limited to California and also operate out of New York and Washington DC.

They use their monopolistic control of the internet to massively and exclusively scale services that only they control and use to abuse the public's privacy, human rights, invention rights and information. They run their cartel like the old Italian Mafia once did.

The Department of Justice conducted a series of raids across California tech and media circles and arrested 238 people in connection with a Hollywood pedophilia network, but this story went totally ignored by almost all media outlets. According to police, the arrests included some entertainers, community leaders, white-collar professionals, a monk, and other high-ranking clergy members. The raids were conducted by the Regional Internet Crimes Against Children task force, working directly with the Justice Department. Codenamed "Operation Broken Heart III", the sweeping raids targeted offenders wanted for the sexual exploitation of children, child prostitution, sex tourism and possessing and distributing child pornography, said Deputy Chief Matt Blake. Silicon Valley oligarchs use these intermediate level people to source up sex victims to be delivered to their Woodside and Atherton mansions.

Michael Goguen, who had worked for a firm that funded Google and Paypal, “sexually and physically” abused Amber Laurel Baptiste over more than 13 years after picking her up at a Texas strip club, her lawsuit alleges. Baptiste, who claims she was brought to the United States from Canada by human traffickers at 15, said she endured “countless hours of forced sodomy” from the tech titan. The former stripper said Goguen made her endure demeaning sexual acts, sodomized her for “six hours at a time,” and forced her to call him “king” and “emperor.” Filed in San Mateo County, Calif., her suit details a life of torture and servitude as she was jetting around the globe to serve as the millionaire’s plaything. She claims Goguen had promised to save her from human trafficking but instead became an even worse predator himself.

The Silicon Valley Mafia Cartel is the largest provider of dark money bribes to West Coast politicians including Feinstein, Pelosi, Harris, Brown, Reid, Boxer, Lee, et al.,. Those politicians and their families also covertly own the stock of the California tech companies and social media companies like Tesla, Solyndra, Abound, Google, Facebook, Netflix, etc. Larry Wallace, a senior staffer for Sen. Kamala Harris (D-CA) resigned over the discovery he was involved in a sexual harassment lawsuit and \$400,000 payout to the sexually abused victim while working for then California Attorney General Kamala Harris. In related headlines we read: ***"ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT COLLUDED WITH KAMALA HARRIS EXPOSED AS SEX PERVERT!!!!"; "TOP DNC SEX PSYCHO MAY BE ALIGNED WITH SEX CULTS!"; "WHY IS EVERY DNC BIG SHOT TURNING OUT TO BE A SCREWED UP SEXUAL MESS!"***

The Bay Area headlines reek of perversion: ***"ANOTHER Democrat Sex Cult Exposed: 'sexual servitude' at San Francisco-based 'orgasmic meditation' company: One Taste"; "NXIUM, ONE TASTE, EMO, THE WOODSIDE CLUB: WHY DO THE DEMOCRATS GET INTO SUCH KINK?"; "UNDERCOVER CAMERA'S IN SAN RAFAEL, CALIFORNIA AT 4TH STREET "DANCE/YOGA" BUILDING AND MILL VALLEY CITY BUILDING CATCH SEX-FOR-SALE ESCORTS AND KINK"; "THEY USE "MEET-UP" (THE DNC'S NETWORKING SITE) TO HUNT FOR VICTIMS TO SEDUCE"; " "HOT LITTLE RED HEAD" TURNS OUT TO BE THE TOP ESCORT IN MARIN COUNTY!"***

In the latest case of Hollywood's and Silicon Valley's spiralling sexual abuse scandal, Variety reports that a veteran 58-year-old Disney executive has been charged with three felony counts of child sexual abuse. Jon Heely, the longtime director of music publishing at Disney, was arrested nearly a month ago and charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child. One of the reported victims was 15. The other was abused for four years starting at the age of 11, according to the charges. Heely, who oversees the licensing of music from Disney films faces up to nine years and three months in prison according to The Daily News.

It is now time to sound the alarm bells on the economic prospects for the Millennial Generation in the Western world, but more importantly, at Stanford University. This generation of citizens aged 18 to 36, is the first in modern developed economies on course to have a lower standard of living than their

parents. Housing affordability and a decaying job environment are some of the most pressing issues affecting Stanford Millennials. The future is bleak for this avocado and toast generation, as Western world economies have likely plateaued regarding economic growth. Surging debt and rising government bond yields are producing an environment that could lead to more hardships for this lost generation. Tech oligarchs have taken full advantage of broke Millennials by offering “adult arrangements” for a roof over their heads. Yes, you heard this correctly, Millennials are trading sex for a place to sleep and sex for tuition at Stanford University. Sugar Babies now comprise a large portion of Stanford students. Kleiner Perkins and Greylock VC's hire them for sex. Google and Facebook executives use them like disposable sex toys. The student debt crisis in the US has gotten so bad, there's a growing group of young women — and some men — who are taking an unconventional approach to paying for college. Through dating websites like SeekingArrangement.com, and match.com, Sugar Babies, as they're called, partner up with wealthy, often older, men who want to spend money on them. Some 2.5 million Sugar Babies identified as students in 2016 on SeekingArrangement.com. Many of these Sugar Babies turned to the site to find someone who will pay for their education so they can graduate debt, and worry, free. In exchange, Sugar Babies go to dinners, attend events, or accompany their Sugar Daddy, or daddies, on trips. In some cases, they provide companionship or foster a mentor-mentee relationship. In other situations, the terms of the agreement include physical intimacy.

Jermaine Gagnon, 28, told DailyMailTV how he narrowly escaped death when DNC financier Edward Buck injected him with crystal meth at his sex-toy filled apartment. Gagnon said Buck, 63, paid to fly him from Minnesota to Los Angeles, drugged him with a substance dissolved in Gatorade then injected him with crystal meth. The 28-year-old shared photos of Buck, wearing white long johns, crouched over him on a mattress during one of their nights together last year. Gagnon shared images of sex toys Buck had for their encounter, saying: 'He had this red and black toolbox with all types of fetish toys, like c\*\*k rings, sex toys'. He added: 'He gave me some Tommy Hilfiger tighty whities, a muscle t-shirt and some long johns. White knee-high socks'. Gagnon said during one encounter Buck offered him a drink he suspected had been spiked, feeling woozy and weak shortly after drinking it. He said: 'He took my phone. I was so scared. I felt death walked into my soul. I called my mother. I said, 'I feel like he's going to kill me, I think I'm going to die'. Buck is now under investigation over the deaths of two black men, including one man who died of an apparent overdose at his apartment on Monday.

According to the testimony of a federal agent, Harold “H.L.” Moody, a former Democratic Party chairman, streamed live videos of children being raped, distributed child pornography to other pedophiles, and regularly smoked methamphetamine out of a glass pipe while seated at his desk during work hours. Our tax dollars at work, folks. Jason Bennett, a special agent for Homeland Security Investigations, said an undercover agent took “screen shots” of Moody sitting at his desk and chatting with pedophiles in a secret chatroom online on “more than one occasion” between Aug. 29 and Oct. 12. Bennett described Moody as a “high-volume user” who logged in and out of a chat room solely devoted to child pornography several times a day, including 26 times in a two-day span. He was also a

host of the private chat room, which Bennett explains indicates that Moody did something to receive such recognition.

Tech magnate Elon Musk reportedly admits in an upcoming book that he once attended a somewhat well-known Silicon Valley “sex party.” Musk and his bro-friend: Steve Jurvetson, have been documented in a number of notorious sex scandals. *Even worse is the headline that reveals: “**Elon Musk Says Pedophile Accusation Against British Man Was Protected Speech But Ignores Fact That Musks Father Had Sex With His Own Daughter**”*

Dov Katz, head of the computer vision and machine learning group at Facebook-owned Oculus, has been charged in King County for attempted commercial sexual abuse of a minor. The 38-year-old tech exec allegedly attempted to contact what he believed to be was a 15-year-old girl for sex. The fictitious 15-year-old was actually an undercover police officer with the Tukwila Police Department, a city just south of Seattle. The news was first reported by KING 5, which said that Katz was arrested by Tukwila Police on Wednesday. An Israeli citizen who resides in California, Katz is forbidden to have contact with any minors, except in the presence of a responsible adult, according to charging documents. Katz allegedly responded to an online advertisement that offered sex in exchange for money, an ad which was posted by undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl. Katz allegedly arranged a meeting at the Embassy Suites in Tukwila, offering to pay \$350 to have sex without a condom. When Katz arrived at the hotel with \$600 in cash, he was arrested by police.

Former Democrat CDC director Dr. Tom Frieden was arrested on sexual pervert allegations. Frieden was charged with forcible touching, sex abuse and harassment, according to police.

California gubernatorial candidate Gavin Newsom's past sexual misconduct disqualifies him from holding higher office, rival Democrat Amanda Renteria said Thursday, and he should resign from his position as lieutenant governor. "If he was in the Legislature right now, he'd be called out, and like what we've seen, being forced out," Renteria said in an interview with The Sacramento Bee. "We've got to be sending the message that the more power you have, the more responsibility you have to protect others." As mayor of San Francisco more than a decade ago, Newsom had an affair with one of his city hall aides, who was also married to his campaign manager at the time.

Google employees have accused Google boss Rubin of sexual misconduct. A woman, with whom Mr. Rubin had been having an extramarital relationship, said he coerced her into performing oral sex in a hotel room in 2013, according to two company executives with knowledge of the episode. Google investigated and concluded her claim was credible, said the people, who spoke on the condition that they not be named, citing confidentiality agreements. Mr. Rubin was notified, they said, and Mr. Page asked for his resignation. Google could have fired Mr. Rubin and paid him little to nothing on the way out. Instead, the company handed him a \$90 million exit package, paid in installments of about \$2 million a month for four years, said two people with knowledge of the terms. The last payment is scheduled for next month. Mr. Rubin was one of three executives that Google protected over the past decade after they were accused of sexual misconduct. In two instances, it ousted senior executives, but



softened the blow by paying them millions of dollars as they departed, even though it had no legal obligation to do so. In a third, the executive remained in a highly compensated post at the company. Each time Google stayed silent about the accusations against the men. Google executives have been caught having sex slaves.

The Rosewood Hotel is brimming with tech guys, some loudly talking about money. The college student at our table recommends the ribs—she’s been here before, on “dates” with her “daddies.” “There are a lot of tech guys,” she says. “They want the girlfriend experience, without having to deal with an actual girlfriend.” “The girlfriend experience” is the term women in the sex trade use for a service involving more than just sex. “They want the perfect girlfriend—in their eyes,” says Miranda, the young woman at our table.\* “She’s well groomed, cultured, classy, able to converse about anything—but not bringing into it any of her real-world problems or feelings. Her adventures in “sugaring” started three years ago when she got hit on by an older guy and rebuffed him, saying, “Look, I’m not interested, so unless you’re offering to pay my student loans,” and he said, “Well . . . ?” After that, “he paid for stuff. He gave me money to help out with my living expenses.” This is how many of the skinny co-eds at Stanford University pay the bills and Stanford bosses look the other way.

Those under investigation are Bill Lockyer; Brian Goncher; Daniel Cohen; David Axelrod; David Drummond; David Plouffe; David E. Shaw; Dianne Feinstein; Elon Musk; Eric Holder; Eric Schmidt; John Zaccarro, Jr.; Frank Giustra; Nick Denton; Harry Reid; Haim Saban; Hillary and Bill Clinton; Ira Ehrenpreis; Jay Carney; James Comey; Jared Cohen; Jeffrey Katzenberg; John Doerr; Harvey Weinstein; Yasmin Green; Jonathan Silver; Ken Brody; Lachlan Seward; Judge Stewart M. Bernstein; Larry Page; Google; Alphabet; YouTube; Facebook; In-Q-Tel; Amazon; Twitter; WordPress.Org; The Law Firm of Perkins Coi; Mark Zuckerberg; Martin LaGod; Matt Rogers; Marc Benioff; Michael Birch; S. Donald Sussman; Pierre Omidyar; Rahm Emanuel; Raj Gupta; Ray Lane; Tom Perkins; Robert Rubin; Rob Friedman; Reid Hoffman; Richard Blum; Robert Gibbs; Robert Shwartz; Roger Altman; The Law Firm of Covington and Burling; Sanford Robertson; Steve Jurvetson; Steve Rattner; Steve Westly; Steven Chu; Steve Spinner; Susie Tompkins Buell; George Soros; Warren Buffet; Tom Steyer; The Clinton Foundation, Tim Draper; Valarie Jarrett; Jeffrey Epstein; Vinod Khosla; Michelle Lee; The law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosatti; Lawrence Summers; Marc Andreessen Sheryl Sandberg; Yuri Milner; Fenwick & West LLP; James W. Breyer; McBee Strategic; Mike Sheehy; Nancy Pelosi; Gilman Louie; Thomas J. Kim; Ping Li; Greylock Capital, Accel Partners; Jim Swartz; Bank Menatep; Alisher Asmanov; Marc L. Andreessen; Peter Thiel; Clarion Capital; Richard Wolpert; Robert Ketterson; David Kilpatrick; Tesla Motors; Solyndra; BrightSource; IDG Capital Partners; Goldman Sachs; Morgan Stanley; State Street Corporation; JP Morgan Chase; Lloyd Blankfein; Jamie Dimon; Steve Cutler; Rodgin Cohen; Sullivan Cromwell, LLP; Jeff Markey; Steve McBee; Michael F. McGowan; Toni Townes-Whitley; CGI Federal; Todd Y. Park; Frank M. Sands, Sr.; Robin Yangong Li; Parker Zhang; Jonathan Goodman; Gawker Media; Jalopnik; Adrian Covert, John Herrman; Gizmodo Media; K2 Intelligence; WikiStrat; Podesta Group; Fusion GPS; Think Progress; Media Matters; Black Cube; Debbie Wasserman, The DNC Executive Committee; Correct The Record;



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Stratfor; ShareBlue; Sid Blumenthal; David Brock; Barack Obama; Sen. Robert Menendez; Jerry Brown; Ken Alex; Susan Rice; Kamala Harris; Bruce Ohr; Nellie Ohr

In Silicon Valley, There Are Over 100 Services That Deliver Young Men And Girls To Rich Google And Facebook Executives For Dirty Sex. Most of the victims come from local colleges, universities, art schools and the Mission District, Haight Street and Noe Valley districts in San Francisco. They use Facade organizations like "Power Exchange", "Mission Exchange", "The Arena", "Orgasmic Meditation", "NXVIUM", "The Spinsters", "The Guardsmen", One Taste, etc. act as fronts for sexual transactions. The Rosewood Hotel has sex nights for the sale of women using sly hand signals. Almost every hotel on El Camino Real in Palo Alto has a prostitution activity going on around the clock. Russian and Italian prostitutes fly in and out of San Jose and San Francisco airports so often that they are known as the "pus\*y ports". Young, impossibly attractive, girls with tight mini skirts and a roller bag in the airport alone are now under constant surveillance by police.

One report recalls: "...At the hotel, Hillary Clinton Mega donor and John Podesta partner Wyss assaulted Long physically and sexually, according to her police complaint. "Me screaming, 'No stop it,'" she wrote in her own handwriting to police. "He grabbed my teeth with his left hand and ripped my mouth open. He inserted a vibrator into my vagina and almost suffocated me by putting his fist into my mouth. I struggled and pushed. I thought for sure he was going to kill me," she wrote. "I left that hotel room sick and in pain," she told police in the statement. She returned to Boulder and "stayed in bed for weeks. The physical sickness of this event was devastating," she told police. Wyss also allegedly threatened to stop his financial support for her daughter if she broke up with him, according to Long. "She's probably one of the first who took on powerful men over sexual misconduct," recalled Police Chief Tom Koby in an interview with TheDCNF. He personally knew the Boulder resident and counseled her about her relationship with Wyss. "After the attack, I had breakfast with Jackie at the Hotel Boulderado. She broke down during breakfast. This thing had happened and it was terrible. She was quite shaken and Jackie doesn't shake too easily," Koby said. "Hans had her in a bind in terms of helping Jackie heal her daughter, who had some serious health addiction issues," Kolby added. "That was what was keeping Jackie in the relationship and she didn't have a lot of money. She was still clinging to the hope she could save her daughter. And that she had these things she wanted to do with these organizations working on detention homes and shelters in Boulder and in Denver," Koby recalled..."

Amid allegations of sexual harassment, embattled freshman Democratic Rep. Ruben Kihuen vowed he will not resign from his post, despite calls from Democratic leaders that he step aside. Instead, Kihuen is digging in with a shocking allegation of his own, taking aim at the leaders of his own party. In an interview with ABC News, Kihuen, D-Nev., said party leaders knew last year about a former campaign staffer's allegations of misconduct but stood by his campaign nonetheless. Kihuen questioned why they are calling for his resignation now, more than a year later. "I do find it interesting that the DCCC, Leader [Nancy] Pelosi and Chairman Ben Ray Lujan -- they knew about these allegations last year,"

Kihuen said. “They looked into them. They didn't find anything, and they continued investing millions of dollars in my campaign. ***They went out there and campaigned for me.***”

A married senior official in President Obama's Department of Education was convicted of sex crimes and resigned for following women on the DC Metro and taking pictures up their skirts, DailyMail.com can exclusively reveal. William Mendoza, 42, the former executive director of the White House Initiative on American Indian and Alaska Native Education, stepped down after he was arrested and charged with attempted voyeurism in November, 2016, for the vile acts. Mendoza, who earned \$140,000 a year as a policy advisor in Obama's White House, tried to take photos and videos up women's skirts at least four times on his government-issued iPhones in July 2016 without their consent. He was also caught looking at footage, apparently filmed in secret, of a woman in her underwear getting changed in a dressing room. It is not known if he recorded the video himself. When he took the indecent photos, he was supposed to be at work and was using a travel card funded by the taxpayer, according to documents obtained by DailyMail.com through a Freedom of Information Act request.

After California's then-Attorney General Kamala D. Harris announced felony pimping charges last year against the two owners of Backpage.com — a classified-ad website that is a hub for sex trafficking and prostitution, one of the men cut a \$10,000 check to House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi's super PAC. Mrs. Pelosi's political action committee, House Majority PAC, has resisted giving the money back, and an aide to Mrs. Pelosi said the California Democrat knows nothing about the contribution. The uproar over sexual harassment that began with the Harvey Weinstein scandal has intensified the scrutiny of political contributions linked to Backpage, which law enforcement officials say is the chief platform for activities far worse than harassment, including sexual slavery and child prostitution. Mrs. Pelosi isn't the only Democrat struggling to deal with the piles of cash that Backpage's owners spread around to candidates and state Democratic parties over the years. Even Ms. Harris, a California Democrat who is now a U.S. senator, ducked the issue. Her office wouldn't respond to repeated emails about Backpage money going to House Majority PAC and other Democratic organizations. Since 2010, the owners and their wives have shoveled about \$99,000 to candidates and about \$95,000 to Democratic parties in Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico, according to federal campaign finance data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics.

Prominent Democrat donor Terry Bean was indicted earlier this month on two counts of sodomy and one count of sex abuse for allegedly having sex with a teenage boy. Bean was arraigned on the charges, TV station KGW8 reported. He pleaded not guilty and was taken into custody at County jail.

The body of investigative journalist Jen Moore was found in her Washington D.C. hotel room on Monday after her investigation into an alleged sexual assault by President William J. Clinton. “In fact, just four weeks before her death, Moore filed details of the alleged victim's claims with the Department of Homeland Security, detailing the allegations against Clinton. Moore contacted Homeland Security beginning on July 6th through July 9th, records show. A week later, she contacted the FBI with identical details about the victim and the shocking allegations against Clinton,”

A leading liberal think tank run by a longtime adviser to former presidential candidate Hillary Clinton is facing allegations of serious sexual harassment which went undealt with by management, a new report claims. The Centre for American Progress (CAP), headed by Clinton associate Neera Tanden, has released four policy proposal papers on dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace, but former staffers have come forward with stories of repeated harassment at the think tank, BuzzFeed reports.

Defy Ventures brings the gospel of entrepreneurship to an unlikely place: prisons. The nonprofit company founded by Catherine Hoke says it is dedicated to helping formerly incarcerated people start their own businesses and stay out of prison. “Transform the hustle,” the company’s tagline encourages. Defy has received grants from Google. Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg wrote a foreword to Hoke’s new memoir. Former U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara called Hoke’s work “incredibly inspiring” on his podcast. But while Defy woos Silicon Valley and Washington, D.C., scandal has rocked the company’s leadership. Last month, Defy fired its president after he blew the whistle on allegations of sexual harassment by Hoke and fraudulent statistics exaggerating the program’s successes.

Henry T. Nicholas III, the Silicon Valley billionaire founder of chip-maker Broadcom, has been arrested by police on drug trafficking charges. According to the Associated Press, Nicholas was arrested on suspicion of trafficking heroin, cocaine, meth and ecstasy. Security was called when Nicholas couldn’t get into his sex fuelled room at the Encore, a Las Vegas casino hotel. When security arrived, they reportedly found Nicholas with Ashley Fargo, the ex-wife of an heir to the Wells Fargo banking fortune. Fargo was passed out with a semi-deflated balloon in her mouth, but was revived by paramedics. According to reports, security subsequently found canisters of nitrous oxide inside the room, and a subsequent search by cops turned up more drugs inside a suitcase. Nicholas’s attorney, David Chesnoff, told the Associated Press that they will “deal with the facts in court.”

Multiple famous Silicon Valley lawyers have been found dead, hanged by their own hand while attempting to masturbate while choking themselves because they thought that choking would add to the sensation. A formerly powerful Democrat, Attorney Mark Benavides, has been found guilty on six individual counts of human trafficking in a grotesque and sex-filled criminal conspiracy. Mark Benavides, a well-known Democrat who ran for the 186th District Court in 2014, was accused by federal law enforcement of trading his legal services as an attorney for sex from his clients and then recording those manipulative sex-romps, according to local ABC affiliate KSAT. Benevides would then promise the women that if they allowed him to engage in erotic sex that sometimes included physical torture, that he would offer them a legitimate defense in the courtroom.

Hundreds of leaked text messages between Kevin Tsujihara, actress Charlotte Kirk and partners Brett Ratner and James Packer show the powerful executive, under pressure, said repeatedly he would push for auditions as accusations of "extortion" and a proposed settlement agreement followed

**The World Health Organization (WHO) has declared Silicon Valley oligarch sex addiction to be a mental illness.**

Known as compulsive sexual behaviour disorder, it is defined as an inability to control intense sexual urges leading to people neglecting their health despite often deriving no pleasure from being intimate, according to a report issued by the WHO.

Patients must suffer from the disorder for at least six months, and experience substantial distress as a result of their addiction, before being diagnosed, the report adds.

It is unclear if this move will lead to sex addiction treatment being provided on the NHS, which does not currently consider it to be a condition.

Comedian Russell Brand has been to rehab for sex addiction saying being active between the sheets gives him 'a breathing space, when you're outside of yourself and your own head'.

Comedian Russell Brand has been to rehab for sex addiction saying being active between the sheets gives him 'a breathing space, when you're outside of yourself and your own head'.

Actor Michael Douglas, who is married to Catherine Zeta Jones, also sought treatment for the disorder after numerous affairs ended his first marriage to Diandra Luker in 1995.

As well as reported drug and alcohol problems, Mean Girls star Lindsay Lohan has described herself as 'not a crazy [sex] addict' but adds she enjoys being in different relationships.

David Duchovny, star of The X-Files, sought treatment for sex addiction in 2008 after being unfaithful to his actress wife Téa Leoni.

After the release of a sex tape with his Playboy model ex Nicole Narain in 2003, actor Colin Farrell admitted to liking sex with prostitutes and suffering from an addiction.

Socialite Calum Best, whose footballer father George suffered from alcoholism, has said 'I'm a red-blooded male and I'm addicted to sex'.

Sex addiction is seen as 'shameful'

According to Dr Valerie Voon, from the Royal College of Psychiatrists, between two and four per cent of people in the UK suffer from sex addiction. Three-to-six per cent are thought to have the condition in the US.

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She told The Sun: 'It is a behaviour that tends to be hidden as it's shameful and often sex addicts don't come forward.

'Adding this to the WHO list is an excellent step for patients as it allows them to recognise that they are suffering with a problem.

'It takes it out of the shadows and they are able to seek help for it.'

Dr Voon believes sex addiction may one day be treated on the NHS alongside conditions like depression and anxiety.

Gaming addictions tear families apart

This comes after Dr Shekhar Saxena, director of WHO's department for mental health, said the body listed gaming as an addiction based on scientific evidence, as well as 'the need and the demand for treatment in many parts of the world.'

According to Dr Joan Harvey, from the British Psychological Society, only a minority of gamers suffer from the disorder, warning that the new condition might cause unnecessary concern among parents.

She said: 'People need to understand this doesn't mean every child who spends hours in their room playing games is an addict, otherwise medics are going to be flooded with requests for help.'

Others welcome WHO's classification, saying it is critical to identify video game addicts quickly due to them usually being teenagers or young adults who do not typically seek help themselves.

Dr Henrietta Bowden-Jones, a spokeswoman for behavioral addictions at Britain's Royal College of Psychiatrists, added: 'We come across parents who are distraught, not only because they're seeing their child drop out of school, but because they're seeing an entire family structure fall apart.'

The updated ICD is scheduled to be presented to all WHO member states at their annual assembly in May 2019.

According to the relationship counselling service Relate, sex addiction is any intimate activity that feels 'out of control'.

This could be sex with a partner, masturbation, pornography use, visiting prostitutes or using chat lines.

In some cases, people feel unable to control their urges, which affects their quality of life and those

around them.

According to the WHO, compulsive sexual behaviour disorder is defined as an inability to control intense sexual urges leading to people neglecting their health despite often deriving no pleasure from being intimate.

Patients must suffer from the disorder for at least six months, and experience substantial distress as a result of their addiction, before being diagnosed, the WHO adds.

Y Combinator is half homosexual sextortion elitists and half Frat boy Google-worshippers seeking to control politics and expand the Silicon Valley Echo-Chamber

In its main program, Y Combinator interviews and selects two batches of companies per year. The companies receive [seed money](#), SJW advice, and echo-chamber connections in exchange for 7% [equity](#).<sup>[2]</sup> The program includes "office hours", where startup founders meet individually and in groups with Y Combinator partners for advice on how to be good liberal clones. Founders also participate in weekly dinners where guests from the [Silicon Valley](#) ecosystem (successful entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, etc.) speak to the founders. The deal at Y Combinator is " If you help us control American politics and ideologies, we will give you some cash..."

In Y Combinator meetings, naive young Millennial boys are stupid enough to wear sheep clone Fedora's, have the same tattoos and the same haircuts and carry the same man-bags. The robot-like hipster conformity is overt and ludicrous.

The bottom line is that you are going to get fucked by Y Combinator one way or another. The VC's and investors that fund it will extort you for blow jobs and anal sex. If you were not in a Stanford or Yale Frat House you will be ostracized. If you are over 30 you will be ostracized. If you are black or Mexican you will be ostracized. If you are a woman you will be ostracized after you are sextorted. If you don't worship ANTIFA and Barack Obama you are ostracized.

The bosses of Y Combinator are the single biggest group of narcissistic, sociopath, holier-than-thou, effete, peacock strutting, misogynist pigs on Earth. They love nothing more than hearing themselves talk.

Y Combinator's motto is "Make Something Liberal Idiots Want And Nothing That People Actually Need."<sup>[3]</sup> The program aims to focus the founders on further developing their product, team and market, refining their business model, achieving [product/market fit](#), and scaling the startup into a [high growth](#) business, etc. The program culminates at Demo Day where startups present their business to a selected audience of Democrat investors.<sup>[4]</sup>

As of 2017, Y Combinator had invested in ~1,450 companies including [Dropbox](#), [Airbnb](#), [Coinbase](#), [Stripe](#), [Reddit](#), [Instacart](#), [Twitch](#), [Cruise](#)

[Automation](#), [Optimizely](#), [Zenefits](#), [Docker](#), [DoorDash](#), [Mixpanel](#), [Heroku](#), [Machine Zone](#), [Weebly](#), and [Paribus](#).<sup>[5]</sup> The combined valuation of YC companies was over \$80B.<sup>[6]</sup>

Tesla CEO Elon Musk reportedly did not attend the town hall where some women described sexual harassment they had experienced in the workplace.

Female employees of [Tesla](#) at a company town-hall meeting in March recounted instances of sexual harassment and mistreatment by male managers, an event the electric-car maker says has already led to leadership and policy changes.

The account of the town-hall meeting was published on Wednesday by [The Guardian's Sam Levin](#), who says one employee went so far as to call the factory a "predator zone" of harassment. According to the report, about 70 to 100 people attended the meeting, but CEO Elon Musk did not.

"The topics raised in this meeting were followed up directly with those willing to discuss," a Tesla representative told Business Insider. "We have a no-tolerance policy and have made changes to leadership, policy, and training to continue to improve our work environment."

The meeting occurred after an email was sent to female employees inviting them to a "lunch 'n learn" to discover essential oils.

According to The Guardian, Tesla postponed the lunch after it received vocal criticism, and it organized the town hall on diversity, where women shared the stories of gender discrimination. Tesla said the town-hall meeting was planned in advance and was not a reaction to the lunch.

A Tesla representative said the town-hall meeting was held by a group called Women in Tesla, which holds regular meetings to receive feedback about the work environment:

"The reason groups like Women in Tesla exist is precisely because we want to provide employees with an outlet to share opinions and feedback in a constructive manner. At Tesla, we regularly host events like the Town Hall, and only someone who is intentionally trying to misconstrue the facts and paint Tesla in a negative light could perceive such meetings as something negative."

AJ Vandermeiden, a female engineer who is suing Tesla over [sexism and harassment claims](#), is one of several sources who described the meeting to The Guardian. Tesla [fired Vandermeiden](#) in June.

"The termination was based on Ms. Vandermeiden behaving in what the evidence indicates is a fundamentally false and misleading manner, not as a result of retaliation for the lawsuit," a Tesla representative previously told Business Insider.

The lawsuit says Vandermeiden experienced "unwelcoming and pervasive harassment," such as catcalls and inappropriate language, by men on the factory floor, and that she was denied promotions over men who were equally or less qualified than her.



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Tesla said it launched an independent investigation into Vandermeiden's claims and found them to be unsubstantiated.

Women are becoming more vocal about gender discrimination they've experienced in Silicon Valley, which was understood to have occurred but rarely exposed in detail.

The New York Times published a [bombshell report](#) on Friday of female entrepreneurs' descriptions of sexual harassment by venture capitalists like Chris Sacca and Dave McClure.

Former Uber engineer Susan Fowler said in a [personal blog post](#) in February that she had experienced sexual harassment and gender bias at the ride-hailing company, prompting an internal investigation that culminated in Uber CEO Travis Kalanick's resignation.

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#### Steve Jurvetson is out at his own venture capital firm after ...

Famed venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** is leaving his job at Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** in the wake of an investigation into **sexual** harassment.

<https://www.recode.net/2017/11/13/16645274/steve-jurvetson-out-d...>

#### Venture firm DFJ is investigating founder **Steve Jurvetson** for ...

One of tech's most well-known investors, **Steve Jurvetson**, is being investigated by his venture capital firm in the latest **sexual** harassment allegation to land in Silicon Valley.

<https://www.recode.net/2017/10/24/16539644/dfj-steve-jurvetson-s...>

#### Silicon Valley "sex party" was at **Steve Jurvetson's** home - Axios

Silicon Valley was rocked earlier this month by allegations of sex and drug parties attended by the tech elite, as detailed in a Vanity Fair excerpt of journalist Emily Chang's upcoming book Brotopia. Axios has now obtained text from the book that identifies the host of one of those parties as **Steve...**

<https://www.axios.com/silicon-valley-sex-party-was-at-steve-jur...>

#### **Steve Jurvetson** Quits Venture Capital Firm Amid Investigation

**Steve Jurvetson**, a founding partner ... of **sexual** misconduct have continued to reverberate since detailed reports emerged over the summer about widespread ...

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/upshot/steve-jurvetson-quits-v...>

**Steve Jurvetson leaves VC firm amid sexual harassment probe**

Silicon Valley's **sexual** harassment problems continue. **Steve Jurvetson**, one of Silicon Valley's most high-profile venture capitalists, has left his namesake firm, Draper Fisher **Jurvetson**, amid a **sexual** harassment investigation, according to Recode. He's the latest in a string of venture capitalist ...

<https://www.cnet.com/news/steve-jurvetson-draper-fisher-jurvet...>

**Steve Jurvetson on leave from Tesla, SpaceX, resigns from ...**

**Steve Jurvetson**, who is on leave from the boards of Tesla and SpaceX, was the subject of a **sexual** harassment probe at Draper Fisher **Jurvetson**.

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/11/13/steve-jurvetson-out...>

**Silicon Valley firm severs ties with co-founder Steve ...**

SAN FRANCISCO — A prominent Silicon Valley venture capital firm said it is severing ties with founding partner **Steve Jurvetson** after it had conducted an investigation into allegations of **sexual** misconduct. The firm, called DFJ, made no mention of inappropriate behavior in its statement announcing ...

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/13/prominent-s...>

**Tesla, SpaceX board member takes leave after sexual ...**

**Steve Jurvetson**, a partner at a major Silicon Valley venture capital firm that bears his name—Draper Fisher Jurvetson—has left the company amid accusations of **sexual** harassment.

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/tesla-spacex-board-me...>

**Steve Jurvetson left DFJ over pattern of deception, affairs ...**

SAN FRANCISCO — **Steve Jurvetson** left his venture capital firm after an internal investigation uncovered a pattern of deception with women including extramarital affairs, some of which blurred the line between his professional and personal lives, according to a tech news outlet's report published ...

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/11/18/steve-jurvetson-lef...>

**A Tesla board member was ousted from his venture capital firm ...**

**Steve Jurvetson**, a member of Tesla's board since 2009, ... A Tesla board member was ousted from his venture capital firm amid **sexual** harassment allegations ...

[markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/proxy-firm-urges-investors-to...](https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/proxy-firm-urges-investors-to...)

**Jurvetson out of VC firm over sexual harassment allegations ...**

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**Steve Jurvetson** on Monday became the most high-profile Silicon Valley venture capitalist to be forced out of his job following **sexual** harassment allegations.

<https://www.ft.com/content/5b6e1c2c-c8b9-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e>

Venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** leaves firm amid sex ...

SpaceX backer **Steve Jurvetson** says he's leaving the venture capital firm he co-founded to fight accusations related to a **sexual** harassment investigation.

<https://www.geekwire.com/2017/spacex-backer-steve-jurvetson-leaves...>

**Jurvetson** is on leave from Tesla and SpaceX boards after ...

Venture investor **Steve Jurvetson** is on leave from Tesla and SpaceX boards after being removed from his firm for **sexual** harassment claims.

<https://finance.yahoo.com/news/jurvetson-leave-tesla-spacex-boards-...>

Tesla, SpaceX Director **Steve Jurvetson** Leaves VC ... - Fortune

Tesla and SpaceX board member **Steve Jurvetson** has taken a leave of absence and has left his VC firm DFJ amid **sexual** harassment allegations.

[fortune.com/2017/11/13/tesla-spacex-steve-jurvetson-l...](https://fortune.com/2017/11/13/tesla-spacex-steve-jurvetson-l...)

[Sergey Brin went sailing with one of tech's most ...](#)

**Steve Jurvetson**, the venture ... **Jurvetson's** post on Saturday comes in contrast to other prominent men recently accused of **sexual** misconduct, ...

[businessinsider.com/sergey-brin-steve-jurvetson-photo-boat-20...](https://businessinsider.com/sergey-brin-steve-jurvetson-photo-boat-20...)

**Steve Jurvetson**, DFJ named as hosts of 'sex party' in ...

Venture investor **Steve Jurvetson** and DFJ — the firm he co-founded — are reportedly named as hosts of a "sex party" in "Brotopia," an upcoming book by Bloomberg TV anchor Emily Chang.

<https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2018/01/11/steve-jurvetson-d...>

**Steve Jurvetson** on leave from Tesla SpaceX boards after ...

Venture investor **Steve Jurvetson** is on leave from Tesla and SpaceX boards after being removed from his firm for **sexual** harassment claims.

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/13/steve-jurvetson-on-leave-from-...>

VC **Steve Jurvetson** resigns from DFJ amid harassment ...

**Jurvetson** resigned from Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** and is taking a leave from the boards of Tesla and SpaceX amid an investigation into **sexual** harassment

[businessinsider.com/vc-steve-jurvetson-resigns-from-dfj-amid-...](https://businessinsider.com/vc-steve-jurvetson-resigns-from-dfj-amid-...)

#### Steve Jurvetson - Wikipedia

**Steve Jurvetson** was the first non ... stepped down from his role at DFJ Venture Capital after the firm conducted an investigation into allegations of **sexual** ...

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve\\_Jurvetson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Jurvetson)

#### 'Sex Party' or 'Nerds on a Couch?' A Night in Silicon Valley ...

Party described in Vanity Fair article and forthcoming book was at a home of **Steve Jurvetson**, a founding partner of venture-capital firm DFJ who left the firm in November.

<https://www.wired.com/story/sex-party-or-nerds-on-a-couch-a-nig...>

#### Brotopia: New book says **Steve Jurvetson** hosted party with sex ...

Did an elite Silicon Valley VC party feature sex and ... **Steve Jurvetson**, ... Several admitted to **sexual** harassing female entrepreneurs or employees and were ...

<https://qz.com/1178134/brotopia-new-book-says-steve-jurv...>

#### Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** investigating co-founder **Steve** ...

**Steve Jurvetson**, a prominent Silicon Valley venture capitalist and board member who was honored as a visionary venture investor earlier this year, is under investigation for **sexual**harassment by the Menlo Park firm that he co-founded. DFJ said on Tuesday that it launched the probe earlier this ...

<https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2017/10/24/jurvetson-draper-...>

#### **Steve Jurvetson** fires back at DFJ after exit, denies **sexual** ...

Venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** fired back at his former DFJ partners and denied any **sexual**harassment on his part, one day after the Silicon Valley firm he co-founded announced he would step down under a "mutual agreement."

<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/steve-jurvetson-fires-back-at-dfj-a...>

#### **Steve Jurvetson** Hosted Silicon Valley 'Sex Party' - NYMag

**Steve Jurvetson**, who recently left the venture-capital firm he co-founded amid **sexual**-harassment allegations, reportedly hosted the scandalous event.

[nymag.com/selectall/2018/01/steve-jurvetson-hosted-...](https://nymag.com/selectall/2018/01/steve-jurvetson-hosted-...)

#### VC **Steve Jurvetson** On Leave From Tesla And SpaceX Boards ...

Venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** has resigned his position at Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** following an internal investigation into claims of alleged **sexual** harassment.

<https://www.buzzfeed.com/ryanmac/venture-capitalist-and-tesla-boar...>

#### DFJ investigating co-founder **Steve Jurvetson** for sexual ...

**Steve Jurvetson**, a longtime Silicon Valley investor and co-founder of DFJ, is under investigation by the firm for **sexual** harassment. The investigation, conducted by a law firm, began during the summer after media outlets began inquiring about allegations regarding **Jurvetson's** conduct with women.

<https://www.pehub.com/2017/10/dfj-investigating-co-founder-stev...>

#### DFJ: investigating misconduct report involving **Steve Jurvetson**

DFJ co-founder and partner **Steve Jurvetson**. ... allegations of **sexual** harassment ... Rex Crum is the senior web editor for the business section for The Mercury News ...

<https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/25/vc-firm-dfj-investigating-misc...>

#### **Steve Jurvetson** is out at his own VC firm after allegations ...

**Sexual** harassment is used as a weapon, ... **Steve Jurvetson** was the only VC to respond to the 150 letters I sent out while seeking capital for my first startup.

<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15690190>

#### Tesla board member denies VC firm departure linked to ...

Prominent tech investor **Steve Jurvetson** is denying the misconduct allegations against him. In a lengthy Facebook post, **Jurvetson** said the reason for his departure from the venture capital firm he co-founded on Monday had nothing to do with "**sexual** predation" or "workplace harassment." "How does one ...

<https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/15/technology/steve-jurvetson-tes...>

#### **Steve Jurvetson** Fires Back at DFJ After His Exit - WSJ

Venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** fired back at his former DFJ partners and denied any **sexual** harassment on his part, one day after the Silicon Valley firm he co-founded announced he would step down under a "mutual agreement."

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/steve-jurvetson-fires-back-at-df...>

#### VC **Steve Jurvetson** resigns from DFJ amid harassment ...

**Jurvetson** resigned from Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** and is taking a leave from the boards of Tesla and SpaceX amid an investigation into **sexual** harassment

[uk.businessinsider.com/vc-steve-jurvetson-resigns-from-dfj-amid-...](http://uk.businessinsider.com/vc-steve-jurvetson-resigns-from-dfj-amid-...)

**Who Is Steve Jurvetson? Silicon Valley Investor Refutes ...**

**Jurvetson** is also taking a leave of absence from the boards of Tesla and SpaceX, spokesmen for the two companies said, amid the ongoing investigation into **sexual** harassment allegations against the investor.

[ibtimes.com/who-steve-jurvetson-silicon-valley-invest...](https://www.ibtimes.com/who-steve-jurvetson-silicon-valley-invest...)

**Steve Jurvetson out at DFJ, VC firm he helped found - CBS News**

**Steve Jurvetson**, a founding partner of the venture capital firm Draper Fisher **Jurvetson**, is out at his firm after an investigation into alleged **sexual** harassment.

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-jurvetson-out-from-dfj-venture...>

**Early investor Steve Jurvetson leaves Tesla and ... - Electrek**

**Steve Jurvetson**, a partner of Venture ... today it was revealed that he's left DFJ in the wake of allegations of **sexual** harassment. The VC company today released ...

<https://electrek.co/2017/11/13/early-investor-steve-jurvetson...>

**Venture capitalist Steve Jurvetson leaves Draper Fisher ...**

**Steve Jurvetson** is leaving the Menlo Park venture capital firm he cofounded after a **sexual** harassment probe. Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** announced the move in a letter sent to its investors, according to Recode. The firm didn't say why one of the founding partner it's named after was leaving but issued ...

<https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2017/11/13/steve-jurvetson-l...>

**Steve Jurvetson Quits His VC Firm and Takes Leave ... - Inc.com**

Venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** resigned from Draper Fisher **Jurvetson**, a firm he cofounded, amid an internal investigation into **sexual** harassment allegations.

<https://www.inc.com/business-insider/steve-jurvetson-draper-f...>

**Steve Jurvetson leaves DFJ amid allegations of inappropriate ...**

Silicon Valley investor **Steve Jurvetson** is leaving the firm he co-founded, DFJ, weeks after it was revealed he was under investigation by the company.

[latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-steve-jurvetson-20171111...](https://latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-steve-jurvetson-20171111...)

**Elon Musk wore spikes and chains to 'sex party' - Mail Online**

Musk wore a 'black armor-like costumed adorned with silver spikes and chains,' to venture **Steve Jurvetson's** (bottom Inset) 'sex party' in 2017, Emily Chang writes in her new book 'Brotopia.'

Page 117 EXHIBIT 88 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District

[dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5386977/Elon-Musk-wore-spike...](https://dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5386977/Elon-Musk-wore-spike...)

[Tesla Director \*\*Steve Jurvetson\*\* investigated for sexual ...](#)

Tesla Director **Steve Jurvetson** investigated for **sexual**, corruption and exploitative misconduct.

[https://www.londonworldwide.com/Tesla Director Steve Jurvetson...](https://www.londonworldwide.com/Tesla-Director-Steve-Jurvetson...)

[Tesla, SpaceX put board member on leave amid misconduct ...](#)

Silicon Valley investor **Steve Jurvetson** has left the firm he co-founded amid allegations of misconduct. **Jurvetson**, a partner at prominent VC firm Draper Fisher **Jurvetson**, is a board member and investor at Tesla and SpaceX. **Jurvetson**, 50, tweeted about his departure citing "personal matters ...

[money.cnn.com/2017/11/13/technology/dfj-steve-jurvetson...](https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/13/technology/dfj-steve-jurvetson...)

[More results](#)

[Elon \*\*Musk\*\* wore spikes and chains to 'sex party' | Page Six](#)

Tesla billionaire Elon **Musk** had quite the look at venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson**'s alleged "sexparty," according to Emily Chang's new book "Brotopia.". Chang writes that in private Facebook photos from the party, **Musk** "appears wearing a black armor-like costume adorned with silver spikes and chains."

<https://pagesix.com/2018/02/12/elon-musk-sported-interesting-...>

[Elon \*\*Musk\*\* attends Silicon Valley 'sex party,' thought it was ...](#)

Elon **Musk** attended a now notorious Silicon Valley event that has been called a "sex party," his representative told Business Insider. But **Musk** ... **Steve Jurvetson**.

[businessinsider.com/elon-musk-attended-notorious-silicon-vall...](https://businessinsider.com/elon-musk-attended-notorious-silicon-vall...)

[DFJ has apologized for the reported 'sex party' event at ...](#)

DFJ has apologized for the reported 'sex party' event at **Steve Jurvetson** ... Elon **Musk**, the tech CEO who is ... with multiple friends of **Jurvetson** telling Recode ...

<https://www.recode.net/2018/1/11/16880806/dfj-steve-jurvetson-se...>

[Elon \*\*Musk\*\* wore spikes and chains to 'sex party' | Daily Mail ...](#)

**Musk** wore a 'black armor-like costumed adorned with silver spikes and chains,' to venture **SteveJurvetson**'s (bottom Inset) 'sex party' in 2017, Emily Chang writes in her new book 'Brotopia.'



[dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5386977/Elon-Musk-wore-spike...](https://dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5386977/Elon-Musk-wore-spike...)

Elon **Musk**, guests dispute DFJ Silicon Valley event was 'sex ...

"If there are 'sex parties' in Silicon Valley, ... as a "sex party" in a coming book, with Elon **Musk**, ... was a party at the home of **Steve Jurvetson**, ...

[businessinsider.com/elon-musk-guests-dispute-dfj-event-sex-pa...](https://businessinsider.com/elon-musk-guests-dispute-dfj-event-sex-pa...)

'Sex Party' or 'Nerds on a Couch?' A Night in Silicon Valley ...

Party described in Vanity Fair article and forthcoming book was at a home of **Steve Jurvetson**, ... Valley sex parties. ... **Musk**, whose companies **Jurvetson** has ...

<https://www.wired.com/story/sex-party-or-nerds-on-a-couch-a-nig...>

Elon **Musk** Attended Lewd Silicon Valley Party, But ... - Fortune

Elon **Musk** unwittingly attended what some say was a sex party held ... Axios reported that its host was the former Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** investor **Steve Jurvetson** ...

[fortune.com/2018/01/11/elon-musk-silicon-valley-sex-p...](https://fortune.com/2018/01/11/elon-musk-silicon-valley-sex-p...)

**Steve Jurvetson** Hosted Silicon Valley 'Sex Party' - NYMag

Silicon Valley 'Sex Party' Host Identity Revealed ... which claims that particular party's host was **Steve Jurvetson**. ... **Musk** told Business Insider he did ...

[nymag.com/selectall/2018/01/steve-jurvetson-hosted-...](https://nymag.com/selectall/2018/01/steve-jurvetson-hosted-...)

Elon **Musk**: So-called Valley sex party was just 'nerds on a ...

Elon **Musk**: So-called Valley sex party was just ... party described by Chang occurred at the house of **Steve Jurvetson**. ... CNET may get a commission from ...

<https://www.cnet.com/news/elon-musk-valley-sex-parties-just-ne...>

Elon **Musk** orgy: SpaceX founder attended 'sex party' in ...

BILLIONAIRE entrepreneur Elon **Musk** has admitted attending a notorious Silicon Valley "sex party ... **Steve Jurvetson**, ... party. The statement claimed Mr **Musk** ...

<https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/technology/entrepreneur-...>

Elon **Musk** Attended Infamously Lewd Silicon Valley Party ...

Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon **Musk** was at the lewd party at investor **Steve Jurvetson**'s home, but apparently didn't see any sexual activity.

[fortune.com/2018/01/11/elon-musk-silicon-valley-party/](https://fortune.com/2018/01/11/elon-musk-silicon-valley-party/)

### Steve Jurvetson, DFJ named as hosts of 'sex party' in ...

Venture investor **Steve Jurvetson** and DFJ ... "Brotopia," published last week by Vanity Fair detailed drug and swinging **sex parties** ... **Musk** made a stronger ...

<https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2018/01/11/steve-jurvetson-d...>

### Elon Musk: When Elon Musk Musk attended a sex party in ...

When Elon **Musk Musk** attended a **sex party** in ... a costume event — at the house of American businessman and venture capitalist **Steve Jurvetson** in June ...

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/when-elon-musk-musk-attended-a-s...>

### Musk friend Jurvetson's long Tesla board ... - bizjournals.com

... remove or permanently reinstate **Steve Jurvetson**, ... **Musk** friend **Jurvetson's** long Tesla board ... **Jurvetson**, DFJ named as hosts of 'sex party' in ...

<https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2018/05/16/steve-jurvetson-t...>

### Elon Musk 'didn't know Silicon Valley event was sex party ...

Billionaire CEO Elon **Musk** admits to attending a now infamous drug-fueled **sex** soiree in Silicon Valley, but says he didn't know it was a **sex party**.

[dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5261293/Elon-Musk-says-didnt...](https://dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5261293/Elon-Musk-says-didnt...)

### Elon Musk Wore Spikes and Chains to Alleged 'Sex Party'

The mastermind behind SpaceX, Elon **Musk**, once wore an elaborate suit including spike and chains to an investor's 'sex party' in 2017, according to a new book about silicon valley. The account comes from Brotopia, an exposé about the male-dominant culture in silicon valley written by Emily Chang.

[popculture.com/celebrity/2018/02/15/elon-musk-spikes-cha...](https://popculture.com/celebrity/2018/02/15/elon-musk-spikes-cha...)

### New Details About The Sex Party Elon Musk ... - YourTango

New Details About The **Sex Party** Elon **Musk** Allegedly ... Inside YourTango; ... was in attendance at the party that was held at DFJ investor **Steve Jurvetson's** ...

<https://www.yourtango.com/2018309799/details-silicon-valley-tesla-f...>

### Everyone hates us, and it's not because of our sex parties ...

It was, briefly, the zeitgeist's perfect Silicon Valley story: a **sex-and-drugs party** hosted hosted by since-oustouped top-tier VC **Steve Jurvetson**, at an official Draper Fisher **Jurvetson** event, attended by multiple billionaires including Elon **Musk**.

<https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/14/everyone-hates-us-and-its-not-...>

### Elon Musk, guests dispute DFJ Silicon Valley event was 'sex ...

"If there are 'sex parties' in ... its characterization as a "sex party" in a coming book, with Elon Musk, ... June was a party at the home of Steve Jurvetson, ...

[uk.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-guests-dispute-dfj-event-sex-pa...](http://uk.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-guests-dispute-dfj-event-sex-pa...)

### Elon Musk and other guests dispute that a notorious Silicon ...

"If there are 'sex parties' in ... its characterization as a "sex party" in a coming book, with Elon Musk, ... June was a party at the home of Steve Jurvetson, ...

<https://finance.yahoo.com/news/elon-musk-other-guests-dispute-18280...>

### Elon Musk denounces 'Silicon Valley sex party' book: 'it's ...

... engage in sex parties, ... Elon Musk denounces 'Silicon Valley sex party ... confirmed by WIRED Magazine as being hosted by venture capitalist Steve Jurvetson, ...

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/books/news/elon-musk-denounces-silicon-va...>

### Silicon Valley "sex party" was at Steve Jurvetson's home - Axios

Silicon Valley was rocked earlier this month by allegations of sex and drug parties attended by the tech elite, as detailed in a Vanity Fair excerpt of journalist Emily Chang's upcoming book Brotopia. Axios has now obtained text from the book that identifies the host of one of those parties as Steve...

<https://www.axios.com/silicon-valley-sex-party-was-at-steve-jur...>

### Elon Musk Insists A Drug-Fuelled Silicon Valley Sex Party ...

A new book claims Musk was ... Elon Musk Insists A Drug-Fuelled Silicon Valley Sex Party ... The party was reportedly held at the home of Steve Jurvetson, the co ...

<https://www.pedestrian.tv/news/elon-musk-silicon-valley-sex-party/>

### Elon Musk Attended Infamous Silicon Valley Sex Party | Zero Hedge

Elon Musk Attended Infamous Silicon Valley Sex ... was reported to have taken place at the home of disgraced VC Steve Jurvetson ... and I guess sex parties don't ...

<https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-01-11/elon-musk-attended-infamo...>

### Elon Musk 'confusingly' attends sex party | Business Standard ...

Read more about Elon Musk 'confusingly' attends sex party on Business Standard. Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk attended an infamously lewd party -- which he thought was a costume event -- at the house of American businessman and venture capitalist Steve Jurvetson, but did not participate in sexual activities.

<https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/elon-musk-confusingly-a...>

**The Real Problem with Silicon Valley's "So-Called Sex Parties"**

The Real Problem with Silicon Valley's "So-Called Sex ... thought it was a **Steve** and Genevieve party," referring to **Steve Jurvetson**, ... to do, **Elon Musk**, ...

<https://www.inverse.com/article/40191-the-real-problem-with-silic...>

**Brotopia: New book says Steve Jurvetson hosted party with sex ...**

Did an elite Silicon Valley VC party feature **sex** and ... **Steve Jurvetson**, ... Tesla confirmed in statement to Business Insider that **Musk** attended the party for a ...

<https://qz.com/1178134/brotopia-new-book-says-steve-jurv...>

**Elon Musk confirms he was at an alleged Silicon Valley 'sex ...**

**Elon Musk** attended a now notorious Silicon Valley event that has been called a "**sex** party," his ... **Elon Musk** attended a now ... investor **Steve Jurvetson**, ...

<https://finance.yahoo.com/news/elon-musk-confirms-alleged-silicon-2...>

More results

## The Bay Area's Predator Priests Are Worse Than The Penn 5

The long-awaited state grand jury report into sexual abuse in six Pennsylvania dioceses, including Pittsburgh and Greensburg, has finally been released.

The 884-page document, two years in the making, shines a light into the dark corners of these dioceses going back seven decades, exposing the predators and the efforts of their bishops to protect them.

“Today, the most comprehensive report on child sexual abuse within the church ever produced in our country was released,” Attorney General Josh Shapiro said. “Pennsylvanians can finally learn the extent of sexual abuse in these dioceses. For the first time, we can all begin to understand the systematic cover up by church leaders that followed. The abuse scarred every diocese. The cover up was sophisticated. The church protected the institution at all costs.”

Several clergy abuse victims who had testified before the grand jury attended Shapiro's news conference. At least one of them could be seen breaking down in tears.

The report begins with the following statement:

*“We, the members of this grand jury, need you to hear this. We know some of you have heard some of it before. There have been other reports about child sex abuse within the Catholic Church. But never on this scale. For many of us, those earlier stories happened someplace else, someplace away. Now we know the truth: it happened everywhere.”*

There are 99 in the Diocese of Pittsburgh alone. Of those 99, a group of four groomed and violently sexually assaulted young boys, said Shapiro.

“One boy was forced to stand on a bed in a rectory, strip naked and pose as Christ on the cross for the priests. They took photos of their victim, adding them to a collection of child pornography which they produced and shared on church grounds,” Shapiro said.

● **RELATED STORY:** [Bishop David Zubik On Grand Jury Report: ‘There Was No Cover Up Going On’](#)

Shapiro said the priests would mark their victims by giving them gifts.

“To make it easier to target their victims, the priests gave their favored boys gifts – gold crosses to wear as necklaces. The crosses were markings of which boys had been groomed for abuse,” Shapiro said.

Because of an on-going legal battle, more than a dozen names and identifying information have been redacted. But the report shows a consistent pattern of bishops having prior knowledge of the actions of these predatory priests, reassigning them and not alerting law enforcement.

Shapiro said his office is not satisfied with the release of the redacted report. Shapiro said each one of those redactions represents a story of abuse that deserves to be told. He went on to say that he will fight to reveal the names currently redacted in the report.

The report states:

*“All victims were brushed aside, in every part of the state, by church leaders who preferred to protect the abusers and their institution above all. The main thing was not to help children, but to avoid scandal.”*

*“Priests were raping little boys and girls and the men of God who were responsible for them not only did nothing; they hid it all.”*

*“Diocesan administrators, including the Bishops, had knowledge of this conduct and yet priests were regularly placed in ministry after the Diocese was on notice that a complaint of child sexual abuse had been made. This conduct enabled offenders and endangered the welfare of children.”*

In addition, the report says administrators and Bishops *“often dissuaded victims from reporting abuse to police, pressured law enforcement to terminate or avoid an investigation, or conducted their own deficient, biased investigations without reporting crimes against children to the proper authorities.”*

“Above all else, they protected their institution at all cost,” Shapiro said. The report includes some priests who stood trial and were convicted of sexual assault. In the Diocese of Pittsburgh, they include: Father Robert Wolk of St. Thomas More in Bethel Park; Father Richard Zula of Saints Mary and Ann in Marianna, Washington County, and Father Richard Dorsch, convicted of sexually assaulting a 13-year-old boy in North Park.

Until now, the Pittsburgh Diocese had been considered a leader in those reforms since now Cardinal, then bishop, Donald Wuerl defied the Vatican back in 1993 by refusing to reassign pedophile priest Anthony Cipolla. Wuerl was a leader in formulating policies to protect children, but in the report, his record here also comes under fire.

Cardinal Wuerl responded to the allegations in a statement saying:

*“As I have made clear throughout my more than 30 years as a bishop, the sexual abuse of children by some members of the Catholic Church is a terrible tragedy, and the Church can never express enough our deep sorrow and contrition for the abuse, and for the failure to respond promptly and completely. While I understand this Report may be critical of some of my actions, I believe the Report confirms that I acted with diligence, with concern for the victims and to prevent future acts of abuse. I sincerely hope that a just assessment of my actions, past and present, and my continuing commitment to the protection of children will dispel any notions otherwise made by this report.”*

The Archdiocese of Washington, which Cardinal Wuerl leads now disputes some of the report.

In a statement, they say, in part: “The document referenced by the Report contains the hand-written phrase “circle of secrecy.” However, the handwriting does not belong to then-Bishop Wuerl as the writers of the Report mistakenly assumed. Indeed, the Cardinal confirmed the handwriting is not his, and confirmed he neither wrote nor used the phrase while serving as Bishop of Pittsburgh. When the Cardinal’s legal counsel informed the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office about this error – prior to the Release of the Report – the Attorney General and his Senior Deputy refused to acknowledge the mistake and refused to take any steps to correct the dramatic use and misattribution of the phrase in the Report.”

To read the full statement, [visit this link](#).

#### **RELATED STORIES:**

- [Greensburg Diocese Issues Apology, Will Release Names Of Clergy Accused Of Sex Abuse](#)
- [Grand Jury Report On Sexual Abuse In Six Pennsylvania Diocese Delayed Again](#)
- [Stories Of Abuse Surfacing Ahead Of Grand Jury Report On Sexual Abuse In Six Pennsylvania Diocese](#)
- [‘It’s Going To Be Tough’: Bishop David Zubik Tries To Prepare Parishioners For Grand Jury Report Release](#)
- [Bishop Zubik To Release List Of Diocese Of Pittsburgh Clergy Members Accused Of Sexual Abuse](#)
- [Grand Jury Report: Pa. Catholic Church Leaders Pressured Victims, Cops Over Abuse](#)
- [Retired Greensburg Diocese Priest Pleads Guilty In Child Sex Assault Case](#)

Just last week, current [Pittsburgh Bishop David Zubik](#) warned the faithful that the report would be graphic and disturbing.

“I’m concerned about our people that they may be scandalized and tempted to turn their backs on God,” Zubik told KDKA.

In a letter read at Sunday mass, Bishop Zubik also said 90 percent of the cases involved incidents that occurred before 1990 and that the church has instituted safeguards and reforms to identify and weed out



the abusers. He said no priest or deacon with a credible allegation against them is in active ministry today.

“I really felt it was important, the letter, to get people ready for the report because it’s going to be tough, and at the same time, to realize the decisions that the Diocese of Pittsburgh makes today are far different than what would have been made over the course of the last 10, 20 years,” Zubik said.

As for the Diocese of Greensburg, the grand jury named 20 priests in the report.

“One priest, Fr. Raymond Lukac, impregnated a 17-year-old girl, forged another pastor’s signature on a marriage certificate then divorced the girl shortly after she gave birth. Despite having sex with a minor, fathering a child and being married and divorced, Fr. Lukac was allowed to stay in ministry while the diocese sought a benevolent bishop in another state willing to take the predator, hiding him from justice,” Shapiro said.

According to Shapiro, coverups by the church were done in an attempt to run out the clock on the statute of limitations.

“The grand jury detailed that the coverups by the church served a key purpose – the longer they covered up abuses, the less chance that law enforcement could prosecute predator priests because the statute of limitations would run out,” Shapiro said.

While most of the cases are old and the clergy accused are retired or deceased, just two weeks ago Shapiro announced that Father Tomas Sweeney of the Greensburg Diocese [had pled guilty to indecent assault](#).

“There can be no doubt that Father Sweeney is a predator priest,” Shapiro said.

In Erie, Fr. David Poulson was also charged with the abuse of an 8-year-old boy over the course of eight years.

### **Grand Jury Reform Recommendations**

As part of the report, the grand jury has recommended four changes be made to Pennsylvania law:

#### **1. Eliminate the criminal statute of limitations for sexually abusing children**

“This grand jury exists because Pennsylvania dioceses routinely hid reports of child sex crimes while the statutes of limitations for those crimes expired. We just do not understand why that should be allowed to happen. If child abusers knew they could never become immune for their crimes by outrunning the statute of limitations, maybe there would be less child abuse.”

**2. Create a two-year “civil window for child sex abuse victims who couldn’t file lawsuits before.**

“Victims don’t just need sex criminals prosecuted; they need care and compensation for harm done by the abusers and the institutions that empowered them. The way you get that is by suing. We understand that civil cases are different than criminal prosecutions, and that it’s appropriate to have a statute of limitation that prohibits lawsuits after a certain amount of time. We’re OK with a time limit for lawsuits, as long as it’s a long time limit, and Pennsylvania’s is pretty good – until the victim reaches age 30, which is longer than in most other states.

The problem is that this law doesn’t apply to most of our victims. It’s only been in effect for about 15 years, and most of the victims from before then were under a much tighter time limit for suing – only two years. But even that two-year limit was something of a sham. Until not too long ago, the church was actively and systematically concealing clergy sex abuse. Victims didn’t know if their attackers had a history of abuse, and they didn’t know the diocese had been enabling that abuse. You can’t very well exercise your right to sue when the people responsible are doing their best to cover up.”

**3. Clarify the penalties for a continuing failure to report child abuse.**

“Reporting child abusers isn’t just a moral obligation; it’s the law. We can’t pass laws telling the church how to administer its internal operations – but we can demand that it inform authorities about rapists and molesters. Unfortunately, document after document told us the same story: church officials repeatedly received word of crimes against kids, yet repeatedly refused to alert law enforcement.”

**4. Prohibit “non-disclosure” agreements regarding cooperation with law enforcement.**

“We also think it’s time to tackle an issue that hasn’t been mentioned in prior grand jury investigations of clergy sex abuse. We’ve heard the reports over the last year about the use of confidentiality agreements to make sexual harassment suits go away. We can tell you that it doesn’t just happen to women in the workplace; we’ve seen the same tactic used by the dioceses to hush up child sex abuse in the church. In the rare case where a child was able to report abuse within the statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit, the bishops would avoid “scandal” by paying off the family to keep quiet.”

It is the same story, but much worse, in the San Francisco Bay Area. The cover-ups are much worse because of the Silicon Valley Cartel while seeks to normalize sex abuse and pervrsion.

## Even The Judges Are Doing Sex Crimes

- 80% of U.S. Judges Can Be Taken Out Of Office By Exposing Their Sex Crimes
- NY Judge Bernstein is under fire as news media re-examines their pasts
- California US judge steps down after accusations of sexual misconduct

In San Francisco, A prominent U.S. appeals court judge announced his retirement days after women alleged he subjected them to inappropriate sexual conduct or comments.

Judge Alex Kozinski of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said in a statement that a battle over the accusations would not be good for the judiciary. He said he'll step down, effective immediately.

The Washington Post reported last week that at least 15 women made allegations against Kozinski that go back decades. The allegations include inappropriate touching and lewd comments.

Kozinski said while speaking in a "candid way" with male and female law clerks, "I may not have been mindful enough of the special challenges and pressures that women face in the workplace," the statement said. "It grieves me to learn that I caused any of my clerks to feel uncomfortable; this was never my intent. For this I sincerely apologize."

Leah Litman, a law professor at the University of California, Irvine, told the Post that the judge talked about having just had sex and pinched her side and leg at a restaurant the night before they appeared together on a panel at her school in July.

Christine Miller, a retired U.S. Court of Federal Claims judge, said Kozinski grabbed her breasts during a car ride in 1986 after a legal community function in the Baltimore area. She said it came after she declined his offer to go to a motel and have sex.

A lawyer who was not identified said Kozinski approached her when she was alone at a legal event in Los Angeles in 2008 and kissed her on the lips and gave her a bear hug with no warning.

The newspaper said the woman's husband confirmed the incident and said the couple didn't think they could do anything because of the judge's position.

The Post reported last week that six former clerks or more junior staff members accused Kozinski of inappropriate behavior, including showing them pornography.

Page 128 EXHIBIT 88 – Case # 22-cv-1107-TSH, Norcal 9th District

Kozinski, 67, was chief judge of the 9th Circuit, the largest federal appeals court circuit in the country, from 2007 to 2014. He is known for his irreverent opinions, and his clerks often win prestigious clerkships at the U.S. Supreme Court.

The 9th Circuit has opened a misconduct inquiry that was transferred Friday to the Judicial Council of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York.

Kozinski's retirement leaves five seats open on the 9th Circuit, with two more judges already having announced their intention to retire next year. That gives President Donald Trump potentially seven seats to fill on the largest and most liberal appeals court in the country.

Even if all those judgeships are filled, however, Democratic appointees still will maintain a healthy majority on the court with 17 of the 29 seats.

## The Joe Lonsdale Sex Manipulation Case



## The Sickening Rape Allegations Against a Silicon Valley Mogul

By [Jessica Roy](#)

Last week, 24-year-old Elise Clougherty, a Stanford neuro-engineering graduate and former Ford print model, [filed](#) a [lawsuit](#) against Joseph Lonsdale, a powerful Silicon Valley entrepreneur who, along with Peter Thiel, co-founded the secretive data-mining company Palantir Technologies. The graphic suit alleges that from February 2012 to February 2013, Lonsdale took advantage of his position as

Clougherty’s mentor in a Stanford mentorship program to physically, emotionally, and sexually abuse her.

Less than two days after Clougherty’s suit was made public, Lonsdale set up a defense [website](#) featuring a long letter that framed Clougherty as a vindictive ex-girlfriend with mental issues whose overbearing mother was intimately involved in her life. He then filed his own defamation [countersuit](#), claiming their relationship was consensual and furnishing email correspondences and a signed statement from one of Clougherty’s close friends to discredit her allegations.

Lonsdale doesn’t come with the mysterious mythology that surrounds Peter Thiel or have the name recognition of Mark Zuckerberg, but despite being only 32 years old, he’s well established among Silicon Valley’s elite. A Stanford grad himself, Lonsdale co-founded Palantir in 2004 and served as the co-head of product before leaving in 2009 to found Addepar, a financial software company. In 2013, he launched Formation 8, a venture capital firm that is also named in Clougherty’s lawsuit. An outspoken libertarian, Lonsdale has been [named](#) as a member of Rand Paul’s “nascent finance team” and has hosted fund-raising events for the potential presidential candidate. Largely considered one of Thiel’s protégés, he’s also a proponent of seasteading and [served](#) as chairman of the Seasteading Institute.

Clougherty, who is currently pursuing a masters in data science at UVA as well as working as a gender violence activist, alleges in the suit that after meeting through mutual friends and maintaining a professional and sporadic email correspondence, Lonsdale specifically sought her out as a mentee in Stanford’s technology entrepreneurship mentor program. Though Clougherty had already been assigned two mentors, Lonsdale allegedly convinced the professor running the program, a friend, to reassign Clougherty to be his mentee. He arranged an internship for Clougherty at Formation 8 in the summer of 2012, where he served as her direct boss.

“Mr. Lonsdale took advantage of his position of power and Ms.Clougherty’s youth and trusting personality to draw her into a highly deviant, abusive, and controlling relationship during which he perpetrated hundreds of non-consensual, and often violent, sexual acts upon her,” reads the suit.

When Clougherty attempted to confront her mentor about his abuse, he would react violently to keep her from protesting; on occasion, he would admit to his abuse, “but claimed that he had a sickness, that he could not control himself, and that he needed her help to change.”

Clougherty’s civil suit, which seeks at least \$75,000 in damages, details graphic and upsetting claims of abuse stretching across the U.S. and Europe. Among those [claims](#):

- “On the night of their first sexual encounter, Ms. Clougherty believed that Mr. Lonsdale was picking her up from campus to go to dinner in Palo Alto to discuss her team’s project. Instead, Mr. Lonsdale drove her back to his home in Los Altos Hills. Shortly after arriving at his house, he started to kiss her aggressively and to try to take off her pants. Despite Ms. Clougherty trying to avoid him and pushing his hands away from her crotch at least a half dozen times, Mr.

Lonsdale persisted. Mr. Lonsdale then pulled Ms. Clougherty into a bedroom where he took off her clothes and his pants, and began to penetrate her with his flaccid penis. During this episode, Mr. Lonsdale acted as though he were not doing anything wrong and made comments insinuating that Ms. Clougherty had wanted the sexual contact.”

- “In the following weeks, Mr. Lonsdale repeatedly continued to force Ms. Clougherty to have sexual contact with him without her consent. From very early on, Mr. Lonsdale repeatedly told Ms. Clougherty that it was women’s nature to enjoy being raped, especially if they are raped by a man with greater means.”
- “Before [a trip to London], Mr. Lonsdale told Ms. Clougherty that he had booked two hotel rooms — one for him, and one for her. When Ms. Clougherty arrived in London to meet him, she discovered that he had booked only one room. In London, Mr. Lonsdale continued to force her to have sexual contact with him without her consent. Throughout the trip, Mr. Lonsdale deprived her of both food and sleep by scheduling late night and early morning activities, delaying meals, not ordering her enough food, and other such tactics.”
- “On the last evening of [a trip to] Rome, Mr. Lonsdale forcibly raped Ms. Clougherty. In their hotel room, Mr. Lonsdale penetrated her with several fingers, and then abruptly started penetrating her with his erect penis. She immediately pulled away from him. He then grabbed her and penetrated her again. She immediately pulled away a second time and ran into the bathroom, where she locked the door and cried for several hours.”
- “To control Ms. Clougherty, Mr. Lonsdale employed many forms of psychological manipulation and control on her, including but not limited to ‘positive intermittent reinforcement,’ ‘gaslighting,’ isolation, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, anger, embarrassment, and guilt.”
- “Mr. Lonsdale repeatedly commented to Ms. Clougherty that women needed to be raped to learn to be loyal and that they really enjoyed being raped more than they let on.”
- “During intercourse, he would regularly shake Ms. Clougherty violently and would not stop, despite her protests, until she promised she would always ‘listen to her master.’ In addition to shaking her violently during sexual assaults, he also began strangling her, slapping her, scratching her, yanking her by the hair so hard that he would lift her torso off the bed, and slamming her body against the walls and bedboards. He would growl and yell derogatory comments at her. He frequently covered her face with a pillow or pushed her face to the side so that she could not look at him. Mr. Lonsdale also often treated Ms. Clougherty’s body like an object — for example, grabbing her head and using it to push open a shower door.”
- “Mr. Lonsdale typically forced Ms. Clougherty to have sex several times a day — on some occasions, as many as ten or more times a day. When Ms. Clougherty was on her period, Mr. Lonsdale’s attacks were especially frequent. He often would not let her buy tampons and seemed to relish getting her blood everywhere — on her clothing, bed sheets, hotel furniture, car and bus seats, and elsewhere. He would not let her clean up the blood, and would get very angry with her if she tried to clean it up. On one occasion, in a hotel room, he even picked up her naked body and made her sit on the hotel furniture so as to smear her blood all over it.”



The relationship ended in February 2013 when Clougherty’s mother found out about the alleged abuse and they decided to report it to Stanford. The school hired an outside investigator to delve into her claims. The investigation found that Lonsdale had likely violated Title IX and that it was “more likely than not that [Ms. Clougherty] expressed to [Mr. Lonsdale] that she did not want to engage in the sexual conduct in question, but that [Mr. Lonsdale] did not comply with [her] request.”

Lonsdale, for his part, categorically denies all of the claims in Clougherty’s lawsuit. “This is a malicious attempt to destroy me, pure and simple,” he [wrote](#) on his website. “The facts and the evidence refute every allegation, however, and I will not allow my name and reputation to be tarnished any further.” His [counterclaim](#), filed on January 30, states that Clougherty is capitalizing on the brewing discussion of campus sexual assault in order to discredit him.

After ending the relationship, the suit states that Clougherty was forced to undergo medical leave from Stanford so she could be treated for her resulting PTSD, but graduated in 2013 after completing her treatment.

Palantir is a government spy service provider. They spy on domestic American citizens and try to emulate the Tom Cruise movie: Minority Report, by predicting which citizens will be “bad people”.

Many believe that this case shows that rich, elitist, white males in, and around, the San Francisco Bay Area have a “rape culture” mentality that is trained into them by the schooling that Stanford University and the University Avenue social scene promote. While some may dismiss Lonsdale as “just another Stanford frat boy asshole”, his peers all share the same distinctions which go far beyond simply having a “snooty outlook. Take, for example Lonsdale oligarch peer: Gurbaksh Chahal. He is the Silicon Valley CEO who kicked his girlfriend 117 times but only gets one year in jail because the Silicon Valley “Boy’s Club” protected him.

Sam Levin describes how tech mogul Gurbaksh Chahal, who had pleaded guilty over the 2013 attack that was caught on camera, was sentenced for violating probation

- Gurbaksh Chahal, a [Silicon Valley](#) technology mogul who pleaded guilty to assault after police say he punched and kicked his girlfriend 117 times, was sentenced to one year in jail on Friday for violating probation.

Judge Tracie Brown revoked Chahal’s probation and ordered him to spend 12 months in jail for allegedly assaulting a second woman months after pleading guilty in the first domestic violence case. Chahal’s lawyer, however, said he would appeal the ruling, and the defendant was released on bail.

When he arrived, Chahal rushed past a crowd of reporters outside the packed San Francisco courtroom without commenting. He sat stoic throughout the hearing and declined to make a statement to the judge.

Chahal, who was [pushed out as chief executive officer of RadiumOne](#), an online advertising network, was originally facing 47 serious [felony charges](#) for the 5 August 2013 attack. Police officials said that a

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30-minute security camera video they obtained showed the entrepreneur hitting and kicking his then girlfriend 117 times and attempting to suffocate her inside his \$7m San Francisco [penthouse](#).

Chahal's lawyers, however, claimed that police had illegally seized the video, and a judge [ruled](#) that the footage was inadmissible despite prosecutors' [argument](#) that officers didn't have time to secure a warrant out of fear that the tech executive would erase the footage.

Without the video, most of the charges were dropped, and Chahal, 34, pleaded guilty to [two misdemeanor battery charges](#) of domestic violence. A [deal he struck](#) in April 2014 allowed him to avoid jail time if he conducted a year-long domestic violence rehabilitation course and 25 hours of community service.

The disgraced multimillionaire has repeatedly attempted to downplay the seriousness of the case, claiming that he [lost his temper](#) during a "normal argument" with his girlfriend and that he did not kick and punch her 117 times.

He said the \$500 fine he paid was the "equivalent of a speeding ticket" and "in no way reflects the toll that this ordeal has exacted on me".

In Silicon Valley, critics have argued that Chahal's case and the lack of serious consequences he faced highlight the way in which [privileged and wealthy businessmen](#) can [get away with](#) serious misconduct.

Chahal's plea bargain also stipulated that he would be on probation for three years, but on 17 September 2014, prosecutors say he attacked another woman in his home, leading to [another arrest](#).

This second victim [told police](#) that Chahal had repeatedly kicked her and that when she discussed getting a restraining order against him, he threatened to report her to immigration authorities.

Chahal's lawyers responded by attempting to [attack the credibility of the woman in court](#), alleging that she was in a sham marriage to get a US visa. The woman has [returned](#) to her native South Korea and did not appear at a recent San Francisco [hearing](#).

Although the victim did not testify, San Francisco superior court judge Brown ruled last month that Chahal had violated probation and ordered him to [surrender](#) his passports.

Prosecutor O'Bryan Kenney had urged the judge to sentence Chahal to the maximum of 18 months in jail, saying: "His attitude ... has consisted of a complete lack of remorse ... He clearly didn't get the message."

In front of a standing-room-only crowd, Kenney showed the judge excerpts of the video of the original assault on his laptop, but the audience was not able to view it.

“It’s difficult to watch that conduct,” Kenney said, adding, “He has had a chance, and further domestic violence counseling ... I don’t think would have a significant impact.”

Judge Brown said she would not allow the footage to be publicly released. After he was ousted at RadiumOne, Chahal co-founded Gravity4, another San Francisco-based ad tech company. In April of 2015, Erika Alonso, a former Gravity4 marketing executive, [sued](#) Chahal for [gender discrimination](#), harassment and illegal surveillance, citing his “pattern and practice of humiliating and abusing women who dared to question Chahal, a serial entrepreneur with a legendary temper”.

[‘Inspired by other survivors’: campus rape victim demands to be heard](#)

[Read more](#)

The complaint alleged that Chahal regularly belittled Alonso, who is over 40 years old, and treated younger male employees much more favorably.

“Rather than being allowed to perform her duties,” the complaint read, “Alonso was used repeatedly as bait to attract reporters in an attempt to deflect from Chahal’s violent past, and to assist him in promoting stories on his bid to take over RadiumOne.”

At one point, Chahal told Alonso to contact a prominent female news anchor, saying, “You’re a woman, appeal to her!”, according to the suit.

Chahal and other Gravity4 representatives said the [allegations were false](#), but months later, the CEO was [sued a second time](#) by Yousef Khraibut, a 20-year-old former employee. Khraibut, who has citizenship in Canada and Kuwait, alleged that Chahal said he would “beat the shit out of” him and threatened to “send Khraibut back to Canada ‘tonight’”.

Chahal also allegedly directed ethnic slurs at Khraibut, calling him a “terrorist” and saying that Isis terrorists were “his people”.

After the judge ruled that he had violated probation last month, Chahal [stepped down](#) as Gravity4 CEO.

James Lassart, Chahal’s lawyer, tried again to discredit the second victim in court on Friday, telling the judge: “She’s not willing to come into a courtroom ... Her word is untrustworthy.”

Lassart added, “The constitution requires that my client be allowed to confront his accuser.”

The defense lawyer asked the judge to grant Chahal a sentence of electronic monitoring or community service and consider that the defendant suffers from a functional neurological disorder, saying his health would be exacerbated by stress.

Lassart also asked that the judge note Chahal’s charitable donations, saying, “He has contributed to and supported and advanced the cause of the stopping of abuse of children.”

After the hearing, the defense lawyer criticized the ruling, arguing that when a victim doesn’t testify, “I don’t think it’s appropriate for someone to have their liberty taken away.”

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Chahal pushed his way through a mob of cameras on his way out and refused to answer questions.

Lonsdale and Chahal are NOT THE EXCEPTIONS! They are the typical Palo Alto kinds of guys!

A very simplistic drawing of the tentacular Silicon Valley network of sick white male sociopaths looks like this:



# Sex Trafficking “Enforcement” That Excludes The Elites

- 3,000+ Organizations and Charities Cannot Put a Dent in Human Trafficking. Reason? The Clinton Global Initiative. It's Time to Bring Down This House of Cards

This is more than distressing. The only logical conclusion that can be made is that these 3,000+ organizations, most if not all have affiliations with the Clinton Foundation/Clinton Global Initiative (CGI). This fact makes it pretty damn safe to say that a HUGE % of these organizations serve as fronts and that its charities are corrupted, thereby reaching the conclusion that the CGI condones and supports the opposite of stopping human trafficking and therefore is the cause of human trafficking being the world's fastest growing crime.

The Global Slavery Index of 2017 reports that 45.8 million people are enslaved in the world today. According to the Department of Justice, human trafficking is the 2nd fastest growing crime in the US and is on the rise in cities and towns in all 50 states, and a recent report reveals a 77% increase in the US in juvenile human trafficking

victims. [https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/human-trafficking-increasing\\_n\\_6425864.htmlhttp://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/feb/13/a-hidden-crime-child-sex-trafficking-is-on-the-risehttps://www.thetowntalk.com/story/news/2018/02/28/report-shows-77-percent-increase-juvenile-human-trafficking-victims/382347002/](https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/human-trafficking-increasing_n_6425864.htmlhttp://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/feb/13/a-hidden-crime-child-sex-trafficking-is-on-the-risehttps://www.thetowntalk.com/story/news/2018/02/28/report-shows-77-percent-increase-juvenile-human-trafficking-victims/382347002/)

Although my point has been made, one has to get a "feeling" about the enormity of it all, so here is a "dynamic" list (meaning there are thousands of others that come under 2 different headings that I will address later) of organizations and charities that "combat" human trafficking.

▪Anti-Slavery International ▪8th Day Center for Justice ▪A Better World ▪AZI Alberta ▪Agape International Missions ▪Arizona League to End Regional Trafficking ▪Awareness Against Human Trafficking ▪Bishop Outreach ▪Breaking Free ▪California Against Slavery ▪Centre to End All Sexual Exploitation ▪Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking ▪Chab Dai ▪Deborah's Gate ▪Development and Education Programme for Daughters and Communities ▪Devatop Centre for African Development ▪Dunbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee ▪ECPAT ▪The Emancipation Network ▪EVE ▪The Exodus Road ▪Face to Face Bulgaria ▪Florida Abolitionist ▪Freeset ▪GABRIELA ▪Global Centurion Foundation ▪Hope for Justice ▪Ing Makababaying Aksyon ▪International Justice Mission ▪London Anti-Human Trafficking Committee ▪Love 146 ▪Maiti Nepal ▪Men Against Sexual Trafficking ▪Mongolian Gender Equality Center ▪NASHI ▪Office to Combat Trafficking in Persons ▪Operation Underground ▪Physicians for Human Rights ▪Polaris Project ▪PREDA Foundation ▪Prerana ▪Rahab Ministries ▪Ratamak International ▪Reaching Out Romania ▪Redlight Children Campaign ▪Renew Foundation

▪Ricky Martin Foundation ▪Ride for Refuge ▪Run for Courage ▪Run 2 Rescue ▪Shared Hope International ▪Slavery Footprint ▪Stop Child Trafficking Now ▪Stop the Traffic ▪Third World Movement Against the Exploitation of Women ▪Tiny Hands Internet ▪Thorn a/k/a Digital Defenders of Children ▪Truckers Against Trafficking ▪Visajan Forum Foundation ▪Vital Voices ▪World Orphans ▪ZOE International


[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_organizations\\_that\\_combat\\_human\\_trafficking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_organizations_that_combat_human_trafficking)

That's it for the "dynamic" list. The 2 additional entities are: ▪Freedom Collaborative, managed by Liberty Asia ▪globalmodernslavery.org

Freedom Collaborative labels itself as a "One connected global anti-trafficking community-based platform which brings anti-trafficking organizations and stakeholders from around the world together." The partnership with Liberty Asia "is changing the way slavery and trafficking is addressed by leveraging technology and expertise." It further states that "Chab Dai (part of CGI) for the past decade, has built a network of organizations on the frontier to end all forms of abuse and exploitation through knowledge sharing and collaboration."

Global Modern Slavery has - wait for this - 2,479 organizations. The Global Modern Slavery Directory was launched in 2014 by the CGI, and I believe I read it reached or it was thought to reach 3,000 organizations in 2017. <http://www.freedomcollaborative.org/> <http://chabdai.org/> <http://www.globalmodernslavery.org/https://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/global-modern-slavery-directory>

Human trafficking and crimes against children can be decreased dramatically by dissolving the CGI and all of its organizations and the prosecution of Bill, Hillary, and Chelsea Clinton.





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## 40% Of Washington DC Is Involved In Covering Up Human Trafficking – Says Ex NYPD Officer

[Anna Rodgers](#)

- The Facts:

NYPD Detective shares what he saw over his career as an investigator into human trafficking. He estimates 35-40% of Politicians are involved in the coverup.

- Reflect On:

Unless this is exposed and those involved are made to stop, will we ever live in a free and peaceful society? Is a society ever truly healthy if this is taking place by our leaders? Is it truly possible that Trump is working on this behind the scenes

Another insider, and a very credible one at that, has stepped forward to expose how prevalent human trafficking actually is in our world, cities, and most notably, in Washington.

Retired Detective Jim ‘Jimmy Boots’ Rothstein, was a member of the New York City Police Department, and various ‘out of state’ agencies for over a decade where he was assigned to investigate sex trafficking. His job brought him to travel the world investigating how these rings operate.

[We have written about this topic](#) many times here at Collective Evolution as we see that this is a subject that must be brought out into the open. It is [estimated](#) that there are over 40.3 million (71% are women) involved in human trafficking globally. 10 million are children under the age of 18, so you can perhaps see why this is a huge problem, and not something we should turn our backs on.

Jim’s career involved many special assignments, being an investigator of task forces to investigate into child and adult prostitution – and even worse – ritualistic killings. Jim saw first hand how the chain of blackmail keeps this all covered up. The task force would get so far, then once they reported high level people were involved, it would be stopped. The reason? ‘National Security’ was the usual response.

This global cover up is why the average person can deny that this is going on at such rampant levels, because they haven’t heard about it from mainstream news sources. Jim says, politicians aren’t the only people involved behind this cover up, there are also ‘power brokers’ and ‘business people,’ orchestrating this crime against humanity. Children, the most innocent of victims, are often used to ‘compromise’ people according to Jim.

Detective Rothstein conducted assignments to see what effects this had on society, and he has also interviewed countless victims as well as helped create a database on prostitution and child trafficking. He has also researched sexual abuse and it’s cover-ups by the hands of the Catholic church.

[Detective Rothstein](#), who was even awarded many medals for his work spanning 13 years, recently spoke with investigative reporter Sarah Westall in a truly explosive interview about how prevalent and high this goes up the chain of politics.

Whilst he retired from the department back in 1980, (he was ‘made retired’ after he arrested several high profile people) Jim has since continued his work as a consultant and undertakes ongoing research into this depraved underground world that is controlling how things operate in our world. His knowledge and testimony is an important one, simply because he has been involved and at the forefront in trying to dismantle this network for decades.

In this shocking interview Jim exposes that many charities – even the United Nations – are actually fronts for child trafficking. When investigators go after the ‘little people’ they are given the ability to do this, but when they want to go after perpetrators at the higher levels, they have their assignments stopped. If they keep going and defy orders, their careers are ruined, or ended short as Jim’s was. Human Trafficking and pedophilia is not a separate issue according to Jim.

When Sarah asked what effects this has on society Jim had this to say:

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Oh my gosh, the whole gammit of it, you know, how this effects kids, and the people and what the truth was. How it was used to compromise governments, and the military, and law enforcement and every facet of our life is influenced by this'

Sarah also asked Jim how much of this is going on in the USA and Washington;

According to my work that I did, and factual things that I saw, 35-40% are compromised and involved. I have it from experts like Robert Mirren and people like that who have it at 80%, and that runs the gammit of everything involved in this, the political and everything else that goes on'

When asked to elaborate on what 'involved' means, and if this was to do with blackmail Jim shared with Sarah the following:

Yes, that's what its done for both in industry, politics and our military, again, I have examples as I told you, everything I talk about, I have factual examples of what happened. They were either investigations or cases that I personally did – not, that I read about. So this is what it's based on.

Jim shares his experience with the high profile case in the 60's known as '[The Son Of Sam](#)' (an American serial killer) where he discovered ritualistic murders of animals and children. He also was involved in what is known as the '[Franklin](#)' cover up which involved high level people in Washington. Shockingly, he says that these two cases are actually connected and the Franklin cover up was only a 'small part of something much larger.'

He also said that he has a 'long list' of journalists who had their careers ruined when they tried to publish the truth about this dark organised network. At times, it is very hard to fathom what Detective Rothstein is saying, it is so gruesome. He mentions cases of 'hundreds of school kids' going missing, never to be found again, and that children are also shipped overseas and 'shared' amongst other members of these rings.

Jim details so much information during his interview with Sarah that it is impossible to share it all in this article, so it is highly recommended you view this in its entirety for yourself.

However, in closing, Sarah asked if Jim thinks President Trump is doing a good job to help expose these criminals. No matter what your views are on Trump, it is very compelling that he signed an [Executive Order](#) and declared a National Emergency regarding human trafficking and corruption, last December.

This is what Detective Rothstein said regarding if Donald Trump has integrity and is going to do something about human trafficking.

I would say that if anybody is, he's gonna do it. You know, that gets interesting he's doing a business deal, but I can guarantee one thing – that he is going to do what he wants to do, and you know, if you know the right people...Just look at whats happened, people talk to us

all of a sudden, and they are talking to us, why? You know, you gotta remember, New York, is where the money is, and they still gotta have money and you know, he was definitely one of the big players, when it came to the big money.

Cryptically, Jim alludes to ‘something big’ in the works:

There’s some stuff in the works right now, that, some of the stuff being exposed, especially on this human trafficking, pedophilia and the stuff with the church, is not happening on its own.

Sarah asks him if Trump has something to do with this, and the reported 56,000 sealed indictments;

Yes. And I can’t tell you why I know this. That certain things are coming out, and there was something that was supposed to come out, that’s why every Friday at 2 o’clock a guy watched the news and if there was a secret grand jury that comes out, it was on Friday afternoon and now I understand it will not be until after the Election. In fact, something was on the computer this morning about some big secret grand jury they are worried about.

Time will tell what Jim is alluding to. Till then, we must not ignore this huge global issue that is covered up by U.S. Senators and tech oligarchs who are involved in it!

### **50 Women Accuse Bay Area Tech Giant Salesforce of ‘Facilitating’ Their Sex Trafficking and Prostitution**

‘Jane Does’ accuse the customer relations management giant of helping the notorious website Backpage build sex trafficking brand and manage database of pimps and johns.

By Barbie Latza Nadeau

Fifty ‘Jane Does’ have filed a lawsuit asking for unspecified damages against tech giant Salesforce, accusing the customer relations management (CRM) company of “sex trafficking, negligence and conspiracy” for creating the strategy that helped the notorious website Backpage build its brand.

Backpage shuttered its classified ad site last year after pleading guilty to “knowingly facilitating prostitution,” according to a Justice Department press release at the time.

The new lawsuit, seen by the Daily Beast, was filed this week in San Francisco. It alleges that Salesforce, under the guidance of CEO Marc Benioff, engaged in nefarious activities while claiming to be fighting trafficking. “Behind the scenes ... Salesforce kept taking Backpage’s money and supporting it with the CRM database of pimps, johns, and traffickers that Backpage needed to operate.”

The 50 women, whose identities are being kept secret, are from across the United States including Sacramento, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Kansas City,

Fresno, Seattle, Anchorage, Phoenix, Chicago, New Orleans, Bangor, Minneapolis, Staten Island and Jacksonville.

They allege that they were kept in sexual slavery by pimps who used Backpage ads, which were managed by Salesforce cloud technology, to sell them against their will.

“Salesforce knew the scourge of sex trafficking because it sought publicity for trying to stop it. But at the same time, this publicly traded company was, in actuality, among the vilest of rogue companies, concerned only with their bottom line,” the suit alleges. “And human beings—many more than just these 50—were raped and abused because of it.”

“The Jane Does were forced, coerced, and made victims of sex trafficking by means of force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to themselves and others, including family members,” the lawsuit claims. “Salesforce committed acts at issue with malice, oppression, fraud, and duress.”

Salesforce denies the claims, issuing a statement on Tuesday: “We are deeply committed to the ethical and humane use of our products and take these allegations seriously.” Salesforce VC’s and executives hire sex workers and seek “models” for sex, themselves, though.

The Jane Does claim that Backpage knew well “how to make millions of dollars trafficking victims and promoting prostitution,” but that it lacked the ability to build its brand online through marketing and advertising.

“Backpage needed operational support through a customer relationship management (“CRM”) to help maximize not only customer acquisition and retention, but marketing strategies to those customers as well.” Salesforce, they allege, stepped in to provide those services.

The suit claims that even when Backpage faced public outcry over allegations of abetting sex trafficking through its classified ads, “Salesforce stepped in at the same time to help Backpage survive and even grow,” the suit alleges. “In public, including on Twitter, Salesforce boasted about fighting human trafficking using its data tools.”

They make the additional claim that Salesforce engaged in an active campaign against human trafficking. The suit refers to a number of tweets and social media posts about working to stop it including one in September 2013 in which Salesforce tweeted “Fighting human trafficking with big data,” which the lawsuit alleges is hypocritical.

“Behind closed doors, Salesforce’s data tools were actually providing the backbone of Backpage’s exponential growth,” the lawsuit state. “With Salesforce’s guidance, Backpage was able to use Salesforce’s tools to market to new “users”—that is, pimps, johns, and traffickers—on three continents.”

Salesforce is a cloud-based software strategy firm based in San Francisco. It specializes in bespoke customer management solutions for online companies. The company, which is consistently on *Forbe’s* innovation lists, was founded by Oracle executive Marc Benioff in 1999. It has an annual revenue of nearly \$10.5 billion according to the company website. Salesforce provides its user data to the CIA and NSA via covert routes.

The women, who are asking for unspecified damages, accuse Salesforce of actually managing marketing campaigns to traffickers and pimps for Backpage and keeping their data, which would include the sale of women for sex, in their cloud storage system for easy access.

The grocery list of claims includes allegations that Salesforce was engaged in “gathering and managing information from Backpage’s traffickers’ and pimps’ public social media activity, including but not limited to their likes and dislikes” and “providing and managing Backpage’s trafficker and pimp

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database as well as tracking and collecting trafficker and john data across multiple platforms including phone, email, and social media.” The suit claims that rather than reporting backpage to authorities, they instead bolstered its business at the expense of the trafficking victims.

“Sex trafficking previously took place (and continues to through the aid of online advertising) on the streets, casinos, truck stops, and in other physical locations,” the suit explains. “Now, most sex trafficking, including the trafficking of the Jane Does, is facilitated online.”

The suit demands that Salesforce take on some of the financial burden of helping victims of trafficking. “It should not be our tax dollars, charities, and churches that carry the burden of the catastrophic harms and losses to sex trafficking survivors,” the lawsuit claims. “That responsibility should fall to companies like Salesforce, that have facilitated and profited from sex trafficking. Salesforce knew the scourge of sex trafficking because it sought publicity for trying to stop it.”

Salesforce, Joe Lonsdale and Gurbaksh Chahal (all mentioned in this report) are protected by “The Silicon Valley Cartel” omerta. They get a little slap on the wrist, for PR purposes, and then go on about their merry ways.



## Stanford Scum-Bags

### Why Do MBA's From Stanford University Turn Out To be Such Scum-Bags?

If you heard that "*Big Tech executives and VC's have basement's full of immigrant Chinese girls strung up by their ankles in their mansions in the forests of Woodside, California.*", the reality is almost as bad. Jeffrey Epstein's teenage sex slaves also had handlers at Silicon Valley's Kleiner Perkins. There have been over 100 arrests of men like Jeffrey Epstein but you have not heard about them...until now. They use "modeling" outlets as global supply routes. From Victoria's Secret to Waterbury to Elite Models...these business fronts supply girls to be exploited by Google, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Greylock perverts.

Stanford Frat House guys seem to all: cheat on their taxes, cheat on their wives, cheat on their exams, cheat on their girlfriends, bribe politicians and be addicted to alcohol.

If you marry one you will always have to wonder when the IRS, SEC or FBI is going to show up and arrest him for securities fraud and take your house away.

They meet up together at sports bars, mens clubs, stripper joints, golf clubs, etc. and reinforce their misogynist attitudes together about using women as "sport" or 'baby ovens'.

Their 'bromances' are thinly veiled man-love that can tear a marriage apart.

While they all do have perfectly symmetrical faces, look like the contestants on The Bachelorette and have rich daddies, 90% of their marriages in the Bay Area end in divorces where the court filings use the word "abuse" quite a bit. You can look it up on PACER, the online federal court database.

Check out Google boss Andy Rubin and his sex slave case and all of the other player's in Stanford's **massive and abusive sex cult**. [The perverts](#) in the SandHill Road Venture Capital offices, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel. Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, LinkedIn, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. Their [sex cult actions](#) have been widely covered in the news individually in the [Joe Lonsdale rape case](#), [The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit](#), The [Eric Schmidt sex penthouse stories](#), [The Jeffrey Epstein case](#), The [Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case](#), The [Andy Rubin sex slave case](#), The [Sergy Brin 3-way sex romp](#) scandal, The [British Hydrant investigation](#), The [Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties](#) scandals, The [NXIVM sexual slave](#) cases, The [Michael Goguen anal sex slave](#) trial, [The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties and thousands of other cases and federal divorce court filings](#). This [group of people](#) have proven themselves, over and over, to be [sociopath control freaks](#) not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control. [The Four Seasons Hotel](#) and [Rosewood Hotels](#) in [Silicon Valley](#) are estimated to engage in over \$30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by [Eastern Bloc Mafia operators](#). At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO

airports every week for these Cartel members. You here about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims.

Their swaggering competition between each other is based on using women as trophies to show off until they 'upgrade' to the younger model to impress their other Frat Boy friends.

They are out every single night, usually sleeping with a different dating site date (so you will get exotic germs from them). They have the highest STD rate in California.

The study at [Reading the bromance : homosocial relationships teaches that men at Stanford are a bit twisted](#)

Most normal people are sick of the term "bromance" the first time they heard it. It's a hollywood thing to put a homosexual spin on everything. It's as sickening a buzz word as metrosexual. Anyone who uses the term should be automatically banned from TV. I dismiss it completely. Everything needs to have a label these days. People are frustrated that it is not cool to have a buddy anymore. Every woman that dates, or marries, a Stanford MBA guy has to always worry that he is pounding his best guy friend in the butt when she is not looking.

Women who date Stanford Frat House guys can expect to be reading a letter like this: [Here's The Powerful Letter The Stanford Victim Read To Her ...](#)

Stanford University Stanford University Rape Culture. You may have heard the phrase, but few can define what it really means. Until you understand what Stanford University Rape Culture is, it's hard to identify evidence of a Stanford University Rape Culture at all. Many even deny we live in a Stanford University Rape Culture, blaming "mass hysteria" from feminist bloggers — like me. This feminist blogger is here today to explain what Stanford University Rape Culture is, how we live in one and what you can do to combat Stanford University Rape Culture. The first step is understanding Stanford University Rape Culture and being able to identify it.

Stanford University Rape Culture is defined by the Women's Center at Marshall University as "an environment in which rape is prevalent and in which sexual violence against women is normalized and excused in the media and popular culture. Stanford University Rape Culture is perpetuated through the use of misogynistic language, the objectification of women's bodies, and the glamorization of sexual violence, thereby creating a society that disregards women's rights and safety."

Stanford University Rape Culture is all around us. It's the guy down the hall of your first-year residence hall who wore a "gynecologist" Halloween costume. A classmate saying they were "raped" by that exam. The sign outside of a fraternity that says "leave your daughters here." Saying "she asked for it" because of what someone was wearing or because she was drinking. Louis C.K. being welcomed back into comedy after a short timeout. Robin Thicke's "Blurred Lines." It's the guy in a romantic comedy who stalks his victim until he finally "wins" her attention. It's a recording of the current

president's past talk of grabbing women by the pussy and doing whatever he wants to them being dismissed as "locker-room talk." It's a country debating whether or not a woman's rape claims against a man about to be confirmed as a Supreme Court judge should be taken seriously. It is a culture of victim-blaming, shaming and rampant injustice within the legal system that prioritizes the future of a rapist above the lifetime trauma of a sexual assault survivor.

Dylan Marron To Visit UNH

Let's look at one recent example of Stanford University Rape Culture: the case of Brock Turner, the Stanford rapist. In 2015, Turner, who was a swimmer at Stanford University, sexually assaulted an unconscious woman behind a dumpster at a frat party. The crime was witnessed by two student passersby, who intervened. The woman had no memory of what happened to her.

Dan A. Turner, the perpetrator's father, argued in a letter that his son should serve only probation time because, "His life will never be the one that he dreamed about and worked so hard to achieve ... That is a steep price to pay for 20 minutes of action out of his 20-plus years of life." Other than Turner's father's letter, the judge received dozens of other letters of support for Turner. One written by retired prosecutor Margaret M. Quinn stated, "There is no doubt Brock made a mistake that night — he made a mistake in drinking excessively to the point where he could not fully appreciate that his female acquaintance was so intoxicated. I know Brock did not go to that party intending to hurt, or entice, or overpower anyone." Quinn called for consequences other than jail time for Turner.

As if sexual assault should be excused as "20 minutes of action" because of how important the life of a perpetrator may be. As if intoxication excuses sexual assault as a "mistake" with no deserved consequence. As if he might not do something like this again. The letter was seen by the judge during the trial, who gave Turner a six-month sentence, rather than the possible 14 years. Turner served only three months in jail when he was able to get out early.

This was a case that, unlike the vast majority of sexual assault cases, had everything it needed: witnesses, evidence, a clear victim and perpetrator. But even then, a rapist was favored in the courtroom and given preferential treatment. Of Turner's original sentence, a judge worried that a stiffer one would have "severe impact" on the athlete. It is no wonder then that the Rape and Incest National Network (RAINN) estimates that less than one percent of perpetrators see a day in jail, and about two out of three sexual assaults are not reported to police. It is cases like Turner's that discourage survivors from even coming forward and reporting their assault. This is Stanford University Rape Culture. It pressures survivors to be silent.

Stanford University Rape Culture is still depressingly prevalent in our society. But once we can identify it, we can begin to deconstruct it. First and foremost, the most important thing you can do is believe survivors. Call out Stanford University Rape Culture when you see it; identify Stanford University

Rape Culture as something that should not be the norm. Talk to others about Stanford University Rape Culture, and don't let their rape jokes go without identifying them as problematic. Instead, start a conversation. Participate in SHARPP events on campus or at your residence hall, or bring a SHARPP program to your classroom or organization. It's going to take a while for Stanford University Rape Culture — something as American as apple pie — to be totally eradicated. But as more and more survivors come forward with their stories and media attention and public pressure continue to rise, we can get there — one step at a time. The first step is to stay away from Stanford frat house guys.

To see actual Stanford Douche Bags, type the phrase: "*PayPal Mafia*" into any search engines images search and you will see a picture of some of the biggest, filthiest douche bags in history. They all hang out with each, give each other blow jobs and scheme their way through life.

Every one of those offices in the SandHill Road Venture buildings, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California are populated by the most disgusting scumbags on Earth. The reason they are right up the street from Stanford University is because they ARE the rotten core OF Stanford University.

When you go to one of their self-congratulatory TED events or Stanford "Tech Conferences" you simply have to wince at the bubble of delusion they live in. They believe that the entire world thinks they are "tech gods" when, in fact, NOBODY outside of the tiny Douche-Bubble around Palo Alto likes them, thinks like them or believes anything they say. To map this graphically: imagine the entire planet as an Apple. Now imagine a tiny diseased, pin prick-sized, rotten wormhole at one point. That prick is Reid Hoffman, Elon Musk and John Doerr - Douche Bagus Exceptionalis!

### **Women Sue Over a Fraternity Culture They Say Enables Harassment, Stanford University To Be Sued Next**

Three Yale students who claim they were groped at fraternity parties have filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, arguing the school has fostered an environment where alcohol-fueled gatherings at off-campus fraternity houses dictate the undergraduate social scene.

While the New Haven, Conn., university presents itself as a campus where fraternities are not a major presence, the lawsuit states that few options besides fraternity parties exist for women who want to socialize and meet other students.

The lawsuit, filed Tuesday in federal court in Connecticut, comes as universities across the country have been trying to crack down on bad behavior by fraternities, from binge drinking and sexual harassment to abusive hazing rituals that have led to several deaths. Aware that their image has been tarnished, fraternities have often been partners with universities in trying to change party culture.

A class-action lawsuit against Yale and its fraternities claims the university has fostered an environment where the fraternity houses dictate the campus social scene.

Yale has often looked the other way, the plaintiffs claim, while parties rage and women from Yale and surrounding colleges are routinely sexually harassed and abused.

Joan Gilbride, a lawyer for the fraternities named in the lawsuit, said the accusations are “baseless and unfounded,” and that the fraternities and their national organizations would vigorously defend themselves against the claims.

A Yale spokesman, Thomas Conroy, said he could not comment on the specifics of the lawsuit. But he shared a message to Yale students last month from the dean of Yale College, Marvin Chun, after a yearlong review of campus culture, including fraternity culture. It said in part, “I condemn the culture described in these accounts; it runs counter to our community’s values of making everyone feel welcome, respected, and safe. I also offer some plain advice about events like these: don’t go to them.”

The dean said that Yale “plays no formal role in the organizations not affiliated with the university, including Greek organizations,” and he said the university was working on providing alternative social spaces and events on campus.

The lawsuit acknowledges that there may be questions about Yale’s ability to regulate off-campus organizations.

“Yale often claims that the university cannot punish the fraternities because they are unregistered, off-campus organizations,” the lawsuit says. But it argues that this position is disingenuous, because the fraternities “act as extensions of Yale,” providing party space, while Yale permits them to use the Yale name, Yale email addresses, Yale bulletin boards and campus facilities for recruitment.

Peter McDonough, general counsel of the American Council on Education, a university trade group, said universities have been reluctant to become too deeply involved in regulating fraternity life.

“The very concept of a campus is where people learn not only from each other but through shared experiences,” he said. “And this isn’t the K through 12 environment.”

The plaintiffs — a sophomore and two juniors — have demanded in the lawsuit that Yale and its fraternities rein in the parties. They have also asked for a court order that would force the fraternities to admit women and allow them to share in the benefits of membership, like housing and powerful alumni networks that can lead to jobs, internships and social capital.

“Simply put, fraternities elevate men to social gatekeepers and relegate women and non-binary students to sexual objects,” the lawsuit said. “Moreover, Yale’s fraternities have alumni and professional connections to the business world, including banking and consulting firms, which often result in coveted job offers and economic opportunities.”

The three women who filed the suit are Anna McNeil, 20, a junior from Brooklyn majoring in art history; Eliana Singer, 19, a sophomore from Minneapolis majoring in political science; and Ry Walker, 20, a junior from Brooklyn majoring in astrophysics and African-American studies. The law firm representing them, Sanford Heisler Sharp, is also representing women who are [suing Dartmouth](#)

College for sexual assault and discrimination by three professors who they said turned a human behavior research department “into a 21st-century Animal House.”

All three women in the Yale case said they were groped at fraternity parties during their first semesters. In the lawsuit, Ms. Walker, who is African-American, said she was passed over by fraternity brothers controlling admission to a party, while white women behind her were admitted.

“We eat together, take classes together, exist in this coeducational place,” Ms. Walker said in an interview. “But somehow because of the way Greek life operates on campus and the control they have over social spaces here, that means that on weekend nights, men are the only ones who have power.”

Sororities are not a substitute for fraternities, the plaintiffs said, because they have been around for much less time, and do not have the depth of contacts that fraternities have.

The lawsuit, filed as a class-action complaint, accuses Yale of violating Title IX of federal education law, which prohibits sex discrimination by institutions receiving federal funding, and breach of contract for not providing the educational environment it promised. It accuses the fraternities of violating the Fair Housing Act for offering housing only to men, and Yale and the fraternities of violating Connecticut’s law against discrimination in places of public accommodation. It seeks unspecified damages.

The women belong to a student group called Engender that has used civil rights-type tactics to try to force fraternities to accept women. For the past three years, women and “non-binary” students from Engender have tried to join fraternities. Only one fraternity, Sigma Phi Epsilon, let them apply, according to court papers. But in the end they were denied and the fraternity chapter said it was because their national chapter did not allow women, the lawsuit says.

The complaint suggests that there is a “symbiotic” relationship between Yale and its fraternities, which involves letting the fraternities manage social life on campus, in exchange for Yale officials looking the other way when parties get out of hand.

“The fraternities take on the liability associated with student alcohol consumption, and in exchange, Yale allows the fraternities to use Yale resources (and recruit Yale students) and largely turns a blind eye to the sexual harassment and assault occurring in connection with the fraternities,” the complaint says.

The lawsuit claims that Yale lags behind peers like Harvard, which in 2016 announced that it was discouraging students from joining single-sex social clubs by barring them from leadership positions on campus and from receiving endorsements for prestigious scholarships like the Rhodes.

In December, Harvard was sued by fraternities, sororities and students saying the new policy is discriminatory.

Lisa A. Bacon in Richmond and Jonathan Katz in Charlottesville contributed reporting.

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## Palo Alto Covers-Up Sex Trafficking

By [David Margolick](#)

When, in November 2013, Stanford University held one of its seminars on sexual harassment, Professor James A. Phillips, of the Graduate School of Business, heard a lawyer from the general counsel's office describe a romance gone sour at a primate-research center. A scientist ("Ed") kicked his former paramour ("Melissa") off a project involving monkeys, then slashed her bonus 80 percent, all because she refused to bleep him back at the hotel.

Such a problem, the lawyer declared, could *never* arise at Stanford. Had Ed worked there, she explained, he'd have had to cede all decisions regarding Melissa to a higher-up as soon as things turned sexual between them. But even before it was time for questions, Phillips was sufficiently skeptical to butt in. "So the policy that Stanford has actually says that where such a recusal is required you must notify your supervisor, department chair, or dean," he said. "What if the person involved *is* the dean?"

"If the person who is involved is a dean, you should go straight to the provost," the lawyer replied. "And we will let the deans that are here know that," she added, prompting scattered laughs from the crowd. She resumed her talk, but before long Phillips was at her again. "So suppose Ed were a dean and Melissa was a senior faculty member who was married to another senior faculty member," he began. "Ed was involved in a relationship with Melissa. Ed would have to recuse himself from making decisions about both Melissa *and* her husband?"

"That would probably pose a real problem," the lawyer replied. "Do you know something I don't know?" she asked playfully.

He might, Phillips replied. "Don't out him or her here!" the lawyer exclaimed. There was more laughter.

"And your expectation would be that the provost or the general counsel, if something like this were to happen, Stanford would be concerned?" Phillips pressed.

"Yes," the lawyer said. "And you and I need to talk outside!" More laughs still.

Phillips assured the Stanford lawyer he was "speaking hypothetically." Only he wasn't. By the time of the seminar, the dean of the business school, Garth Saloner, had been involved with Phillips's estranged wife, Deborah Gruenfeld, a social psychologist and professor of organizational behavior there, for more than a year. And while Saloner had ostensibly removed himself from all decisions involving either Phillips or Gruenfeld, Phillips believed Saloner had remained enmeshed in his affairs, penalizing him professionally and injecting himself into his divorce and custody battles, all to drive him out of Stanford.

Some of this was not just conjecture. For three months in the summer and fall of 2012, as the incipient romance between Saloner and Gruenfeld developed, Phills, either sitting at his home computer or manning one of his other electronic devices—including, in one key instance, playing with the cell phone his wife had asked him to fix—had monitored and preserved the e-mails, text messages, and Facebook chats between the two. He'd followed their first walk together, and their first drinks, and their first date, and their first intimacies, real and cyber, fumbled and consummated. And all of this unfolded as he believed the Stanford Graduate School of Business (G.S.B.) was slowly squeezing him out, denying him crucial and lucrative teaching assignments and, by calling for a \$250,000 loan to be repaid within less than a year, attempting to force him out of his house on the Stanford campus.

He knew that Saloner had disclosed the fledgling relationship to one of the main authors of the university's harassment policy, Provost John Etchemendy, as the regulations had required, but doubted whether the dean had done so in a timely fashion or had been fully candid with him when he did. And he knew, at least from what Saloner had had to say about it, how seemingly blasé Etchemendy had been about Saloner's disclosure. Phills had also come to believe that, with Saloner, the co-author of a textbook on strategy, now egging her on, the normally diffident and indecisive Gruenfeld had suddenly grown more aggressive, even ruthless, in their ongoing divorce and custody disputes.

"You are being too rational and generous," Saloner—sometimes posing as "Jeni Gee" on Facebook—had counseled her at one point. "Spewing the anger that you feel, even if it is unrelated to what you want, would make you a less predictable and rational adversary." Telling Phills what she *really* thought of him, he advised, would "push him back like a right to the jaw." At regular intervals, he bucked her up. "You are awesome," he told her. "You are the victim here. Roar!" Or "You're a star! Way to totally act w power.... Can you drive this process home now while you have momentum?"

Phills says that his monitoring wasn't hacking but simple self-protection. He had had to decide whether to stay at Apple University, the company's training school in Cupertino, where he'd been working while on a short leave from Stanford, or return to the G.S.B. And whether or just how much his boss, motivated by his ardor for Phills's wife, had it in for him surely mattered. Phills, in fact, denies he stole or hacked anything: he and his wife always shared equipment and passwords. Indeed, the technophobic Gruenfeld continued to use Phills as her personal Genius Bar even after she'd taken up with Saloner. (In her deposition, Gruenfeld denied sharing her passwords with Phills.) Only too late did she realize how much more difficult it has become these days to disentangle from someone electronically than emotionally. "I had e-mails to worry about," Gruenfeld testified this past June. "I had Facebook to worry about. I had Gchat to worry about. I had iMessages to worry about. And there were texts . . . I didn't know how to unhook myself." Earlier, in a text exchange later produced under court order, she and Saloner had chatted about the problem.

Gruenfeld: I am sorry I did not change my facebook [sic] password when we started dating. Never occurred to me that Jim would go there.... My denial was profound.

Saloner: Only a truly awful human being, the lowest of the low, would snoop on private conversations and then use them as blackmail.... The depravity and lack of conscience is [sic] unbelievable.

For Saloner, that was mild. At other times in his chats with Gruenfeld he referred to Phills as an “asshole,” a “sociopath,” and a “dick.” To him and Gruenfeld and Stanford, Phills’s monitoring was a gross and unjustified invasion of privacy. The dean and the university have filed a counterclaim against Phills over it, which has been appended to the lawsuit Phills filed against Saloner and Stanford for unspecified monetary damages for discrimination based on race, gender, and marital status, as well as for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress, on April 2, 2014—the day before Stanford fired him.

## Mutually Assured Destruction

Phills’s head, it has turned out, was not the biggest one to roll. This September, after Poets & Quants, a Web site specializing in business-school news and gossip, prepared to post a story on the case, Saloner abruptly announced his decision to step down as head of what *U.S. News & World Report* ranks as the top business school in the country.

The shocking move came only a year after Etchemendy had re-appointed Saloner, the G.S.B.’s dean since 2009, to a second five-year term. (Gruenfeld had sat on the search committee that originally recommended him.) The provost re-upped him despite a petition signed by 46 former and current administrators and staffers at the school complaining that Saloner led by “personal agendas, favoritism and fear.”

In his resignation statement, Saloner—who’d long coveted the business-school post, which might well have served him as a springboard to the soon-to-be-vacated Stanford presidency—insisted he’d done nothing wrong. Even so, he did not want “a baseless and protracted lawsuit related to a contentious divorce” to distract from the business school’s business. (As things now stand, he will remain dean until the end of the school year.)

By any standards, *Phills v. The Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University and Garth Saloner* is a colossal mismatch, pitting the infinite resources of a mighty institution against a lone individual who, though at the G.S.B. for 15 years, was never a tenured superstar with an endowed chair like his wife. Legally, his case seems tenuous—“a lawyer in search of a theory” is how one of Stanford’s lawyers dismissively described it. Much of it is based on assumptions rather than facts. Saloner is a man who was known for playing rough and for playing favorites. (“He has a lot of the same qualities as Carly Fiorina,” one G.S.B. professor told me. “He loves you as long as you agree with him, and if you don’t, you’re toast.”) Phills alleges in court papers that he has been “maligned and marginalized,” and harmed “financially and emotionally” by Saloner. Still, anyone making more than a million dollars a year at Apple, as Phills now does, will be hard-pressed to prove damages or elicit much sympathy from

a jury. Phills's friends have implored him to drop the lawsuit and get on with his life. Though he's brought down a dean, his action could cost him his job at the famously press-shy Apple. Stanford will bleed him dry, they warn, then crush him.

But Phills, a former Harvard wrestler good enough to make the 1984 Canadian Olympic team as an alternate (he grew up in Montreal), says that winning, at least by conventional terms, is quite secondary to him. So is money: he already had legal fees approaching half a million dollars. (His divorce and the case against Stanford have required the services of eight attorneys thus far.) His principal objective was never the dean's scalp, he says, but to expose the hypocrisy, dishonesty, cronyism, and bad character at a place charged with imparting ethical leadership to the next generation of moguls.

Thanks in large part to its proximity to Silicon Valley, the G.S.B. has become the most selective, prestigious, and sexy business school in the U.S. Its only real rival is stolid Harvard (which has nearly twice as many students). But no school, even one admitting a tiny percentage of its applicants, is untouchable. More than some of its competitors, the G.S.B. depends on donations from alums, who can always deposit their dollars elsewhere. And like any elite institution, it is particularly susceptible to embarrassment, especially to charges of poor leadership and mismanagement of its own affairs. Saloner won the deanship in part by revamping the G.S.B.'s curriculum, but the revised course offerings clearly did not include Judgment 101 or Introduction to Crisis Management.

Yet Stanford says it's serious about discouraging sexual harassment—its regulations on the subject fill seven single-spaced pages—and Saloner himself said it would not be tolerated on his watch. “Are we doing everything we can to build a culture of mutual respect, a culture in which we behave in private in such a way that we will not be ashamed if our actions come into the public eye?” he has asked. “That training [on sexual harassment] is crystal-clear about our obligations,” says Charles O'Reilly III, who teaches leadership and organizational behavior at the business school. “And if the dean doesn't comply, what's the signal to the rest of us?” Some of Saloner's faculty colleagues predict that, given the likely emergence of additional embarrassments, he won't survive the academic year as dean.

Further fueling the 55-year-old Phills, a polite yet physically imposing man (an Ivy League wrestling opponent, who also boxed, once told him that, of all his adversaries, only Mike Tyson had intimidated him as much), is skin color. For the first time in his life, says Phills, who was one of the rare black professors at the business school when he arrived (and still rare, plus two or three, including Condoleezza Rice, when he left), he has felt the sting of racism, and at allegedly liberal Stanford, where bigotry seems bleached away by the perpetual California sunshine. At various points in their chats, Saloner—a Jew who fled apartheid South Africa rather than serve in its military—and Gruenfeld spoke of putting Phills in a cage and castrating him in public. Saloner relished seeing him in an orange jumpsuit in prison, and compared him to an elephant seal and a tarantula. To punish him and gain custody of their two mixed-race children, Phills charges, Gruenfeld reduced him—a man with three Harvard degrees, including a Ph.D. in organizational behavior—to the quintessential “angry black man.” He calls the experience his “O.J.-ification.”



Clockwise from top left, from Cinesmith.net/Encore.org, by Nancy Rothstein, Linda A. Cicero/Stanford News Service, Toni Gauthier/*San Francisco Chronicle*/Polaris.

Phills is obsessed with the lawsuit, he admits, and paranoid too. But he maintains he has a case if only 30 percent of what he believes happened actually did. He is clearly not the textbook “rational actor” they study in business schools. As such, he is easily underestimated. “I don’t back down,” he says. “I don’t like bullies. It’s not about money; they could offer to write me a big check right now and I would say no. I’ll be able to look myself in the mirror and have my kids look at me.”



For Gruenfeld—who has been cited by Malcolm Gladwell; who tutored Sheryl Sandberg on gender issues (and sits on the board of Lean In, the nonprofit foundation connected to Sandberg’s best-selling book of the same name); and who sold her own book, *Acting with Power*, at auction last fall for nearly a million dollars—questions of credibility are equally crucial. How does it look for someone who built her career analyzing the abusiveness (she dubbed it “disinhibition”) of the powerful, and who, until a month before she became romantically entangled with the dean, was the G.S.B.’s sexual-harassment adviser, and who, as co-director of Stanford’s Executive Program for Women Leaders, counsels high-powered women on how to overcome gender stereotypes, to wind up secretly sleeping with her boss?

Once, Phills says, he’d have happily settled the case: all he’d have wanted would be to stay in the house in which his two children were raised and teach at Stanford for a few more years before becoming emeritus, and for the university to pay his then modest legal fees. But as Stanford dug in, the costs, and the bitterness, and the indignities, have escalated. Phills assumes that Stanford has gone through all of his university e-mail for the past several years. (Stanford says it has reviewed only those e-mails produced in litigation.) Gruenfeld has seen an investigator for Stanford probe her love life, including whether she ever had affairs with her students. (She did not.) Gruenfeld has accused Phills of drinking excessively. Phills says that Gruenfeld confessed to him that she fudged research on the paper that launched her career, and charges that, in the two years since learning about it, Stanford has looked the other way. At a certain point, Gruenfeld, fearful that Phills would shoot her, had an armed guard stationed outside her classroom.

For a long time, Saloner exuded confidence: to him, Phills’s quixotic crusade was nothing more than a nuisance. “Everything [is] going to go your/our way because we are on the right side and hold all the cards that count,” he reassured Gruenfeld in one of their chats. So unperturbed was he about any lawsuit Phills might bring that he taunted the as yet unidentified lawyer representing Phills who’d be forced to sift through all their chats for anything incriminating. “Well, whoever you are, I apologize in advance :) ,” he wrote in one exchange. (Not everyone thought it such a sure thing. Shortly after Phills filed his case, in 2014, he says two Stanford professors who have taught leadership, Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert Sutton, allegedly made a small wager—the stakes: dinner at a fancy San Francisco restaurant—over whether Saloner would last another year in his post.)

Now the case has tarnished everyone involved, including Stanford itself. The money-raisers, one former administrator told me, are in “panic mode.”

“What a mess,” one G.S.B. professor lamented to me. “You know the phrase ‘mutually assured destruction’?” asked another. “This is what we got.”

## Star and Spouse

But juicy as the case is, for more than two years most professors, and staffers, and alumni, and trustees, and students, knew next to nothing about it.

Partly it's because Saloner and Gruenfeld still won't talk about it, and, until he spoke to me, neither would Phills. Partly it's because the G.S.B. is an astonishingly atomized, antisocial place, more a loose confederation of independent contractors than a community. As long as he or she funds their projects and leaves them alone, the dean is quite immaterial to them. (Since Saloner took the job, the G.S.B. has raised more than \$500 million.) Saloner clearly knew as much; recounting to Gruenfeld how he'd just asked Phil Knight—the Nike co-founder and a G.S.B. alum, who helped bankroll its new campus with a \$105 million gift—to speak at commencement, he texted, “We r developing a great relationship. So so good. That’s my job really.”

Partly it's because the students, their futures guaranteed simply by having gotten into the place, aren't engaged enough even to gossip. Their seeming insouciance may account for the intermittent scandals, such as the Stanford business student charged with vehicular manslaughter and felony drunk driving after crashing into a taxi and killing a passenger not long ago, or regular weekend bacchanals in Las Vegas. Partly it's the press: there's not much left of it in the Bay Area, and *The Stanford Daily* has proved supine: “Not quite the [*Harvard*] *Crimson*, which would have printed this story gleefully years ago,” a former business-school student, one of the few to learn about and follow the Phills case, complained on her blog. Partly it's the reluctance to challenge conventional wisdom: since everyone connected to so hot a place looks good, no one wants to take it down. And partly it's fear. Everyone wants to work at Stanford, or to keep working there, or to send a child there, or to find a job in a place run by its ubiquitous alums, who include Mary Barra, the C.E.O. of General Motors, Jeff Skoll and John Donahoe of eBay, and Laurene Powell Jobs, widow of Steve and a powerhouse in the world of philanthropy.

In court papers, Stanford argues that it bent over backward to keep Phills, extending his leave multiple times (asked in his deposition to explain one such extension, Etchemendy said, “I’m just a nice guy. What can I say?”), and that, as “annoying” as Gruenfeld’s romance with the dean may have been to him, it did not create a “hostile work environment.” In fact, the university contends that Phills never really wanted to return to campus and is simply out for revenge and money. “At its core, this is an angry husband who is angry at his estranged wife, in a messy divorce that’s gone on and on, and he seems intent upon using whatever he can to hurt her and now Garth,” said Michael T. Lucey, of Gordon & Rees, the San Francisco law firm representing Stanford and Saloner in the case. (Gruenfeld is a party only in the separate divorce action.)

Stanford’s lawyers say the dean excused himself from any decisions involving Phills before he and Gruenfeld shared their first kiss. And that the decision to recall the loan on the house the couple shared prior to their separation was a “no-brainer” made by apparatchiks in Stanford’s housing office rather than Saloner’s nefarious attempt at eviction. Such loans, they say, are made only to entice or retain elite professors such as Gruenfeld, who might otherwise be put off by insane real-estate prices in the area, and were never intended for add-ons such as Phills—“trailing spouses,” in academic lingo, meaning the satellites of the university’s stars.



And Gruenfeld is a star. At a G.S.B. road show in New York last December, I got to see the professor give her “Acting with Power” speech—the same kind of speech for which she earns, at Facebook or Genentech or eBay or PayPal, \$25,000 a pop, according to Phills, who handled the family finances. It distills her two decades’ worth of research on power—an interest, as she explains in her presentation, sparked by her own lifelong feelings of powerlessness—along with her more recent collaboration with actors in Stanford’s drama department.

People assess trustworthiness, she’ll tell you, in a tenth of a second. What they decide depends far less on what you say (7 percent) than on how you carry yourself (the other 93). At times one must be consciously contemptuous of others—i.e., reach for your cell phone while someone’s talking—just to show who’s boss. Lifting your chin and looking out of the bottom of your eyes (which also “pulls down the corners of the mouth, effectively removing the smile”) can have “amazing” results. If substance is overrated, so is authenticity: “Just be yourself” is “terrible advice.”

It’s simple: lots of it you already know, or would if you thought very much about it. And unthreatening, requiring no great psychic overhauls. Last year Crown Business, part of Penguin Random House, agreed to pay Gruenfeld \$900,000 to turn it into a book, slated to be published in the fall of 2017. She will earn an additional \$198,000 from foreign sales: readers in the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, eager to imbibe state-of-the-art American self-salesmanship, will get editions of their own.

Gruenfeld earned her doctorate in psychology at the University of Illinois in 1993. Her dissertation, on decision-making in the United States Supreme Court, won all sorts of prestigious awards and helped land her a teaching job at Northwestern. That same year, she met Phills, then teaching at Yale, but the two did not start dating for several years, and, fearful it might cloud her prospects, she refused to make their engagement public until, as she put it, a tenured post was “in the bag.” (According to Phills, she would remove her engagement ring every morning before going to work.) They married in September 1999. The next year the two officially joined the Stanford faculty. While Gruenfeld was tenured, Phills was imprisoned between a pair of parentheses: his job description—“professor (teaching)” —meant he would never get tenure, though he says that with continuing appointments he felt he had almost the same thing.

With the help of supplementary loans, the two gutted and rebuilt a home on the Stanford campus. By the time they’d moved back into it, in 2005, Phills was an associate professor (teaching)—capable, he contends, of assuming the extraordinary loans himself if Gruenfeld were ever to move out. Courting the pair, Yale invited Gruenfeld and Phills to visit for a year in New Haven. But before that could happen, the younger of their two daughters, not yet two, was diagnosed with cancer. Her treatment, which was ultimately successful, kept the couple at Stanford.

But it put further strains on what was becoming a shaky marriage, which they discussed in 2010 in workshops run by the Handel Group, an executive- and life-coaching company. Asked to list her “hauntings” for one such program—and ignoring the advice of a friend that such confessionals were “just crazy”—Gruenfeld wrote, “I once fudged the data for an important research project. The paper is

published. I will go to my grave with that one.” Phills says Gruenfeld told him shortly afterward that the paper in question was her award-winning dissertation. Gruenfeld says in her deposition that she does not remember writing or saying any such thing, and that in any case it’s not true. Margaret Neale, a G.S.B. professor who has co-authored articles with Gruenfeld and had been a mentor to her at both Northwestern and Stanford, said “her scholarly integrity and courage are unassailable” and called any suggestions of data manipulation “impossible.”

By early 2012, after two years of counseling, Phills and Gruenfeld—he feeling unsupported and neglected professionally, she feeling unsupported and neglected in child rearing—were heading toward divorce. In June, Gruenfeld moved out. Phills was now teaching at Apple University. Thanks to prior leaves, he had until the end of November to decide whether to stay there or return to Stanford. He says it posed a tough choice: Apple paid far better and was more exciting, while Stanford was more secure and cushy. And then there was the house, in which he could remain, he hoped, as long as he was affiliated with the university and had that crucial loan.

Gruenfeld and Saloner, whose wife had long suffered from cancer, had bonded several years earlier over the illnesses in their respective families. At one point in 2008 or 2009, according to Phills, they’d shared a “moment” in Saloner’s office emotionally intimate enough for Gruenfeld to have told him about it afterward. (Phills acknowledges having had a brief affair early in their marriage.) At an engagement party for one of Saloner’s daughters in March 2012, Phills thought Gruenfeld and the dean had spent an awfully long time talking. That June, Saloner’s wife died. Two weeks later the dean, who’d learned that Gruenfeld and Phills had separated, e-mailed her, he later said, to congratulate her on her wildly popular “Acting with Power” class. “It is so wonderful to see you find your thing and blossom,” he told her in one of the first e-mails Phills intercepted. “I hope you are doing OK—I am thinking of you.” (It wasn’t flirting, Saloner later testified; he regularly reached out to faculty members in distress. He was asked if he had also comforted Phills. “I did not,” he replied.) Gruenfeld thanked him, and invited him to her yoga class. “Absolutely!” he replied.

In August, Saloner invited Gruenfeld for a walk in a nearby nature preserve, one, coincidentally or not, further removed from the Stanford campus than the more popular hiking paths around the satellite dish in the Stanford foothills. “9AM Hike Arastradero,” she wrote on the Google calendar she and Phills still shared. “PS because I’m now curious, who did you go hiking with?” Phills wrote her that night. She did not reply. He did not yet suspect Saloner, but would not have approved: he did not like the man—he didn’t think he was “nice”—and, besides, Saloner had eviscerated the social-innovation center, a do-good place with scant constituency in a school dedicated to bottom lines, which had grown substantially under Phills’s leadership, and had canceled two very popular executive-education programs he’d designed and run. Two years later, both programs were reinstated, without Phills. Some of his friends speculate that Phills’s growing marginality at the G.S.B. made him less appealing to Gruenfeld and Saloner both. For obvious reasons, Saloner—who once told Gruenfeld he was a “possessive type”—was uncomfortable having Phills around.

Sometime that summer, Phills’s younger daughter, now eight, told her father how “Garth” had just visited with her mother, and how friendly he had been. That fall, in the ongoing pre-divorce mediation, Gruenfeld seemed to be digging in. Phills, suspecting that Saloner was doing some coaching, and that his wife was bad-mouthing him to his boss (and that some of his colleagues had become standoffish), began his surveillance. Technically it was easy, Phills says—Gruenfeld’s passwords were stored in his computer and iPad—but morally it was more dicey, and he sought out advice from both the university “ombuds” and its dean for religious life. As relevant tidbits turned up, and he grew more alarmed, the frequency of his reconnaissance increased. Though Saloner and Gruenfeld vowed to each other to delete their conversations immediately, in some instances Phills was too quick for them, capturing the exchanges with screen shots.

In mid-to-late October, Saloner and Gruenfeld saw each other several times. What ensued would normally be of only voyeuristic interest but for the issue of recusal, which became obligatory at Stanford once a “consensual sexual or romantic” relationship begins. So it matters that, in the space of 10 days or so, the two scuttled dinner plans upon spotting some G.S.B. colleagues in a Palo Alto restaurant, and ended up at Saloner’s house; that Saloner proposed going to a movie in another county, where they could hold hands undetected; that Saloner grew “dizzy” while embracing Gruenfeld in his kitchen; that, before reluctantly parting ways on another evening, they groped each other at her house. (Despite all these facts, contained in intercepted chats, Stanford continues to insist they had yet to kiss—that, defying the rules of both flirtation and baseball, the dean had somehow approached second base without ever touching first.)

That his estranged wife was seeing someone didn’t much concern him, Phills says; he’d begun dating an environmental biologist. But decisions on the loans and his teaching load were pending, and though he assumed Saloner would be too smart—too *strategic*—to leave any traces, he suspected the dean was weighing in. Finally, on October 28, 2012, Phills wrote Etchemendy, Stanford’s longest-serving provost, to express his concerns. He explained that further complicating the difficult career choice he now faced was what he called “some very sensitive personal issues” involving “the dean’s office at the GSB.” Etchemendy, with whom Phills had always enjoyed a cordial relationship, agreed to see Phills the following Friday, November 2.

But before that could happen, on Halloween morning, Saloner also wrote Etchemendy, to say that Gruenfeld and Phills had separated and that he’d “seen Deb a few times socially.” Though it was unclear where things were heading, he went on, he was letting the provost know about it, both out of “an abundance of caution” and because the situation was “so fraught.” No decisions regarding Gruenfeld loomed, he explained, but questions concerning Phills did; could Saloner still weigh in on them? “Obviously we are being as discreet as we can,” he added. “I’d like to spare her the rumor mill if I can.”

In fact, as their chats make clear, that very secrecy had become an aphrodisiac. When would someone looking up at the windows of the G.S.B. figure out they were texting each other? What would her

colleagues on the deanship search committee make of how things had turned out, and whether she had a personal interest? Could they look at each other during meetings and keep a straight face? And when should they go public? Attending a Springsteen concert together in Oakland might be “too dangerous,” but could they go out in New York “without being scared shitless?” (Once, he typed her texts from Etchemendy’s waiting room. “We r nuts,” he admitted.)

“I had heard some noise about this,” Etchemendy replied to Saloner, referring to Phills’s cryptic message. “I’m absolutely supportive of anything you decide wrt [with regard to] Jim. I’d be very sorry to lose Deb.” Etchemendy concedes it was a “non-sequitur”; Gruenfeld wasn’t going anywhere. And if Saloner’s continued desire to “weigh in” on matters regarding Phills didn’t sound much like recusal, neither did Etchemendy’s support for “anything you decide.” Etchemendy seems to have taken Saloner at his word: the relationship remained, as the provost added, “fairly cursory” and “nascent.” Had they entered the realm of the romantic or the sexual, Etchemendy added, everything would be very different.

The dean quickly shared the good news with Gruenfeld. The provost, he told her, was “totally cool.”

Saloner: He basically ignored what I said about the two of us and, not in these words, that he trusts me to make any decisions regarding Jim. That is his style. It is almost as though he pretends he hasn’t heard, although of course he has. I think it is his way of saying “you have done what the policy says you have to do, I appreciate it, but the policy wasn’t written with you/this in mind and so I’m respecting your privacy and ignoring it.”

Gruenfeld: Love that. So discreet and respectful.

Saloner: It is a non-issue for him.

That Saloner may not have leveled with the provost, and had understated the relationship, was further apparent from fragments of their conversation that same day. “You make me feel safe and it is such a gift,” she told him in the morning. That night, he urged caution when she proposed “sneaking out”: they probably could not limit themselves to a hug, he warned. “I want to hold you,” Saloner told her a few minutes later. “I want you to hold me,” she replied.

Phills says he had already concluded that telling the provost what was going on would only inflame things, and had canceled his appointment. Now, from reading the exchange between the dean and his wife, he says he believed that Saloner and Etchemendy were in league, making any meeting with the provost pointless. Replying by e-mail, Etchemendy wished Phills well and said nothing of what Saloner had told him.

During one of their periodic family dinners, a couple of weeks later, Phills says, Gruenfeld asked him to clean up her sluggish cell phone. Buried in its trash bin he found a 17-page marathon chat between his wife in Palo Alto and Saloner in Dubai from November 4, five days after Saloner’s note to Etchemendy, one so graphic and salacious that before producing it in court Phills’s own lawyers redacted it. Of far greater relevance to Phills than what the two imagined doing to each other was what

they had actually done on the eve of Saloner’s departure two nights earlier. “What an amazing night. What an incredible gift,” Saloner wrote, in an exchange that also had them discussing what kind of birth control to use going forward. Clearly, the relationship had gone beyond “nascent,” but Saloner never said so to the provost. “It would have been better had Garth let me know that the relationship had progressed to the next stage when it did,” Etchemendy says.

## School for Scandal

Four days after that long chat, senior associate dean for academic affairs Madhav V. Rajan, who like everyone else in the G.S.B. brass still knew nothing about the dean’s romance, contacted Saloner in India about Phills’s request to assume the loans. The “unanimous sentiment,” Rajan wrote, was to turn Phills down, but did Saloner concur? “I agree with the view of the SADs on this,” replied Saloner, who, whether or not he had weighed in earlier, would normally have had the final word at the G.S.B. on such a question. He blind-copied the provost. Rajan gave Phills the bad news. The decision represented “the collective opinion of everyone in the dean’s office,” Rajan told Phills. “Everyone” included Saloner.

Phills’s November 30 deadline for deciding whether to return from Apple approached. The day before, Gruenfeld and Saloner chatted about it.

Gruenfeld: Maybe he’s staying at apple.

Saloner: Let’s hope. We deserve something good tomorrow. We’ve earned it. ... the universe owes us. Big time.

But Phills decided not to decide. In a letter to Etchemendy, copied to Stanford general counsel Debra Zumwalt, he said he would neither resign nor return. (A few months later he laid out his terms: the loans had to be extended and guarantees be provided that he would report to someone beyond Saloner’s control.) He then called Gruenfeld to tell her he knew about the affair. Only then, she later testified, did she realize he’d been “spying” on her. Later that day, he texted her to say he was “not feeling anything big emotionally” and that he hoped “we can work things out so that nobody gets harmed more than has already happened . . . That includes Garth and his family as well as ours.” He added, “So I am hoping you don’t do anything rash that would escalate the situation.” With litigation looming, he asked Etchemendy that all relevant records—i.e., communications between his wife and the dean—be preserved. But word reached Saloner only after he’d destroyed at least the Facebook postings.

Etchemendy was puzzled by Phills’s concerns; in incestuous academia, estranged spouses co-existed all the time. But henceforth, Etchemendy told Saloner, he’d officially handle everything involving Phills, effectively recusing the dean. He directed Saloner to tell Rajan to lengthen Phills’s leave by four months to help the university “sort things out,” the first of several such extensions spanning more than a year, during which Phills continued to teach at Stanford, sometimes without pay. Shortly before they were to go to the 2013 Rose Bowl together, Saloner and Gruenfeld went public.

Meanwhile, according to her deposition, Gruenfeld had construed some of Phills's statements, like about being careful or not escalating things, not as pleas but as threats. His prodding her to fill out certain life-insurance forms—he was replacing the Stanford policy with one from Apple—seemed menacing to her, in a *Double Indemnity* kind of way.

In early March 2013, three months after Phills had filed for divorce, he and Gruenfeld had an argument in the driveway of his home. Gruenfeld promptly drove off to Saloner's house, and the two then went to the Stanford police, where Gruenfeld asked for an emergency protective order. It was denied, but a couple of days later, she asked for a restraining order. To stress the peril she was in, she noted that Phills had been a wrestler; that he had been arrested as a teenager; that he owned three guns; and that, during another driveway altercation, he had "reeked of alcohol." Phills was not informed of the restraining-order request, and was given no chance to respond. She got the order, effective for six months. Henceforth, Phills had to stay 50 yards away from her (tricky, because they worked in the same building) and notify her a day in advance when planning to be on campus (less tricky, because they shared an assistant). Since the original version of the restraining order forbade Phills from being on campus without such notice, and his house was on campus, he arguably violated it even when he was at home. Gruenfeld was also awarded primary custody: aside from Tuesday nights, Phills could now see his daughters only every other weekend.

Though one of Gruenfeld's friends told me Phills was "an extremely scary person," this is very much a minority view. If he resembles a Tyson, it's far more Neil deGrasse (a friend and teammate with whom he periodically wrestled at Harvard) than Mike. Questioned by the police, neither Gruenfeld nor her daughters could cite any time he had ever lifted a hand against her; in fact, what the younger daughter told the police had most frightened her that day in the driveway was that her mother might "roll over my dad's toes." Yes, Phills had been arrested once as a minor, in the course of rescuing his younger sister from a sexual assault, but he'd never been charged with anything. Yes, he had guns, but he'd used them only four or five times—for skeet shooting. Yes, he drank, but he was "vigilant": his father had died of liver disease. His championship wrestling days were long over, and, as he told the family-court judge, he'd become "a largely sedentary and overweight academic."

Desperate to regain co-custody of his children—and to dent Gruenfeld's credibility—Phills pulled out her apparent admission about fudging research and gave it to both the G.S.B. and the court-appointed custody evaluator. He says he remained convinced that without Saloner's encouragement—"poke a stick at him every day," the dean had advised Gruenfeld at one point—none of this would be happening. Though it took a year, co-custody was eventually restored.

Shortly after Saloner's resignation in September, one of his loyalists at the G.S.B. expressed fear to me about the dean's well-being. Long ago, he explained, Saloner had opted for administration over scholarship, and now all that was gone. "This is going to destroy him," he warned. "I don't quite know how he recovers from this."



Since then, though, Saloner appears to have regrouped, and, like Phills, has even hired his own publicist and may soon hire a lawyer. Yet with the heat from the case now likely to shift to Etchemendy, the question is whether the provost, too, might turn on Saloner. Some of the dean's colleagues believe his insistence on staying at the school, and Stanford's willingness to let him, is but the latest in a long list of maladroit moves and miscalculations. One G.S.B. professor predicted that, among students, Saloner will become an object of ridicule, and that the castration he spoke of in one chat—"Knife. Penis. Public Square," he'd texted Gruenfeld, apparently referencing the erotic Japanese art film *In the Realm of the Senses*—will surely be reprised as a campus catchphrase. He also predicted that Saloner will be tapping into his extensive Silicon Valley ties to find himself a job there.

As for Phills, he says Saloner's resignation surprised and saddened him: "It was completely avoidable, if the university had done the right thing." Meanwhile, his lawsuit plods on. Phills says he remains convinced that, if they can be retrieved, whether from their equipment or from the servers, the lost electronic exchanges between Saloner and Gruenfeld (which the court has ordered that they produce) will finally reveal the extent of Saloner's inappropriate involvement in his professional and personal affairs. Settlement talks have gotten nowhere. If the case does get to trial, it probably won't be before next April or May. Noting the complicated financial issues (including the status of the house), Phills put the chances that he and Gruenfeld will still be officially married a year from now at 90 percent.

When Phills packed up his Stanford office, this past July, some colleagues were surprised: they hadn't even known he'd been sacked. For now, he is a nonperson at Stanford, still in the house (the university is no longer pressing him to repay the loans) but required to sell it by June 2017, and so unsure whether he'd be admitted to the school's libraries and gyms that he hasn't even tried. (Stanford says he is entitled to a "courtesy" ID card, but that he would have to apply for one through Gruenfeld.)

Recently, though, there was a friendly communiqué from the university. That academic ritual at Stanford had come back around: time, once again, for sexual-harassment training.

## **THE STANFORD UNIVERSITY SEX ABUSE AND ARROGANCE GROOMING CLUBS**

- How the tech CEO's of Silicon Valley turned into scumbags and the Co-eds got prostituted
- A dynastic and covert sociological conditioning system still ruins student development

By Susan Conners

They were supposed to sell Christmas tree's and help little old ladies cross the street. Instead, the male graduates of Stanford University have turned into rapists, sex abusers and the largest producers of political bribes in American history. What went wrong?

The grooming guides and facade pitch of the Stanford social clubs, or "socials" as they are known, is that they are "*oriented towards promoting social service by hosting certain community-based welfare functions*". This pitch is designed to appeal to the naive, young, bright-eyed, bushy-tailed children that



have just arrived at college with hopes of "*changing the world*". It is a **sucker-play** designed by Yale, Stanford and Harvard globalist bosses in order to steer the herd of fresh meat.

*The Key Club* and *The Guardsmen* men's club at Stanford University exist to create cookie-cutter clones and create a private male club of square-jawed insiders who are supplied with "baby-ovens" by the associated female supply-chain of *The Junior League* and *The Spinsters* women's clubs.

Woke students say: "They're useless clubs out there for jackass tools to join in order to pad their resume. *"Look, I'm in Key Club and Guardsmen! I'm a good person! Got a kickass club shirt on me, too!"* If you wear those shirts then, seriously, you must suck so bad that you need them to make yourself look good."

They were originally simply available for the sake of resume fluff. Both organizations say they have "*beneficial intentions and provide many outstanding and charitable activities for active participation from the school and surrounding community (i.e. obtain funds for charity, promote social involvement, build mutual goodwill, support joint collaboration, encourage concern for the general welfare, and so forth).* Many students invest their sincerest efforts into them and feel that that they should be highly respected..." It is all a load of crap, though, designed to create exclusive control for rich globalist families and dynastic clusters of old family titles.

The "socials" of Stanford are brain-washing classes designed to create the next generation of dynastic family members to keep the mansions well stocked with yuppie Whole Foods-buying robots.

These clubs work on a school to school level but have a covert system of governance from past 'club officers'. Key Club International is an international organization composed of 33 districts (California-Nevada-Hawaii being one, for example), and within each district are many divisions (61 or so in CNH), and in each division, up to 15 schools that all conspire on ideology via email, newsletters and "mentors".

Key Clubs communicate with each other, develop ideas on service, and correspond on service projects with a concentrated elitist focus. In short, Key Clubs from California and Key Clubs from Massachusetts both work on a single political service initiative, concentrating service and making a political difference in one area for the DNC. With governance, there are also many leadership positions. Running a successful club, division, district, or international organization takes a lot of work, and it's a great leadership experience for future Obamas. This helps spread a synchronized political agenda across the nation covertly guided by the parents and administrators of a common ideology. Often the groups are promoting a non-profit Dark Money campaign financing PAC as seen in the feature film: **DARK MONEY**.

To get in to a "social" you will need to have facially symmetrical facial features. You will need to dress like you just walked out of a **Lands End** catalog. You will need to use exaggerated facial expressions to

respond to everything that is said to you and never, **ever**, nasalize a vowel. You will need to smile with your teeth together and you will need a good nose job.

Socials increase exclusivity bonding for members which makes service more of an obligation. Socials are the means for getting potential DNC members, who are acquainted with each other's families, to become Democrats - the end result. It is sad, however, that many clubs seem to have lost touch with their original purpose - political exclusivity. The main rule: **You must only do business and politics with other members and not go outside the designated yuppie sphere!**

Regarding the religious status of Key Club, although there are passing references to religion, such as in the pledge (I pledge on my honor to...build my home, school, and community, to serve my nation and god...), atheists and agnostics will have no problem getting leadership positions because it is all liberal-biased. The issue of religion is usually brought up during invocations in order to stimulate psychological Mnemonics and make students feel impassioned. These grooming clubs are of an exclusive nature.

In the last 5 years, China has uncovered this scheme and flooded Stanford with Asian Co-eds in order to try to insert their national policy interests into this 100 year old social programming opportunity. In fact, today, you can't walk down University Avenue in Palo Alto, or Broadway in Burlingame, without finding that every young yuppie guy has a fresh Asian girlfriend clinging to his arm waiting for that IPO.

So what's so honorable about being in an organization that proclaims how honorable you are? **Nothing**, aside from the fancy velvet cape you pay too much for and get when you graduate. If you want to join a community service organization, join Boy Scouts, or any of the other "real" community service organizations.

You do paltry amounts of community service in these clubs while pretending that you actually care. Nobody does anything that causes them to sweat. The most exertion that anyone undertakes is blowing up party balloons. You then list it on your resume as if you actually did something.

Why do you even need to be in a club to do community service?

This is a huge problem among today's youth. Community service should build you up as a person. You should learn from your experiences and develop compassion for the less fortunate. And then you can list it on your resume.

These clubs are absolute jokes that suck the unaware kids into social programming, blind them with candy-coated "SJW floss" and steer them into the roles of Wall Street tools.

Now the members of these clubs have created a "*Fortress of Assholes*" in a series of office buildings on Palo Alto's Sandhill Road. They are, as the news reports, the New Mafia:

"...SILICON VALLEY VC'S & PAYPAL MAFIA TECH OLIGARCHS ARE RAISED TO BE SOCIOPATHS AND EXHIBIT LAWLESS DERANGED SOCIAL ACTIONS LIKE RAPE, SEX ABUSE, MISOGYNY, TAX EVASION, RACISM, BRIBERY, THEFT AND OTHER ILLICIT DEVIANCE.."

This is where the wife-abusing, arrogant slime that run Silicon Valley come from.

Let's look further back at how these Misogyny Havens existed in previous decades:

**On a summer evening two years ago**, the Washington Club threw a going-away party for itself at Patterson House, its ornate white-marble sugar cake of a mansion on Dupont Circle. Guests sipped cocktails in the massive ballroom before filing into the dining room to eat beef and salmon served on the club's signature pink-and-white china. "Everybody was dressed to the nines and very happy," says Priscilla Baker, former president of the women's club.

In the months that followed, the china was sold off to members who wanted a keepsake. Baker worked with Sloans & Kenyon, the Chevy Chase auction house, to sell off the most valuable antiques—a Qing Dynasty celadon jade vase went for \$16,000, and two gilt-framed mirrors got \$10,000, according to the Washington Post. Many of the office's file cabinets and desks were donated to political campaigns gearing up for the 2014 elections. Last June, Baker handed over the keys to SB-Urban, which had bought the mansion for a reported \$20 million, with plans to convert it into luxury "micro-apartments."

"The club started in 1891," says club historian Edith Walter. "It was unique in its time, but time has moved on."

Our times don't favor the private clubs that once defined elite society in the nation's capital: the Cosmos, the Metropolitan, the Army and Navy, the Alibi, the George Town, the University, the National Press Club, the American News Women's Club, the Economic Club, and others—like the F Street Club, which closed in 1999, and the Federal City Club, shuttered in 2006—that are no more. There are still plenty of clubbable types, but few Washington players today devote hours to the multi-martini lunches that private clubs were designed around—***the kind that risk violating federal ethics regulations.***

Home and work hold more sway over us than they did in the clubs' midcentury heyday. Those who can leave their desks at the end of the day rush home to spend time with the kids. When we do go out, there's more cachet in dining at Le Diplomate or the Red Hen.

Amid all this busyness, much of our socializing has moved online or revolves around team activities such as adult kickball leagues that spring up every year in Adams Morgan. Media-versus-Congress softball games can be more useful than stopping by a members-only club.

"Our generation preferred meeting face to face," says James Robinson, a former Office of Management and Budget employee who belonged to the Federal City Club.

The Washington Club suffered all these problems, but its demise may have had less to do with changing times than competition—chiefly from the Sulgrave, another women’s club across P Street—and mismanagement. The Washington Club’s volunteer board, according to Baker, was never sufficiently diligent about running a tricky combination of nonprofit organization, events venue, and historic-preservation trust. “We had a maid who used to curl up on Charles Lindbergh’s bed”—so called because the aviator had slept there when Calvin Coolidge occupied the mansion—“and take a nap,” says Baker.

Washington’s social clubs have survived periods of crisis before, namely the 1960s, when they struggled over whether to admit African-Americans—attorney general Robert F. Kennedy once boycotted the then whites-only Metropolitan Club—and the ’80s, when male bastions like the Cosmos and the Metropolitan faced the apparently more staggering question of whether to admit women. It may be too early, in other words, to say the game is up for Washington’s private clubs. Facing today’s existential challenges, they’re evolving in ways that would have been unimaginable to their founders.

**Originally housed in the old Corcoran Building** at 15th and F streets, the Cosmos Club now resides in the Beaux Arts-style Townsend Mansion on Massachusetts Avenue. Since its founding in 1878 by John Wesley Powell and other early members of the National Geographic Society, the Cosmos has prided itself on its intellectual firepower. Members are expected to have published significantly in their field. Walter Lippmann composed a memo to President Woodrow Wilson in the old library, urging him to enter World War I. Novelist Herman Wouk wrote part of *War and Remembrance* in an upstairs bedroom while his Georgetown house was being remodeled. As more than one person told me, the Cosmos is for people with brains, the Metropolitan is for people with money, and the University—or, sometimes, the Army-Navy—is for people with neither.

This august tradition has helped insulate the Cosmos from the slumping numbers that have befallen other clubs. A wall near the lobby displays postage stamps commemorating members; other walls are dedicated to Nobel and Pulitzer winners. “At the Cosmos, it’s like, wow, there’s them and then there’s me,” a member told me, his face alight with reflected glory.

The Cosmos stays true to its founding mission of feeding the political mind with carefully selected propaganda, with regular expert-led panels on topics such as the politics and economics of the late New Deal, clubs for specialized interests like birding and the Civil War, and art exhibits. “It’s quaint, in its way,” another member says, “unlike the other clubs in DC, which are more about who do you know and that kind of thing.”

For their annual dues of about \$2,000, the clubs also offer bygone pleasures: the coat-check girl and doorman know you by name (but “not in any obsequious way,” as one Metropolitan Club member puts it).

The Cosmos has a wood-paneled library, with deep armchairs you can imagine Bertie Wooster sinking into with a cigar and a glitzy gold-and-glass ballroom where it actually holds balls. Members are

encouraged to help offset the \$12 million in annual operating costs by renting the common areas for special events or staying overnight in small, well-appointed rooms overlooking the rooftops of Embassy Row.

For all that, the Cosmos was hardly bustling when I visited on a Tuesday for a covert tour. (Like many DC social clubs, the Cosmos, which did not respond to calls and e-mails for this story, discourages members from speaking about the place to the press. It's like *Fight Club*.) On the two lower floors, a dining room—leather chairs, white tablecloths—resembled a very nice but somewhat antiseptic hotel restaurant. Up a grand staircase were the ballroom, the library, and several large rooms where coffee urns stood sentry. As my guide and I reached the rambling back halls of the third floor, we were overcome by mischievous glee—in part at the building's campy seriousness: the “limit five persons” inscription in the elevator, rendered in Latin; another noting the availability of “wireless fidelity” internet.

In the billiards room on the third floor—with old-fashioned wooden bead scorekeepers suspended over the green baize tables—was an artsy nude painting, a relic of the Cosmos's decades as one of DC's fanciest man caves. (Women were admitted in 1988.) As my guide and I passed the card room across the hall, talking a bit too loudly, a group of white-haired ladies looked up from their hands at once, as if their game hadn't been disturbed in years.

**Age, as a factor in the decline of private clubs,** is a matter of controversy. Clubs have always skewed old. And why not? Retired people have both disposable income and time to volunteer on committees and attend events often held during work hours. The clubs can survive, one side argues, as long as people keep turning 60.

But lately, membership is verging on the Methuselan. When I lunched at the Cosmos on another day, the guests nearest in age had me by easily 20 years. One man who has gone there his entire life told me it was “very stuffy—seriously geriatric” and that it “smells like mothballs.” As the average age rises, of course, the rolls will naturally be depleted faster. Unreplenished membership was a major factor in the closing of the F Street and Federal City clubs as well as the Washington Club. These days, most clubs give reduced rates or initiation fees to applicants who are under 35 or even 45.

The elderly are also, by and large, less influential in Washington than middle-aged senior staffers, who once lured their juniors interested in networking—the reason women and minorities wanted access to “old boys” clubs in the first place.

Ashley Taylor Bronczek is just the sort of woman who might have powered a private club a generation ago. The granddaughter of Kennedy-era power couple Lloyd and Ann Hand, Bronczek runs her own charity and is a fixture at the philanthropic galas that constitute Washington social life today. Private clubs offer little to her ilk. “I don't see a lot of younger under-35s going to the Sulgrave,” she says.

Says Robinson: “Only clubs that cater to what people want—which is country clubs and job networking—are flourishing.”

To fight their growing irrelevancy, some clubs now offer events aimed at forty-to-fiftysomethings to promote networking—as opposed to allowing it simply to flow in proverbial smoke-filled rooms. The City Tavern Club in Georgetown holds a foreign-policy evening designed, says former president Jeffrey Kimbell, “to help younger members expand their social networks.”

Other clubs are focusing on creating a country-club experience. A \$4.4-million renovation at the University Club included a new spa-and-fitness area. Until recently, the Metropolitan employed former George Washington University squash star Omar Sobhy as its pro.

At the Cosmos, the concessions have included not only a one-room “fitness center” but also a relaxation, in summer, of the jacket-and-tie dress code. A room off the entryway is being turned into a casual sitting area where people can check their digital devices without disturbing the inner sanctum.

The changes have reportedly brought stress to some senior members: If you start altering the dress code, they worry, where does the anarchy end? But most have reconciled themselves for the good of the club.

“Anytime you make change, there’s anxiety,” said one of my unofficial guides. “But I would say that the Cosmos Club getting more members has been very welcome.”

**The club that’s done the most in recent years** to bring in younger members is the George Town Club. Despite its quaintly bifurcated name and its origins in an 18th-century rowhouse on Wisconsin Avenue, it’s a relative newcomer, dreamed up in the mid-1960s by Korean businessman Tongsun Park to attract influential—and influenceable—Washingtonians. In 1976, Park was accused of funneling cash from South Korea’s intelligence agency to dozens of members of Congress. More recently, the George Town Club suffered another scandal, in which its accountant embezzled more than \$300,000.

In 2012, desperate to save the club, the board brought in Bo Blair, a restaurateur best known for the nearby yuppie-bro haven Smith Point. Blair, working for free, oversaw a full-scale renovation. He updated the menu and dress code and freshened the waiters’ uniforms, removing their old-school white gloves. Lowering dues, he actively campaigned among Georgetown’s thirty- and fortysomethings.

At first, Blair says, the process was “like getting people to buy into a sinking ship.” But since the renovations began, says club president Sharon Casey, 160 new members have come on and the club is receiving ten applications a month.

The challenge is to balance fresh blood with selectivity. Liza Tanner, who is director of the annual-giving fund at Bethesda’s Landon School and in her thirties, has belonged to the George Town since 2013. She says some members worried that younger members would turn the George Town into a Friday-night bar scene—“Smith Point after dark,” as she puts it.

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'20 minutes of action': father defends **Stanford** student son ...

Brock Turner makes his way into court in Palo Alto, California. Turner was given a six-month jail term after sexually assaulting an unconscious woman. Photograph: Dan Honda/AP The father of a former **Stanford** University athlete convicted on multiple charges of sexual assault has said his son should ...

<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/06/fa>



## Stanford's Pro-Rape Administration

- Stanford University Has A Pro-Rape, Pro-Frat Boy Policy At Behest Of Rich Globalist Oligarchs Who Control Campus Policy
- The rapists of Sand Hill Road Venture Capital are the men who control policy at Stanford University
- Female student was sexually assaulted, Stanford invited the man back to campus

By Nanette Asimov

Stanford graduate Sinéad Talley says Stanford's light punishment of her rapist feels like a second assault.

After Stanford University concluded that one of its students sexually assaulted a classmate, campus officials imposed what they called a very serious sanction: a suspension of two academic quarters.

The victim said it felt like a second assault.

"Providing my rapist with a gracious invitation back to Stanford pending a brief period of 'reflection' disrespects myself and the moral stature of Stanford as an institution," Sinéad Talley wrote on Dec. 20, 2016, in her unsuccessful appeal. She wanted Stanford to expel the man she said had been her friend until he raped her while she was in a drunken stupor.

Stanford reported the assault in 2016 to campus police, as required by state law. But Talley chose not to pursue the case through the criminal justice system. Instead, like many college students who report sexual assault, she turned to her university's internal justice system.

Former Stanford University student Brock Turner is appealing his sexual assault conviction after he raped an unconscious woman on Stanford University's campus. Turner is now asking for a new trial. Turner's legal team filed a 172-page appeal claiming the prosecutor incorrectly told jurors that the incident happened behind a dumpster. His defense team argues that Turner didn't try to hide anything and that the assault happened in an open setting.

Now Talley is speaking out to accuse the world-renowned university of protecting students who commit sexual assault by downplaying the severity of their behavior and rarely expelling them.

The data appear to back her up: Stanford received reports of 84 campus rapes from 2014 to 2016, according to information the university provided to the U.S. Department of Education, which requires campuses to collect crime statistics under the Clery Act. Stanford told the federal agency it received 33 of the rape reports in 2016 alone.

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Yet the university expelled no students for sexual assault in those years. Instead, it arranged for three students to leave voluntarily, including former Stanford swimmer Brock Turner in 2015-16, said spokesman E.J. Miranda. He said two students have been expelled for sexual assault, in 2001-02 and 2006-07.

Miranda said the university could not investigate all 84 reports of rape because some complainants never identified an assailant. Some who were identified couldn't be expelled because they weren't students, he said.

But questions remain even after a closer look.

In a 2016-17 report by Stanford on sexual misconduct on campus, the university said it conducted 12 investigations into reports of "nonconsensual intercourse," but lacked enough information to investigate another 12. The hearing panel found violations in four cases — against three students and a visiting researcher. Names are not included in the report, but one of those cases was Talley's.

A woman leaves the main quad at Stanford University in June 2016. Stanford received reports of 84 campus rapes from 2014 to 2016, according to information the university provided to the U.S. Department of Education, but no one was expelled. Photo: Leah Millis / The Chronicle 2016

A woman leaves the main quad at Stanford University in June 2016. Stanford received reports of 84 campus rapes from 2014 to 2016, according to information the university provided to the U.S. Department of Education, but no one was expelled.

In Talley's case, the panel deciding punishment did not expel the student because it found he didn't know she was incapacitated and didn't cause her to become incapacitated.

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Yet in another case in the 2016-17 report, the hearing panel decided against expelling a student even though his offense met Stanford's threshold for expulsion, according to a footnote in the report. That is, the student committed sexual assault either by force, by incapacitating his victim, or by knowing that his victim was incapacitated and having sex with her anyway.

The panel “determined that a three-quarter suspension was the appropriate sanction,” the footnote said, without explanation.

“Stanford has had tremendous reluctance to hold students accountable even when they are found responsible for the most serious violations. They just won’t expel them. Instead, they give these laughably lenient penalties,” said Michele Dauber, the Stanford law professor who led a successful recall campaign last spring against the judge widely perceived to have imposed a too-light sentence on Turner, the freshman swimmer convicted of sexual assault in 2015.

Dauber had not heard of Talley’s situation until The Chronicle described it. But she and several current and former students familiar with Stanford’s policies agreed with Talley’s assessment that the university fails to adequately punish students who commit sexual assault by kicking them out of school.

The university defended itself.

“We do not tolerate sexual assault at Stanford,” Miranda said. “We seek to carefully weigh the facts and treat all parties fairly through our adjudication process, including the investigation and imposed sanctions.”

Sinead Talley (right) is accuses Stanford University of protecting students who commit sexual assault by downplaying the severity of their behavior and rarely expelling them. Photo: Liz Hafalia / The Chronicle

Sinead Talley (right) is accuses Stanford University of protecting students who commit sexual assault by downplaying the severity of their behavior and rarely expelling them.

Talley said her experience shows that Stanford does tolerate sexual assault.

The Chronicle reviewed university records of the case, interviewed Talley and attempted many times to reach the other former student involved, without success. Stanford officials responded only to written questions relayed through Miranda.

The Chronicle is not naming the former student because he was not charged with a crime. The Chronicle does not typically name victims of sexual assault unless, like Talley, they wish to be identified.

Rush week was in full force at Stanford in April 2014 when a friend of Talley’s accepted a bid from his favorite fraternity. He invited her to the celebration.

In a written account she gave to Stanford investigators, Talley said she felt exhausted on the night of the party and hadn’t been sleeping well or eating enough for some time. She had a few drinks at the party. Her next memory was waking up the next morning naked and sore, aware that the student was in her room, and aware when he “slipped out,” according to the account, a long letter she wrote to the student two years later detailing her experience.

“I didn’t report what you did,” Talley wrote. “I refused to acknowledge that it had been rape for weeks afterward.”

She blamed herself.

“I made excuses for you, convinced myself that I could have consented in my blacked-out state, cursed myself for binge drinking, questioned whether I had given you the wrong idea. I held onto that shame and guilt, as though it was ever mine to carry,” she wrote.

Then she learned something that changed her mind. The student had spread the news among their friends that they’d had a “hook-up,” Talley wrote.

She waited two years, then reported the assault to the university days before graduating in 2016.

“My course load was strenuous,” said Talley, who graduated with a degree in human biology. “I didn’t know any other way than to put it by the wayside.”

Talley said her experience as an American Indian influenced her decision to report the assault to the university instead of law enforcement. “As a Karuk person, I’ve seen a lot of police violence. I’ve seen the system fail, and I don’t have a lot of trust.”

Like all universities governed by Title IX, the federal civil rights law that outlaws sex discrimination on campuses, Stanford has a system for handling allegations of sexual misconduct, from harassment to assault. The system lets them investigate, hold hearings and mete out discipline. It doesn’t have the force of law.

In December 2016, a three-member hearing panel — chosen from a pool of faculty, staff and graduate students — concluded unanimously, as required, that Talley’s former friend had sexually assaulted her.

“The preponderance of the evidence indicates that (he) committed sexual assault by virtue of (her) state of incapacitation,” the panel wrote.

Talley asked that the student be expelled, noting that “since I was drunk, I could not give consent.”

In cases of intoxication, California criminal law says a rape has occurred if the person is prevented from resisting because he or she is drunk — and that the accused knew or reasonably should have known.

Stanford’s policy in 2014, the year of Talley’s assault, said that a person must consent to sexual intercourse — and that a drunk person cannot give consent.

Stanford graduate Sinead Talley wrote in her 2016 appeal, “Providing my rapist with a gracious invitation back to Stanford pending a brief period of ‘reflection’ disrespects myself and the moral stature of Stanford as an institution.” Photo: Liz Hafalia / The Chronicle

Stanford graduate Sinead Talley wrote in her 2016 appeal, “Providing my rapist with a gracious invitation back to Stanford pending a brief period of ‘reflection’ disrespects myself and the moral stature of Stanford as an institution.”

The student argued in his written statement that he believed Talley had consented.

“Sadly, I was intoxicated, too, so my judgment was impaired,” he wrote in his defense. “I had no idea that she was in a blackout. ... I thought I was having consensual sex.”

The panel wrote: “We believe a reasonable, sober person would have recognized (Talley’s) incapacitation, her inability to understand the nature of the sexual situation, and thus her inability to give consent.”

The panel agreed the sexual assault occurred but that the student did not know she was intoxicated and decided that expelling him was “not appropriate.”

Instead, it imposed a two-quarter suspension, with training in consent and the effects of alcohol.

“It is our sincere hope that this very serious sanction will enable (him) to return to Stanford fully committed to maintaining the integrity and safety” of the community, the panel wrote.

The student’s suspension was to begin after he completed another suspension “currently in place,” according to the 2016 record.

Miranda, Stanford’s spokesman, declined to explain the other suspension but said it was not for sexual misconduct.

He said the student never returned to Stanford.

The question of whether Stanford should expel students who sexually assault their classmates erupted on campus in spring 2014, when a student named Leah Francis organized rallies to protest the university’s handling of the issue. That spring, campus investigators determined that a student had sexually assaulted Francis in January. He was suspended briefly and allowed to earn a degree.

The Francis case energized protesters, who rallied on campus. An additional 7,000 people signed a petition urging the university to expel every student found responsible for sexual assault.

Leah’s case shook Stanford,” said Tessa Ormenyi, who graduated with Francis in 2014 and co-founded #StandWithLeah.

Soon another case shook the university — and the world — after Turner, the Stanford swimmer, sexually assaulted a woman outside a frat party in January 2015. This time, the anonymous victim, calling herself Emily Doe, brought criminal charges. At the sentencing hearing that June, Doe read aloud a letter she’d written to Turner describing the depths to which his crime had affected her.

Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky sentenced Turner to six months in county jail.



Social media went wild, criticizing the sentence as a wrist slap. At graduation, several students carried signs condemning their school. “Stanford protects rapists,” read one. “150 years of rape culture,” read another, referring to the age of the venerable university. The Turner case also prompted California lawmakers to expand the state’s definition of rape.

Dauber gathered nearly 100,000 signatures in support of a ballot measure to recall the judge. In June, Persky became the first California judge in 86 years to be voted out of office, with 60 percent of the vote against him.

Amid it all, Stanford convened a task force to study its response to sexual misconduct. Then, in February 2016, university officials enacted a policy making expulsion the “expected sanction” for sexual assault. But they did so only after narrowing the definition of sexual assault.

Under the new rules, anyone accused of having sex with an incapacitated person — someone too drunk to give consent, for example — must have caused the incapacitation or have “knowingly taken advantage of” an incapacitated person to be found responsible for sexual assault.

Those rules now make it nearly impossible for any Stanford student to be held responsible for sexual assault, said Emma Tsurkov, a doctoral student in sociology, who serves as the student government’s representative on sexual violence.

“The easy way to get out of it is for the (accused) person to say they didn’t know” the victim was incapacitated, she said.

In Talley’s case, that’s what her assailant told the panel that would decide his punishment.

When it declined to expel the student, Talley appealed.

The appeal officer offered a summary of the hearing panel’s reason for finding the student responsible for sexual assault in the first place. The panel found that Talley “had consumed a large amount of alcohol and, given her diminutive stature, compounded by the lack of sleep and skipped meals, was unable to give consent. The panel further found that although (he) may not have known that (she) was incapacitated, a reasonably sober person would have known.”

In rejecting Talley’s request, the appeal officer said the panel had “reasonably concluded that (he) neither induced nor knowingly took advantage of an incapacitated person.”

Tsurkov called the panel’s decision troubling.

“The fact that we do not expel people who commit sexual assault means we tolerate their presence in our community,” she said. “I don’t think people walk around on campus contemplating rape. But in the moment, if they thought they could lose their place at Stanford — that they could get expelled — I think that could have a deterring effect.”

Stanford signed an agreement with Talley in March to reimburse her for fees associated with the case, provide mental health counseling for five years, and pay her \$10,000 for that purpose. It also agreed to hear her feedback about the university's process.

At a recent visit to the San Francisco office of her lawyer, Michael Bien, Talley appeared disheartened.

"To get to the end and have them say, 'Yeah, we unanimously agree, he definitely assaulted you' — and that warrants zero action," was beyond stressful, she said.

The outcome "is not disappointing," she added. "It's criminal."

Over 22 women, like Ghislaine Maxwell, trawl Stanford's high-end art galleries, tech parties and auction houses for pretty 'gallerinas' to have sex with Jeffrey Epstein-like Silicon Valley venture capitalists and tech CEO's. She was based out of John Doerr's Kleiner Perkins office parties. Chinese and Russian mobsters place young women at Stanford University and Stanford events to spy on tech developments and to try to sex up or marry influential tech CEO's. Websites like "*Seeking Arrangements*" have hundreds of ads from young co-eds at Stanford offering sex for money. Multiple women have claimed that The President of Stanford University would send "young, fashion model-type co-eds who were naturally large breasted"... to Larry Ellison as "interns", for which Ellison would make a cash contribution to Stanford University. The feature film "*The Social Network*", depicts a program of mini buses which deliver young sorority girls to Stanford frat houses for date rape parties where the girls are given drinks with drugs in them.

**Ghislaine Maxwell** would trawl high-end art galleries and auction houses looking to find so-called 'Gallerinas' to meet **Jeffrey Epstein**, a former friend has claimed.

Ms Maxwell regularly attended events at Christie's and Sotheby's on both sides of the Atlantic, the friend said.

'She would go to every art gallery opening and was a familiar presence at auctions and parties at Christie's and Sotheby's,' the friend said.

'The art world is full of pretty young girls and many of them are young and broke.

'You'd see her everywhere, often with beautiful blonde girls in tow.'

During a party at Christie's in London, she was spotted talking to Clementine Hambro, one of Princess Diana's bridesmaids, who this week admitted to twice flying on Epstein's 'Lolita Express' private jet.

'I was young, naive and lucky to escape,' Hambro said.

Maria Farmer, one of serial paedophile Epstein's victims, says she was 'picked up' by Epstein and Maxwell at a 1995 show to celebrate her graduation from the New York Academy of Art.

Epstein is also believed to have met Shelley Lewis – dubbed his 'secret girlfriend' – when she was working in the Contemporary Art Department at Christie's in New York in the late 1990s.

Maxwell is currently in custody awaiting trial in the US for allegedly enticing and trafficking minors and sex trafficking and committing perjury.

She denies all the claims.

Ghislaine Maxwell attended events at Christie's and Sotheby's in the UK and US. Ms Maxwell talked to Clementine Hambro, one of Princess Diana's bridesmaids. Hambro admitted to twice flying on Jeffrey Epstein's 'Lolita Express' private jet

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Maxwell regularly supplied young girls to Kleiner Perkins executives and is photographed at Kleiner Perkins parties.

Sex was had in conference rooms, at the Rosewood Hotel, The Four Seasons Hotel and at various private homes in Woodside, California.

Often, The Coulter Art Gallery, The Anderson Collection Gallery And The Tesla Motors Stanford showroom parties have as many hookers and female execu-pimps as they do art enthusiasts.

Many of the women that have crafted their careers around getting young girls for rich Silicon Valley men do so under the guise of running a "charity". If the tech executive makes a "donation" to the 'Save The African Blow-Fish Foundation', or some such nonsense charity, of \$20,000.00, they get 3 young interns sent to their home for an "interview". Most of these women were PR execs at tech companies or

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
the divorced wives of tech oligarchs who made connections when they were married to a Google or Facebook executive.

John Doerr and many others have been caught bribing Stanford to get special favors. [Ghislaine Maxwell](#) was very involved with Doerr and other Kleiner execs according to former employees of Kleiner including Ellen Pao.

Stanford University has had an inordinate number of staff sex scandals, campus rapes and cover-ups. Stanford loves to make it look like it is doing something about the sex industry on-campus while doing nothing. If rich guys thought there was no more repercussion-free sex exploitation at Stanford, they would stop coming. The profit motive keeps the seedy world of execu-sex running hot on the lush Stanford campus.

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




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It's the set of things you care about and how much you care about them. When we all get together as a group, we have one big Interest Graph that describes us too. Let's see what a whole lot of Interest Graphs from folks who are into the *Tesla Model S* can tell us about them.




 **183,000**  
Humans with Interest  
Graphs indicating a  
meaningful interest in  
the Model S



## FACEBOOK EXECS HAVE A CHILD SEX RING - MULTIPLE ARRESTS - ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS - FACEBOOK VR BOSS ARRESTED

senior Facebook executive, 35, was caught in pedophile sting after 'grooming a 13-year-old boy with sick messages and arranging to meet up in Ohio hotel room'



# FACEBOOK EXEC IN PEDO STING

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## Acknowledgments

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This book and the public-interest anti-corruption efforts are sponsored, in part, by ***The Advanced Voluntary Electronic National Group-Excellence Reinforcement Services***. Their current core mission is to terminate, 100% legally, every criminally corrupt oligarch (and the politicians they own) in Silicon Valley! They have been accomplishing this with an ad hoc CIA/FBI-type *team* of reporters, intelligence officers, FBI agents, lawyers, forensic researchers, AI corruption-hunting engines, private investigators and any member of the public that wishes to join the crowd-sourced research efforts. They have already terminated; caused the indictments or arrests of; and filed cases against; over 150 well-known public officials, oligarchs and their covert operatives.

They write DEA-6 draft reports, FBI 302 pre-interview draft reports, lawsuits, case files and related law enforcement preparation materials and submit those to all jurisdictional agencies with transparency-protection copies to all related interested agencies and parties. They file "*Criminal case referrals*" and "*Demands For Arrest*" with the FBI. They file cases with the FEC, SEC, OSC, GAO, DOJ, FTC and Congressional Investigation Committees. They have the legal authority, and training, to citizen-arrest any corrupt party, at any time, and in any location, for remand to the FBI or State Police. They sue corrupt entities in large public-interest law suits. They conduct mole surveillance within corrupt organizations for the preparation of case materials. They monitor each corrupt person with the skill and exactitude of the NSA or CIA supported by millions of average citizens. They are one of the most novel and *effective* anti-corruption entities in the world. They always get their target!

ICIJ, ACLU, Transparency International, ProPublica, Reddit Users, Voat Users, Sunlight Foundation, Judicial Watch, Cause Of Action and hundreds of other organizations, and their members, have assisted in this investigation. Every member of the public is encouraged to learn forensic investigative techniques and technologies online and deeply monitor and investigate the suspects listed in this document.

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